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PREFACE.
THISnarrative, originally mitten to utilize the otherwise vacant hours of an Afgh6.n captivity, h a s been
long out of print, having Been ~vithdrawnf r o m publication by the author, with a view to subsequent revision
and reprtblication, should opportunity offer. But
amid the vicissitudes of an Indian career, n e w duties
and more attractive subjects gradually w i t h d r e ~ vhis
thoughts from the saddening reminisceuces of the
KA3ul catastrophe. Meanwhile the public mind seemed
to have grown weary of thc matter, and the cotemporary journal of the author's distinguished fellowcaptive, Lady Sale, seemed amply sufiicient t o supply
whatever popular appetite might still s u r v i v e for so
plentiful a ('supper of horrors."
But now that history seems to be to s o m e extent repeating itself, and with a new Afgh&nwar actually on
our hands, there has been naturally a g e n e r a l rush to
the book-ahelves in search of the dusty r e c o r d s of past
transactions and adventures beyond the Indus, a n d thus
the quondam captive of Akbar K h h finds himself, not
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without some reluctance, yielding to the newly
awakened populay impulse and to the pressure of the
times, and figuring, perhaps superfluously, as a "veteran
on the stage " in the evening of life.
The nawative was originally published simultaneously
with Lady Sale's volume, and passcd rapidly through
several editions before the writer himself had an opportunity of reading it in print. His supply of stationery
being scanty, the manuscript was crampcd into the
smallest possible space, and thus admitted of being
conveyed by stealth to General Polloclr.'s camp at
Jall6lBbtid. On one occasion a considerable portion
was lost in transit and had to be entirely re-w~itten,
no copy having been kept. After perusal by General
Pollock it was t r a n s m h d by;,him to Lord Ellenborough's private secreta~y, the late Sir I-Ienry
Durantl, and was then, at his Lordship's suggestion,
transmitted to the writer's Eamily in England with a
view to immediate publication.
I t may, in fact, be said to have supplied the British
public with the first regularly detailed accounts of
the British military and political operations at Kiibul
from the outbreak of the insurrection on the 2nd
November, 1841, to the final catastrophe in January,
1842. It was written under circumstances more
than usually favourable to ensure strict historic
fidelity; for, besides having been personally an eyewitness througliout, the author found himself in daily
1
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close proximity with many of the chicf survivors,
among whom were the unfortunate General himself
and his second in command, besides several members
of the military and political staff, I-Ie was thus in a
position to hear and to record much that would other
wise have been beyond his reach ; and, by a diligent and
careful comparison of their various statements and
experiences, as well as by access to the public documents in their possession, to combine the whole into a
faithful and, he hopes, impartial nanative, which has so
satisfactorily stood the crucial test of time as to be
deemed wortlly to be interwoven with the standard
histories of that memorable period.
I t has bcen consitlcred axlvisal~le,for thc benefit of
readers of the prescnt day, to prefix two preliminary
chapters, the first containing a brief description of
the geography and the inhabitants of Afghinisth,
derived partly from his own notes, but chiefly from
the best published sources available to him while
wintering in Italy.
The second chapter gives a retrospective summary
of the first Afgh6n war, and contains the substance
of a lecture delivered by the author at the Royal
United Service Institution in 2869. I t is to be hoped
the reader will thus be aided to a more complete understanding of the main narrative.
As a plain relation of facts, he has found but little
requiring suppression or alteration, but inasmuch as,
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in the fervid ardous of youth, some of his own commentaries on the acts of officers far his superiors in
ranlr, though 'made in fearless honesty of purpose,
do not altogether meet the approval of his maturer
judgment, and are, moreover, no longer needed to
instigate public inquiry, they have, in the present

!
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I t is hoped that the occasional omission of those
" youthful indiscretions " may not be found to detract
from the vital interest of the main narrative, and that
this revival of an " over-true tale" may be not without
its public use, even in the midst of present triumphs,
on account of the solemn warnings it conveys. The
valuable aid so generously afiorcled by the author's
friend Colonel Malleson in superintending this volume
through the press, in. the midst of his own pressing
literary avocations, demands an expression of more
than ordinary gratitude.
VINCENT
EYRE,
Major-Gene?-alllate Royal Artilles-y (Bengal).
Rome, lot Juauary 1879.
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THE KABUL INSURRECTION

CHAPTER I.
GEOGRAPHICAL
POSITION.
--The country n o w inhabited by t h e nulvcrous tribes known by the common
name of Afgh6ns may be briefly said to bc bounded on
the north a n d north-west by the stupendous mountain
range of Ilindfi-IChush, o r Indian Caucasus, on the
south by BiMchistAn and p a ~ tof Sindh, o n the east
by the g ~ e a river
t
Indus, and on the west b y the extensive desert tracts that border the Persian empire.
The difficulties of access that AfghBnistSin opposes,
on all sides t o an invading army, surrounded a s it is by
vasC tracts of mountain and desert, the former only to
be traversed by surmounting steep ridges and threading

1
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narrow defiles where a Few hundreds of well armed and
resolute men
effectually oppose the passage of as
many thousands, entitle it to be considered, in a milit a r y sense, as one of the strongest countries in the
whole worlcl, whilst the manly independence of its
hayay inhabitants, their sturdy valour, and their skill
in t h e use of weapons of war, t o vhich they are trained
f~om
eaxly boyhood, combine t o render them fa-from
despicable opponents, especially on their own gro~mcl,
f o r even the disciplined warriors of Europe.
c ~ ~ ~ n s . - T hchief
e
cities of AfgliBnistBn a ~ Kribul,
e
Ghazni, Kandah&r, I-Iiriit, Jall.515b6d, and Pesh&war,
each situated in a fertile m d well-watered valley, enclosed more or less by lofty hills, and Eortified i n the
usud oriental stylc with high walls, either of mud,
stone, or brick, with round or polygonal flanking
towers. Peshiiwar became a Sikh possession i n 1823,
and has formed part of the British Indian dominions
since 1849.
~~UNTAINS.-!&~
three principal mountain ranges,
f r o m which innumerable branches diverge in all directions, are those of Hindii-IChush, Safaid Koh, and
Sulaim6n. The first, under which I include the great
Paropamisan chain which forms the northern barricr
extending. from east to west, is a continuation of thc
great Himdayan range of northern Inclia, the last 01'
whose long line of giant snow-clad pcalcs, the Koh-iSoha, rears its hoary head about seventy miles t o thc

G;BOGRAPHICAL AND DE SCRIPTIYE.

:11 armed and
passage of as
ed, in a miliutries in the
ldence of its
~d their sltill
:y are trained
,em far from
own gro~md,
)e.

tin are IGbul,
nd Pesh&war,
red valley, enortified in the
ither of mud,
onal flanking.
~ssionin 1823,
ian dominions

~untainranges,
ge in all direcBid Icoh, and
:lude the great
wthern barrier
uation of thc
bia, the last of
hlcs, the Kah-imiles to thu

ty

3

north-west oE IGibul. Its height is eighteen thousand
feet above tlie sea. Thence to its termination in the
vicinity of Hiritt this procligious rampart of mountains
loses much of its sublimity. Tlle race of people called
Hazitras are dispersed among its valleys, where they
have been settled from time immemorial.
The STJFAIDKoa, or great ('White lMountainJJ range,
whose culminating snow-clad peak attains an elevation
of iiftecn thousand six hundred and twenty-two feet,
stretches from east to west, between the Ichaibar hills
and Ghazni, like a stupendous impassable barrier,
whose minimum height is said to be twelve thousand
five li~~ncbecl
feet, and f ~ o mvhose long uniform ridge
are thrown off an iilfiility of spurs on either flanlc to
north ancl sonth. At intervals along its conrse it sends
fortli long mountail~ous ramifications in a soutl~erly
di~ectiontowards Bil15chist611, and gives rise to several
rivers, including ille Arghandcib (a i'eeder OF the Ilelmancl), flowing west towards Ihndahk; the Kci6ul
river, flowing llortll towards the capital 2nd thence
turning eastward to Peshdmar ; the Kzwam and Gomd2
rivers, flowing south and east through tlie famous
valleys slnrl passes so named, to mingle their respective.
waters with those of the grcat river Intlus in the vicinity
of Isalcbel and DerA Ismitil K115n.
The S U L A ~ ~ Irange
A N runs in a direction nearly
p ~ a l l e ltvith the Indns and pellpendicad;~rto that of
Sufaicl Icoli. Its lugliest peak, thc TaIrht-i-Sulaimlin,

l *
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or <'Throne of Solomon," is eleven thousancl five hundred feet above the sea, and the average lieigl~t of the
whole range is about equal to thxt of tlle I'yrenecs.
The valleys encloscd within these vast inomlta~ii~.
ranges, ancl their numelpous ramificatioris, a1.c peopled
by almost as many distinct tribes, eac:li govcruc(l. in a
great rncasure by its own siml)le laws r i ~ i r l cilstonis : of
tlieae a brief account \rill be given f~on.1t l ~ cl~ctstsourcns
available.
PASSES.--Therearc four principal roiltcs avni1al)lc for
military pwposes and gcr~eraltrnific bot;n~c:oiiI i ~ ( l iaild
:~
ASgl~Bnistbnfrom :;long the liilc of our Tllrlll'i fi'oliticr,
between Peshkwai. in t l ~ ciioiltlt ~ L I1101.i
I ~ ill
SOU~~L.
Tllese are lrnoml as tllc I<ltaibar, 111~ 1<11i.:uii, tllc
Gomkl, and the Bollill pnsscs.
Tllc direct route from Peslikwn~to I<;il)ul lies tl~rough
the Ichaibar pass, ovcr a total tlistul~cc ol' ollc 111~iicli'cd
and ninety miles. T l ~ cpass itself' is tl~irty-tl~~.c~c:
iililes
long, and is ilefeiicle(1, nt n distance of ciglit ruil(:s Crom
its castern ei~trancc,I)y tlic l ' o ~ of
t illi RTns,jitl. Sixtyseven miles beyoiltl thnt is t11o wallrd towu :~n(lfcrtilo,
valley of Jallhl;il)bd, al)oul onc tliousailil 11ilic Inuidred
and sixty-four feet abovc tlic RC:~. Tllc~i~cc~
tu 1C;i111~l
the route l)i70sents :L ~oliti~iuo11s
soiaiebs of' ;iscc:ilts all(1
01' tedious and tliaicult passes; tliosc c!lli~lilyrvorthy of
motition being Ganddrr~uk,Jc~gdnllak,~ Z ' Z ~ IILa, l t liotl~l,
2~11dICILUT~
I<iBul, tlie latter only tell niilw fro111Rlillul
itselti and all liavc been tlic scenes of' cl(::~illy~truggles
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~ & h~ritish'forcesduring the first Afgh6n campaign,
\&h its series of successes, disasters, and final retribntive triuinphs.
The ICUILAM valley is entered at Thal, sixty-six milcs
from the British fortress of ICoh4t. A march of fifty
miles along the bank of the river leads to Kurarn fort,
a d sixty miles bcyond that is the Paiwnr pass, at a
height of eight thousand feet above the sea. Thence
to the summit of the Shatar Gardan pass, on the ridge
of the Sufaid Koh, the route lies between precipitous
peaks and over lugged spurs of a most formidable character, if defended by a slrilful and resolute enemy.
The descent t o thc valley of the Logar on the northern
side is of a similar character, and leads eventually
through a comparatively easy route to Kkbul.
The GOMALpass penetrates the SulnimBn range
about sixteen miles west of 'rink, through a narrow
defile, with a continuous ascent to Kotal-i-Sarmand,
sevcn thousand five hunclred feet above the sea, one
hundred and forty-five miles by road. Thence f allowing
the course of the river another easy pass leads to tlie
final ascent of the crest of a steep mountain range,
beyond which the city of Ghazni is reached.
This route has been followed during many centuries
by the mercantile clan known as Povindahs, in their
annual journeys to and fiom India with merchanclise,
and who boldly encounter considerable peril from the
robber tribes that persistently beset their path through

6
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the passes, obliging them to fight their way with loss of
life' and property, and yet still adhere to their favourite
time-honourecl route.
The Bol6n pass has its entrance near the town of
DStdar, seven hunclred and forty-two miles above the
~
sea, and five l~undredmiles south of the I i f ~ u i b apass.
There is a continuous ascent through the EEI6ld inountains for sixty miles to the crest of thc p:~ss, which is
five thousand eight l~unclrerlfeet above tlYc se:~, anrl
thence to Qetta, which bas an elevation of five tllousancl
five hundred ancl forty feet. The Boliri river flows
th~ougllthe greater portion of the pass. The last three
miles are very contracted, between towering precipitous
QETTA has lately become an advailced British
frontier post, and is distant one lmnclred and fifty miles
from KandahBr; to rcach which it is necessary to
traverse the Pishin valley ancl the lofty IChojalc pass,
which reaches ah elevation of seven thousanrl f o u ~hundred and fifty feet ; whencc to the plain of ICandahk
there is a long descent of four thousand fcet.
CLIMATE.-Thesuperior coolness and salubrity of the
climate in most parts of Afghcmistiin woulcl appear t o
be due less to the differences of latitudc than of elevation. Thc following table exhibits the compailative
heights of the principal places on the two grand roufes
lately travellecl by owr armies, an& as a gcueral rule,
the climate may be said to improve in proportion to
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the incrcase of altitude. ( I derive the heights here
given from Major Hough's .iraluable n a ~ r a t i ~ofe the
march and operations of the army of the Indus.)
Above the sea.

XBbul

. . .

6,247

,,

Al~ovethe sea.

p; *.

LIGazni

.

.

. 7,726 ,,

At Peshiwar and Jall&lrib'acl the summer heat, though
less intense than in India, is still dreadlully oppressive
and unfavourable iu its offccts on the European constitution. On the K6bul route thc temperate climate
begins at Gand&mal<, beyond which snow usually
covers tho ground during the raiclde of winter, when
few travellers expose themselves voluntarily to the
rislrs and inconveniences of the road. On the route
from ShikS;rl~urt o Randahsr the Bo16n pass forms a
similar boundary between the hot and cold climates ;
DBclar, which lies on the south side, being insufferably
hot, whilst the splendid valley of Shawl, a t the northern
extremity, enjoys a delightfully cool and healthy tamperature. The I a o j a k pass, through which lies the
direct line of communication between Qettah and
Randahk, being blocked up By snow during minter, all
traffic along that route is suspended. Nevertheless,
the rigorous winters for which ICdbul and Ghazni are

so notorious are unlrnowri at ICaizdahk, where snow
seldom falls, and whcrc an army can with ease keep
the field throughout the year. Snow begins to cover
the hills afouncl ICiibul abont tlie beginning of October,
but seldom visits tlie plain beibrc December, when it
acc~imulatesfast up011 the grouizd until thc end ol'
January or miclclle of J?cbruaily, llrom ~ v l ~ i ~c le~r i o dto
the end of April rain 1211s in great ab~tndance. The
remainder of the year is dry.
TRIBES.-Tlic 131-incipnl Afglihli tribes, of whom it i a
desirable to give some account in this worlr, are comprised in four great divisions, viz. :1. The Abcltilis, or DdriLniu.
2. The Glialzis.
3. Tlie Birdfirhnis.
4. The ICaulrars.
The two first are clistiibutctl ovcr that portion of
AfgliinistAn wliich lics west of the Sulaimlin range,
whilst the two last occupy tlie lcss civilized tracts on
the opposite side of it.
DURANIS.-The Abdrilis, or Dfirhnis, as tliey are
more commoiily designated, are divided into iiine great
clans, of which tllc lour principal are the lJopalzis,
Alakhzis, Buurikzis, and Achikcis. Tlie~cagain are
subdivided into Khuils, or families, of mliich by far the
most eminent is that of tlic S a d k i s , a, brandl of
the Popalzis, which, from a very remote period, h w ~
becn regnrdcd as the hcatl of all the Ddrinis.
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Prom this distinguished stoclr sprang the celebrated
Ahmad ShQi, the founder of the DLirBni monarchy,
by whose talents, energy, ancl pruclence, t h e A.fgbin
nation Nas for the first time united under a native
Icing, and whose grandson, ShAh ' ~ h u j i i - u l - ~ u l was
k,
destined, a century later, to become a tool in the
liands of European politicians, and to experience some
of the most extraordinary reverses of fortune that are
recorded i n the annals of the world.
The whole D6rhni population is conjectured to fall
little short of one million souls.
Tlie LhBns, or chiefs, hold their lands by military
tenure, originally granted by their Persian conqueror,
NBdir Shilh, on the express stipulation that they
shoilld furnish a horseman for every plough, the performance of mhich engagement has been exacted as
rigidly as circumstances mould admit by every subsequent occupant of the throne. Under the Sad6zi
dynasty all the p e a t offices of state weye monopolized
by chiefs of the Dhirbni tribe, who having been
nlainly instrumcntd in tlie original constitution of the
empire, and being bound by the ties of clanship to
their monarch, mere llnturally considered to have a
primary claim t o honorary rewards and courtly distinctions. Each of the great DLirknni clans has, or
had, its owrl Sirdkr, or commander chosen by the king
out of the head family, the S i r d k in his turn appointing some of the leading Ichiins to the chief civil and
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military control of each ulzis, or subdivision of a
clm.
The administration of justice in crimi~laland civil
cases is not, however, except in lwgc towns and cities,
entrusted to any olic iiidividu,zl, but has, from time
immemorial, been vcsted in a jiry(4, or council, coinposed, in tlie morc important cascs, of tllc lrh;ins,
eldcrs, and mull{~sof thc ncigl~bourliood;but minor
offences and disputes are scttlcd by village jityas,
elected by the peoplc themsclvcs.
This primitive system of jndicature is not peculiar
to thc D6rdnis, but is coiumon to all thc AfgLLn
tribes.
The title of K7~dnwas held, undcr the monai-chy, by
a patent from the king, but is l~estomedby gciieral
courtesy on the petty chiefs of cach sinall community.
Every such titular khlin invariably rcsidcs i11 his own.
little fort, or castle, commonly built in a square form,
~ d about twelve fcet tlliclr at the base
with high m ~ walls
and tapering to tho same number of incl~csat thc top,
having numerous loopholes for muslrctry, and flanlicil
at each angle by substantial towcrs or bastious. These
forts, scattered far and wide over the facc of thc hole
c6mtry1 each having its littlc orchard attacbcd, anti
surrounded by vcrdant fields of cultivation, with perchance a gushing rivulet shaded by t11c willow, poplar,
and oleaster, in gracefnl groups, form one of the rnovt
pleasing characteristics of Afglibn sccnery.
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The DdrAnis, like the majority of ATghfin tribe8,
are dividecl into agricultural and pastoral classes, the
former having their fixed places of resicicnce, and the
latter dwelling a l t o g e t h ~i~n tents, with whicli they
form large camps and move about with thcir I-locks and
Iierds to find pasture. The Achibis are almosl; mliolly
pastoral, and posscss a large portion of the mountain
range of KhojA Amv&m as wcll as of thc ncighbouring
plains. Tliey are greatly addictcd to plundel; and are
thc least civilized of all tllc Dfir;inis ; yct as soldiers
they rank high, mcl their SirdBrs have gcl~orallyexec
cised a more than ordinary share of influcncc in the
country.
aach Ddriini village has its mulls', or Muhammadan teacher, by whom the offices of religion are performed. Considel7able attention and regulwity is
evinced by thc commonalty in offering up their
daily stated prayers. I-Iospitality is onc of the most
plcasing traits in tlie popular cllaracter, cvcry
straager being secure of .a ready welcomc to such
entertainment as they can provide.
To these
rernaiqlrs the Acl~ikzis form a solitary exception,
being alike careless of the rites of hospitality a11d of
religion.
The personal appezradce of the Dh4nis is manly
and prepossessing, their features are generally well
forded and strongly definecl, and their manners are
selclom otherwise than franlr, social, and filiendly in

1
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the extreme. The conversation of the upper orclcrs is
animated, intelligent, and frcc horn
often i~einarkal~l~
prejudice and bigotry, a freedom which constitutes
them, on the whole, very agreeable companioxis. Tliese
excellent traits are somewhat connterbnlnncccl by thc
~rices common, in a greater or less degrce, to all
Asiatics, among the most prominent of wlliclz may be
enumerated avarice, duplicity, sensuality, meanness,
and revenge, but in these, as in ~nost other respects,
they exhibit a manifest superiority to a11 otller A f g h h ~
tribes, by whom they arc i n conscqucnce regarded with
a proportionate degree of respect.
GHALZIS.-T~~
Ghalzis next claim our attention.
They were formerly the most powerlul, arid are still the
most numerous, of d l the Afg1i;in tribcs. Tllcir name
is supposed to indicate a Turltish origin, but tllcir scttlement in AfghAnistiLn is referrccl to a very rcrrlotc
period, and their military polvcr and promcvs arc rccordecl by some of the earlicvt Mu1iammad:m writcr.r.
I n the early invasions of India by the Afghhns thcy
took a prominent part, b u t tl~cirfaale rcaclicil its
climax by their conquest of Pcrvin carly in tho l m t
century, over which country, after having ilcfcatcd in
succession the armies of tlie Ottonia~iempire, tllcy
established their dominio~l undcr tllrce consceutive
kings.
The last of these Ghalzi rnonal*chswas driven from
his throne by Nridir ShBI1, thcn in ihc nioriling of his
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famc, though not without a prolonged and dcsllerate
resistance on t h e part of the former.
With him t h e power of the Glialeis cxl~i~cd,
but tllcy
nevertheless maintained a fiercc and obstirlntc struggle
for their liberties in hfg.hiilist$n on tlic invasion of
that country b y the same ambitious warrior. Tl~cir
defence of ICundah&r lastcd for eightccn ~r~ontlis,
;mrl
was only terminated by a desperate but unsucc~csslul
sortie, in which great nuulrlbers wcrc slain. Their
ascendancy receivcd its final blow 1)y tlic risc of tIic
rival tribe of DLil.:inis to supreme powcr undcr ii11nl:~d
Sh6h.
The rernembmnce of their supcrsc~sion still c~iibitters the minds of tllc C+llnlzinoblcs,nrl~orc'gn~.tltllr*ir
success~nlrivals will1 undisgniscd jci~lousy:uitl tlislilrc:,
although in some of thc Icnding Cnrnilics or t.11~l ) ~ ~ o h ( ~ ~ i t
day thcsc inimical fccliligs 11nvc hccn iiulicl~;~l):1~1~1
juclicious iaterrnan,iages, Tlic Gl~nldcllicfs rst*l-ceisc
but little influevcc or authority in tlicir om11 t~~iljcs
beyond the circle of their own irnmec1i:~tcdl~pcr~(lal~ts.
In this respect their position diiFers Prom t l ~ ol'
t illc
Diirhni nobles, wlio clerivcd adi1ition:ll powers J'i'orn
the crown, t h e stability of mllich inust hoacvc:~.ill
great measurc depend on thc m:iiiitenazic!c of :L scbttlctl
government in the country. Urlilcr tllc monnrc+~y
s DlirLni governor was al)poi~ltcil1)y thc! kirlCr over
the whole Ghalzi tribc, in wl~ornautllority mas vcstctl
for the management of tlic rcvcnue, t11c ~ n : ~ i r l t . ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ( ! ~ :
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of troops, and the administration of justice in all cases
requiring his inteySerence.
Uncle? such a system the influence of the Ghalzi
kh&ns graclnally declined, the people becoming accustorncti to act indepenclently of them, and referring
almost every dispute to the villagejirga.
The absence of any minor local controlling autho. rities rcnders blood feuds of common occurrence, both
between private individuals and whole communities.
Thc Gbalzis to the west of Ghazni conform more
nearly to the D6rinis i n their general habits than
those to the east of that city." They are, taken as a
mhole, a brave, hardy, warlike, and handsome race,
simple ancl frugal in their fare, possessing great bodily
strength, stcrn, violent, vinclictive, impatient of control, intelligent, energetic, and ever ready to unitc
under their own chiefs against a coinmon foe or in a
popular cause.
Though all are either husbandmen or shepherds, yet
every man can, on emergency, at once transform himself into a solclier. They are more ignorant and barbarons than the Dbr&nis, al;td possess a large share of
their virtues ancl vices in common.
Uncler the restraining and improving influence of a
strong and civilized government they might probably
be transformed into valuable subjects, but there seems
little likeliliood of any such desirable metamorphosis
at present. The following table exhibits the distribu-
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tion, numbers, ancl occuq,ations of the diffLrent diviions of the tribe :-
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Sooth of Ma- Ohiofly rollo~vagxicultnro and .
bilr rnuge.
com~no~ce,
bot live much in
Qnltit -i Gbnhl, tents aud feed flocks.
valley of Taun61r, nnll hill
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East ai~du o r t l ~ viz. :-Ahmndsls
oE Ghazui.

in AlthmSr

pastord.

and Spaiza, auj. nre
Sthizls, uorth of Ghnznl;
a~iltur~~l.

mail and Isluailzis
south and east of ~ h a z u i :
Uud pn1.b of Znrmnt; agriculhird nucl ~nstoml.
Plain of Z u m ~ bApic~fituml.
F u ~ h m 6 1 ~ancl Ag~ionltwtdnud psstoral.
alsnr

mm7vIir.

Sl~ilghs~
Agriwltuwd.
~ u k h a n c i l l & g i -A&~ic111tunl
mud l~astoral.
bourhood.
Hills between Agric~dtmaland pastel-d,
Goin61 river

f31irL11.

ruge.

6,000 l?al't of Koh-DL- d & ~ i ~ l d tand
l~~
11aatoral.
td
lnhn and dong
bank of K6bul
river.

B ~ n ~ u n ~ ~ r s . - T Bivdzirawi
he
tribes are next to
be considered. Thcy are strictly an agricultural
people, and inhabit the hills and plains east and north
of the Sulaimiin Lnange, extending &om thc foot of the
Indian Caucasas to thc latitude oE Dera Ismdl K h h ,
and including every imaginable variety of climate
the bleak, wintry, and scarcely habitable regions of

perennial snow, t o thc etlually uncom~ortablc cstrenlc
of exccsaivc heat.
The only clans requiring particular ulcntion licre
n1.e tllc Yu'sztSzis and tllc IUu~iburis,thc I'ornlcr inhabiting the mountaills and vallcys north ol' Pcs2iGw;1r,
ancl thc lattcr tllc liilly regions 011 tlic right 1~:~lllcof
i ~ l cI(;ib~ll rivcr 1)ctwccn J:lll:il;il):id tultl tllo Indns,
Soutli ol' tllcsc arc the l</ulltaks, 13(io~!y(/rrshits, Ttiris,
and W ( ~ z f ~ togctllor
is,
wit11 tlir: mllizrrol1.s c1:ill.s of
I)tinzli.nz, which I:~ttc~.
:LIT csol~sitlarc!tl nltogctllcr distinct from tlic BircZtirri~~is.To t l ~ clcl't 01' tllc IC:il~ul
river are tllc Moj~ztolcls and l'ccrkrilti~is~,tho lattcr
l ~ ~ ~thc~ c ~ u ~~ i t c:tlIril
sl ~ iy ~73(v1ir.
g
Y u s u ~ ~ z ~ s . - ~ l p l i i ncstiin:rtc:s
~ t ~ ~ ~ ~tllo
c IrLiisrrS,-i pol~ulation at sevcn In~nilrcil tl~tms:ti~ilsorrls. Tllcly arc
the most vicious :ulil I):l~.ljn~olrsol' all tllc ~lfgll:ins,
and bcing pcrpctunlly crig:::lgotl i l l intc~stillcsilbilc, arc
in n statc but littlc i8cmovcd I'ro~ii :ui:~rcl~y,I~looil
feuds being so numerous t11:~ttl~c~rc::u*r I'c\r vil1:lgcs
whencc t l ~ cIlusbandm:u~ ( l a w to vcuturo fOl.tll to
plough and sow i~~liwn~cil
wit11 llis s\rortl and rifIo,
The collcction 01: rcvcnuc I):IS g~1ic~rally
1)c(111I'CJI~ILC~
iin~~racticablc.Yct, s~lllli: ~ st11c.y r1rc: ill tllc vcry tli.l)tlis
of' dc~wwity,in 110 pal-t of AfgI~:inistLr~
:llBc:tlla ooi,\r:vrl
observances of the M~tll:~l~inlnil:~rl
rcligiol~ so stluic.tly
ol~scrvcdand intulcn~nccso lu~ll:q~pily
prcv:~lr:ilt.
Tlic Siklis, cluring thcil. rulu in tlic P:lnj:il~,fouuil tllc
Ydszfzis to bc bravc and fonnid:hlo opl)oncnts, ~ ~ c i i -
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:ular mention I ~ c P ~
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thc right banlc of
iicl and t h d IUL~ILS.
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dering the continued presence of a large force at and
around Peshkwar necessary to inspire dread and enforce
submission. I may add that the Ytlsufzi solrliers who
were enlistecl in the British service during our first
campaign in MghAnistrin, l~erformed excellent and
faithful service on various occasions under Captain
Ferris and other English officers.
ICHAI~ARIS.
-Thc I<haihari tribes are so called
h o r n inhabiting the IChaibar mountains, separating the
valley of PesllBwar from that of Jalldkb6d.
This range, in fact, forms the north-eastern barrier
of Alghzinistbn, tlzrough mhose stupendous defiles the
tide of invasion mas wont to pour its predatory hordes
of hardy warriors from the north-west into the rich
and Iertile plains of I-Iindtlsth. The Ichaibaris,
firmly established as the acknowledged guardians of
this important thoroughfare, have not failed to reap
every possible advantage Prom their position by
levying a heavy toll on every traveller, born the invacling conqueror at {he head of his armed hosts down
to the solitary and peaceful wayfarer venturing
with his little stock of merchandize to a distant
market.
Besides the toll levied on travellers, the Khaibaris
have lor many generations past received an annual
stipend from thc ruler of KAbd for the benefits derived
Prom an open roacl for commerce.
The three ~ r i n c i p d clans are the Afii(lis, the
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Sltainwaris, and the Urakzis, riumbcring altogether
about twclve thousancl sonls.
They are estccmcd cscellclit nlarksrlicli -cvith tlie
Afgh&lljnzail, or rifle, whicli Ilns a n iisor1 or lvooden
projection at tlie cud of tlic l)nn*cl, wlticl~t l ~ c grcxt on
the ground, n~irltlius takc ste;rtly a ~ i dclli:c~Lt~al
nitn at a
distallce of eight Ilutitl~~tl
y:~~'dtc. ' l ' l ~ ':KC
~ proverbially fnitlilcss in tl~cil*
cngng~:mcnts,1)cilig co~lstantly
tenil~tcd by tllc 11011~ of ~~lmltlor,
to nttncli l~articu
wliosc sai'ety t1icy lli~vcl ) r ~ v i o ~ l ~g11:~1':11itl!(:d.
Iy

'I'11esepeople :Ire bnrl~nrituisof n rudr: ~r;~tri:trc*hul
type
-without any govcrumcrlt bcyontl tlic! "jirgas," or
ally rcligio~lbeyond
Councils of Elders, and ~vitlio~it
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cring altogether

the worst form of Muhammadanism. Blood for blood,
and fire and sword against ill infidels, are their ruling
ideas. They are priest-riclden, sensual, ava~icious,and
prcdatory ; faithless, also, and bloodthirsty. Each
tribe and section of a tribe has its internecine wars,
each family its hereditary blood feuds, and each individual his personal foes. Consequently they are
always armed, cven while grazing cattle, driving beasts
of burden, or tilling the soil. They will undertake
military service, but are impatient of discipline,
and are true to'their salt unless led away by fanaticism.
The task of establishing friendly relatiolls with tribes
so fickle ancl treacherous is one of extreme difficultyfriendship with one tribe is apt to be enmity with
another; ancl treaties ratified one clay are repudiated
the next. Nothing unites them but a common danger,
and a common jealousy of the intrusion of strangers.
These tribes always resisted Sikh rule, under which
such heavy dutics were levied as to reduce trade to the
lowest ebb, and heavy revenue was demanded from
those tribes within the Sikh border.
Conciliatory measures have been adopted under
British rule, ttlansit duties have been abolished, taxation reduced, and fricndly relations cultivated.
The border Pathins me freely adrnittcd into the public
service, military, police, or civil. Charitable dispensaries have been established all along the borrler. open,
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~
cargoc9 aggrcgating two hu~~rlrcd
m ~ dsisty-ii\lc tliol~s:~iid
I ~ : L I I I ~ill
~~S
1855, to more tl~nrit l ~ r c ctllousa~ltl1)o:lts with lienrly
one million and :L cjualstcriziauulds in I HCiEi-GC,.
Mcrcailtilc f:~ir.uarc n l ~ o l to
~ t he ostill~lishcdat Pcelih~varand Dcr:~Isinail R11511. Thc! stncly of I'uslltfi
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highly-cultivated valleys. Though more rude and
ignorant-, they are far less turbulent than other
AfghAns, but owing to their remote position they
are dso less lrnown and appreciated; nor are they
of sufficient importance, in a political or military
view, to require a more lengthened notice in this
worlr
To the four great tribes alrcady described the conimon name of Afgl~iinstrictly appertains, but besides
these Afghfinisixin has othcr inhabitants, of an origin
altogethey distinct, 01whom it is expedient to give a
separate account. The most important of these are
the Tdjilcs and the Euzci~as.
T6jiIcs.-The
Tiijilrs, though now forming a part
and parcel of the Afghiin nation, were formerly a distinct people, and are supposed by Mr. Elphinstone to
be descended from those Arabian soldiers of the
t
of lX~&ammadanism,
Prophet who, in the f i ~ s century
after overrunning the whole of Persia and T6rkisttill,
and propagating their faith by force of arms in those
countries, carried the mar into AEghjnistiin, where
they obtained possession of the plains, but the inhnbitants subsequently, collecting their forces in the
mountains and descending upon their invader^, par-?
tially reduced them to a state of dependence horn
which they have never since emerged.
These are now mixed up mith the Afghfin ~opulation, to whom they have become in most respects

.

assimilated, and 116th whom they Frequently intermarry.
They possess but little landcd property, and reside
principally in the neighbourhood of the large towns,
where they employ themselves in manufactures or
trade, or as servants to Afghhn masters. They are
usually denominated Pn'rsiw(i?as.
1ioAistrinis.-Of
those TCljilcs who retained their
indepenclence and lander1 possessions, the people now
called Ko?uistn'nis are the modern representatives.
These differ widely from their subjugated brethren,
ancl possess the strong, fertile, and extcilsive province
of I<oiristhn, to the north. of ICCLbul, comprising 'the
valleys oE Panjshb., Gi~urhand, and N j ~ u ' o . The
I<ohisttini population has been estilnatcd at forty
thousand. The principal town is Istitif, situated at the
base of the Ghurband mountains, and uizsurpassed in
picturesque beauty.
The houses being built on the slope of a hill, and
rising in a succession of ii*regulnr terraces, onc above
another, form an imposing spectacle, the bcauty and
grandeur of which is greatly augmented by the innumerable orchards and vineyards that culivcn the surrounding laudscape, arid the mng~lificcnt snow-clad
peaks of I-Iindd-Ichush, with its mountaiuous progeny spreading their mazy braaches far and wide,
toweling i n the rear and perfecting a picture that hhaa
but few pai~allelsin nature. Istdif is celebrated for
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the superior excellence of i t s fluit, but more especiaIly
oi its grapes, which are grown in prodigious abundance, and in size, flavour, and variety aye perhaps
equal to any in the world. Apples, pears, peaches,
apricots, phlms, cherries, and other Xuropean fruits,
grow in the greatest profusion, but the mulberry tree
is more extensively planted than any other, the dried
fruit being ground into flour and converted into bread,
which forms a cheap and wholesome article of food for
the common people. The ICohistBnis are rude,
violent, and contentions, their chief delight being in
war. They are v6rl.y efficient as infantry, especially in
mountain warfare, and can take the field in large
l~odies, at the shortest notice, subsisting for weeks
together on dried mulberries alone, of which each
soldier carries a bagful. The people are more completely under the control of their khkns than is the
case with any of the tril~esbefore noticed.
They axe regarded by their neighbours with mingled
Feelings of drearl, distrust, and aversion. They have
generally resisted every attempt to render them tlibutary to the lC6bul rulers, and have always enjoyed a
considerable degree of independence.
Hazliras .-The Bazci7.a~inhabit the Paropamisan
mountains between Hiriit and Khbul, and though formerly composing but one people have long been
divided by religious schism into two sects or branches,
the Sunis and the Shiahs, the former occupying the
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western, and the latter the eastern, hall: of theirb wild
and rugged country. The Suni I-Iazhras are usually
called Airn&Jcs,whilst t h e SJ~iahbrancll alone retains
the name of Hazciras.
Their square Tritnr features sufficiently distinguish
them froin thc Afghiins, independent of their Inany
essential differences in othcr rcspectu. The Aima'ks
dwell almost wholly i n tents, feeding fIoclts anrl cultivating the few arable strips 01 land that nature has
allotted them. Their chiefs possess many strongholds
in the most inaccessible parts 0-E thc mountains, and
exercise an al~nost despotic sway ovcr their own
tribes.
The IZazliras dwell i n open villagcs defcildcd by
high towers, and the cliicfs in small 101%~.Tlieir
country is inore ruggerl and bnrrczi, and its clirnate
more inclement, than that of the Aim:iltn. Thcy a r e
slmrle, good l~urnourerl, and social~lc,but hot tempered, and, when their eninity is arousccl, a t once stubborn, fierce, and revengeful. Thcy are consta~ltly
engagcd in strife, either amongst tllcmsclvcv oy against
the Aim&lcs, U~begs, and Afghbns, sturdily resisting
t h e payment of tributc t o the IChl~ulgovcrnnient whenever opportunity oBers. I n religion tlicy are zealously
attaclled to their own sect, and uncompromising in
their hatred of all Sunis. Thcir chiefs arc, with a
few exceptions, equally despotic as thosc of their
Aim& brethyen.
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Iiazi1hdshis.-I next proceed to notice the principal
foreign settlers whose numbers, wealth, and influence,
entitle them to distinct consideration.
Foremost
among these are the Iiazilbdsl~is,or Persian colonists,
who emigrated from their own country i n the time of
Nadir ShSh, and of whom not less than twelve thousand dwell in the city of ICSLbul alone, whcre they
occupy a fortified quarter called the Chanclaul. They
have smaller settlements in the towns of Kandahiir and
Hirtit, and lime obtained several small grants of land
in various other parts of the country.
Many of the chiefs held situations of trust and importance under the Dfiiini monarchs.
Amid the Prequent struggles for the empire that
have distracted the land after the death of Ahmad
ShBh, their usual policy has been to maintain an armed
neutrality, cautiously abstaining from joining either
party until the issue of the struggle seemed no longer
doubtful, when they of coilrse declared in Eavour of
the strongest. But although politically timid, they are
personally brdve, and, being able to muster a strong
force in the field, they are always certain of being wclcomed as acceptable auxiliaries to whichever party they
attach themselves.
The sectarian differences in religion between them
and the AfghAns must ever prevent anything like
real cordiality on either side, the Kazilbislis being
Shiahs, like the Persians, whilst a11 the Afghans are
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Sunis in faith. The Kaaihiishis are vain and fond
of display. They usually dress well, and attend more
to domestic comfort and personal cleanliness than the
Afghins, who are very careless of such matters. They
also surpass thc latter in general refinement and civilization, but are inferior to them in manly virtues and
in religious toleration.
Arabs.-The Arabs are the only other foreign settlers
of any importance. They arc computed at two thousand families, and a large portion of their number were
employed under the Diirtini monarchs to garrison
the BB&Hisk, or royal citadel, of I(ibu1.
Sh6.h ShujB, on his restoration t o the throne in
1839, enlisted several hundreds in his service, who
remained faithful to him amid his subsequent disasters.
Description of Kdbu1.-The city of Khbul has been
so often described that its principal features must be
already pretty familiar t o the majority of English
readers. The traveller who for the first time approaches it from the direction of Jall&l&b,bSd,after
having passed through the savage defiles and toiled
over the barren steeps that intervene, feels both relieved and delighted, on entering the plain of KBbul,
by the cheerful and picturesque aspect of the distant
city, closcried afar off in a gorge between two lofty
hills, up and along whose steep and rocky ridges is
discernible a long line of massive wall, with numerous
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half-ruined towers, once forming an imposing barrier
of clefencc against the sudclen and clevastating inroads
of the western tribes.
0
1
1 the left, OY eastern extremity, occupying alow
spur of hill and commanding the entire town, the BBfi
I-Iisgr, or citaclel, with its lofty stone walls, bulky bastions, and enclosed crowd of high-storied dwellings,
forms R striking object. The mountains of Pughrnh
ancl Eoh Dbmdn, covered with snow cluring two-thirds
of the ycar, form a magnificent background to the
scene. Green ficlcls of various kinds of grain and
clover, blossoming orchards, and small square forts,
are thiclrlg?interspersed over the adjacent plains, which,
howevei~, a1.e intersected on the eastern side by low
barren hills that somewhat injure the otlierwise rich
and extensive prospect. On the western side of the
city, and sepa~ateclfrom i t by the gorge through which
the I<&bulriver flows, is a most beautiful valley, varying in width from eight to twelve miles, encircled by a
succession of mountain ranges whose most distant '
summits reflect a clazslillg glare from their mhite
mantles of perennial snow. On the gentle slopes at
the base axe well-stocked orchards, cultivated terraces,
and villages embosomed in wood, whilst.; the plain
below presents to view one vast garden of lavish plenty
through which the river of Khlml and its tributary
streams pursue their winding courses, clistributing their
crystal waters, en route, among innumerable artificial

canals that diverge in all directions t o irrigate the
upland fields.
Castles, villages, orcl~ards,and plantations of poplar,
lvilloyJ and other trecs, are thiclcl~scattered over the
diversified landscape, thc vicw of wlrich from an
eminence ncnr Btibar's tomb descrvcdly coustitutes
one of the chief boasts of IC6bd. The city is very irregularly laid out, and, wit11 cxccption of t h e celebrated covered bazar ancl the tomb of Taimrir Shhh,
contained no public builclings at dl striking.* The
streets ase narrow, and the ~ O U S C Slofty with flat roofs.
To many of the bctter sort of privatc dwellings a
garden is attached. The largest portion of t h e city
stands on the right brink o% the river, t h e opposite side
being
lined with walled gardens ancl private
forts of the upper classes.
The covercd baznr consisted of five open squares
connected by foul. arcades, down tlie centre of which a
marble aqueduct conveyed a small ruilniilg stream.
The sides mere lined wit11 s h o p exliibiting a wealthy
display of home ancl foreign producc.
That which most excited a stranger's admiration was
the number of fruiterersJ sliops, wherc every variety of
tempting and delicious fxuit was piled u p in matchless
profusion.

*

Tlio former no longer oxists, hnving boor1 ciostroyod by General
Pollock in Oobobor, 1842,ns nn act of rolriBut,ivo vongeunoe for the
insult thoro offorod t o tho body of a British onvoy on the 23rd of
December, 1841,
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Crowds of busy merchants and lounging idlers, in
the various costumes of Asia, thronged this favourite
mart during the greater part of the day and night, excepting on Fridays, when the shops of all true believers
were shut and business suspended, whilst the inhabitants attendecl to their religious duties, or enjoyed
their diversions in the gardens and fields of the
snburbs. The garden that contains the tomb of the
Emperor 136bar was their usual place of resort on these
occasions, m d they could not possibly have selected a
more suitable spot. One of the strangest sights in
IC&l~ul
is that of thc lndics glicling about the crowded
streets enveloped from head to ftet in white sheets,
having a veiy small networlc in front of the eyes to
peep through. This ghostly costume affords the most
perfect concealmcnt to 110th face and figure, and has a
tcndency to excite a feeling of curiosity in all foreign
beholclcrs. That is, under the circumstances, very excusable, their reputation for beauty being amply sustained by the handsome features and rosy complexions
of their offspring. So impenetrable is the disguise of
this out-door dress, t h c fashion of which is never
varied, that it is impossible for a man to distinguish
his o m wife when he meets her abroad.
The facility thus afforded for intrigue may be easily
conccivecl, although it is probable that even the most
fertile imagination of an Englishman would fall short
of the reality.
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Tlie plains to the north and east of K6bu.l are l o w
and swampy in many places, being subject, during the
rainy months, t o inunclation from the river.
Much more might be written illustrative of a couuntry
and people that recent events have rendered so interesting to Englishmen, but I believe there is s c a r c e l y
anything of importance on these subjects that may not
be found most ably and adequately described in the
admirable work of the Hon. Mountst~~rtrt
Elphiustone,
the correctness of whose inforlnation has now been
fully tested, and in baldly a single instance impugned.
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CHAPTER 11.

P~REAP
noS Governor-Generd of India ever assumed

I

I

I

!
I

the reins of office with more benevolent inclinations
and more peaceable intentions than Lord Auclcland in
1836; yet, within less than two years, he plunged
headlong into a war to which, there is reason to believe,
he was all along secretly averse, and which has been
since stamped by universal public opinioll as the most
unjust, ill-aclvised, and unnecessary that had ever
engaged the energies of a British army, or risked the
honourable reputation of the British name throughout
the East.
I t is now a well-established fact that the initiative
in the Afghrin war was taken in opposition to the
opinion, and even in defiance of the protests, of the
Court of Directors, who were at that time the nominal
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trustees of India; and that a large share of the responsibility belongs to Her Majesty's Ministers in Eugland,
who, in common with Lord Auclrland's official advisers,
believed that the stability of our Indian empire was
being so seriously threatened by the warlilre operations
of Persia, secyetly influenced by Russian diplomacy in
Central Asia, as to rendcr it absolutely necessary for
the rulers ol India to arouse themselves to ward off the
impending danger by some outward demonstration of
power in that quartcr.
A new monarch had recently succeeded to the throne
of Persia, vhose partialities had betrayed tl-lemselves in
favour of a Rnssian alliance, in opposition to the interests of Great Britain, whose influence had heretofore
prevailed over all rivals at the Court of Tehrhn; and
among the earliest results of this change, was the determination to hurl a Persian army against the fortress of
I-IirBt, which had long been in possession of the Afghhns,
but to which an old claim on the part of Persia was
now conveniently revived.
A general belief prevailed among European and
Asiatic diplomatists of that peliod that the possession
of Hirzit by Persia must necessarily threaten not only
the safety of AfgGnistAn, but of the rich plains of the
PanjiLb (at that time in possession of thc great Silrh
rulcr Ranjit Singh) and of British India lying beyond.
Tlzereforc it was bnt natural that Afghrins, Siklis, and
Euglish should be anxious for some sort of alliance
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for purposes of mutual defence against a common
enemy.
But, when it is considered what large disciplined
forces might have been easily concentrated on any
threatened point of our Indian frontier, horn powerful
an army of friendy Sikhs at that time occupied the
Panjcib' and what formidable physical obstacles thc
intervening country presents a t all times to the march
of a large invading force, hampered with artillery,
commissa~iat,and other necessn1.y impedimenta, it is
difficult to account for the panic that so generally
prcvailed, on any othcr rational ground than a consciousness of solve weak and combustible points in
the heterogeneous fabric of our Indian cmpire, which
might cause it to collapse or explode suddenly and
disastrously on thc application of any sufficiently
exciting forces from without.
It is to be hoped that the interval of forty years
which has since elapsed has gradually placed our
moral and material hold of India upon a much sounder
basis than then existed,
At that time the chicf power in Afghhisthn was
i n the able hands of Dost Muhalnlnad IChcin, whose
capital was KSibul and three of whose brothers governed at ICandahcir. FIirSit itself was held as an independent principality by Shhh Khmrhn, a Bad6zi prince,
whose father and uncles once reigned over MghAnisttin,
betraying and supplanting each other by turns, until

3
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themselves betrayed and supplanted by the great
BSrakzi chiefs, whose power now predominated, and
whose elcler brother, Path Khjn, had long acted the
part of minister and king-maker, until at length
treacherously put to a cruel death by Shkh IChmr6nn,
against whoin Dost Muhammad and the other surviving
brothers of Fath IChkn accordingly cherished the
bitterest feelings of hatrcd and revenge.
To gratify this dire hostility, the 1Candah;ir brothers
were now willing to lend themselves to the designs of
Persia, not without hope of some benefit resulting to
themselves. But their grcat chieftain at KAbul, more
far-sighted and patriotic than they, had solcmdy cautioned them against the danger of incurring the cnmity
of the British, to the superior value of whose alliance
he was fully alive, although Russia was at that very
time bidding high for his adherence.
Matters mere in this unsatisfactory state when, in
September, 1837, Sir Alexander Burnes presented
himself before Dost Muhammad at ~ ~ b u as
i , the
accredited agent of thc Indian Government, on a sostyled commercialJJmission, the r e d ob ect of which
was, however, suficiently transparent.
The two men wcre already personally known to
each other ; Burnes having, about five years previously,
been most hospitably entertained by the KAbul chief
when passing through that city as a private traveller
en route to Europe; hcnce his reappearance at the
((
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present momentous crisis could not but be hailed as
a favourable omen of the friendly intentions of the
British Government, whose represeutative he no m was.
His reception was, accordingly, of the most cordial
and flattering description, and to all appearance he
had an easy game to play; and it is probable that had
he been allowed to arrange matters in his own way, all
clifficulties woulcl have been smoothcd over, and all
motive for hostilities removed.
The obvious policy of the British Government at
that pel-iod was to conciliate the goodwill of the Mgl16n
nation (of whom Dost Muhammdmas the aclinomledged
and populw de facto ruler), as the most effect;ive
barrier we could raise against present and future
innovations of the Western powers ; and this we had
now a glorious opportunity of effecting through the
timely instrumentality of Burnes, than whom no agent
could have been found so appositely qualified for such
a taslr, or more zealous to consummate so desirable a
result. '
Brit i t was not so to be I Lord Auckland and his
official advisers had, from the very first, conceived an
inveterate 'distrust of Dost Muhammad for the difficulties of whose position they failed t o make due
allowance, and whose many sterling qualities as a
~ d e they
r
equally failed to understand and appreciate.
In point of fact, they had meanwhile conceived a
favou~itepolicy of their own, entirely opposed to that
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so earnestly recommended by Bui-nes, and the result
was his summary recal from G b u l early in 1838, and
the -temporary triumph of Russian and Persian
interests in the councils of I<Abt~land I<andalibr.
A Persian army, with some Russian officers i n its
train, had mea~iwhile already laid siege to Iiiyit, and
d l India looked on in wonder and alarm at the eventful
drama enacting at lier distant portal in the north-east.
Fortunntely, few Asiatic powers undeystalld how to
conduct siege operations; and Persia, even with the
aid of Russian officers, and with its own monarch in
person
at the head of a sufficiently powerful army
and battering train, Iormed no exception to the rule.
The siege lingered on from November, 1837, until
September, 1838, affording ample time for intermediate
action on the part of the British.
The credit of this prolonged defcncc mas clue, in
an eminent degree, to the accidental presence within
the walls of Hirfit of a young British officer of the
Bombay Artillery, Eldred Pottinger by namc. His
~rofessional skill and personal energy were of the
utmost use in directing the defensive operations,
and keeping alive thc martid spirit 01 the garrison.
On more than onc occasion Che Afghsin commancler,
YCtr Muhammad (who was also ShBh I<hmrinJs prime
minister), was on the point of yielding to his assailants, but was shamed into a show, at least, of fresh
courage by the entreaties, reproaches, and even
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friendly violence of Pottinger, who would not suffer
him to retreat from the breach when retreat on his
part must have been the signal for general flight, but
literally dragged him forcibly again and again to the
front, until the enemy, in despair at the pertinacity
of resistance enco~mtered, retued discomfited and
crestfallen to their trenches.
According to the authority of Russian officers engaged in the siege, the ShGh of Persia's army amounted
to forty thousand men, with sixty guns ;and among the
former was a Russian battalion, which I understand
to have been composed of Russian refugees settled
in Fersia. Not content with eighteen-pounder m d
twenty-four-po~~nder
siege guns, the fire from which,
if properly concentrated ancl sustained, must have
speedily effected a practicable breach, the Persian
engineer entrusted with the siege operations established
a foundry in the midst of the camp, whercin four
monster seventy-pounder guns were cast, from whose
fire vast and immediate results were expected. Two
of these burst on trial, killing ~everalbystanders;
the other two stood the test better, and several days
werc then occupied in hewing stone balls of the required
calibre from the marble supplied by the monuments
of a neighbouring burial-place; and it may have Been
the periodical advcnt of these unfriendly, though
fortunately harmless visitors, which Pottinger likens in
his journal to the rr three shots a-day which the Spanish
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army before Gibraltar 'fired for some time, and which
the garrison called after ' The Trinity.' "
The garrison of Hir&t possessed very few pieces of
ordnance wherewith to return these boisterous compliments; but, happily for them, i t was not until five
months had elapsed that Persian self-conceit could
bring itself to take council from the Russian officers
by erecting regular breachiug batteries against particular points of the fortifications. The situation of
the defenders then became more critical, and Pottinger's professional abilities were called into constan

I

-I

The walls of NiriLt, as then existing, formed a large
quadrangle, enclosing a space of nearly one square mile,
being about one thousand six hundred yards long by one
thousand four hundred broad, each face having about
thirty round bastions; those at the four angles surpassing the rest in height and bulk ; a deep wet ditch,
having a fausse-braye, surrounding the whole. The
walls, which were from twenty-five to thirty feet high,
stood on an elevated mound of earth, varying from
forty to sixty feet above the level of the ground, and
were of unburnt brick. There were five gates, each
defended by a small outwork. On the north side stood
the citadel, overloolcing the city and enclosed by lofty
defences of a similar character, but i n a very dilapidated condition. The defenders of Hirht justly felt
more faith in their double fausse-braye than in their
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walls, which now began to crumble rapidly under the
concentrated fire of the enemy's round shot.
At length, on the 24th of June, the long-threatened assault took place, which was confidently
expected to carry all before it. The Persian astrologers, after closely consulting the stars, hacl predicted
a signal triumph for their monarch on that day. The
assaulting force was t o advance i n five divisions,
each under its own independent commander. The
Russian battalion formed the forlorn hope of one of
them; but its leader (General BorowsBi) was shot
down at the very first onset, and, by some accident,
the men composing it contrived to get under the fire
of the Persian batteries, in addition to the bullets
and missiles of the Afghhils, and were obliged to
beat a retreat, with a loss of four officers and two
hundred and fifty men killecl and wouncled. Better
success for some time seemcd in store for another of
the storming columns, which actuallypenetrated the defences, ea-rryingall before it, but being feebly supported
from behind, was again and again driven back, though
more than once on the very verge of victory, but was
as often baffled by the indomitable pluck of Eldred
Pottinger, who, when dl seemed lost, drove the fainthearted Ycih Muhammad beforc him to the rescue, as
already related. ltussian accounts do not hesitate to
give the young English officer full credit for the result,
so triumphant to the Afghgns, so humiliating to their
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opponents; and one of them adds, " Thc Sh&h was in
a violent rage at the failure, and gave orders to encompass the placc with a high wall of mud, armed with
towers, in orcler to starve the garrison out."
This desperate struggle was succeeded by a prolonged
lull, duri~lgwhich famine and discord seemcrl but too
likely to erect that wherein ordinary appliances of
war had failed ; when at a most critical juncture, the
ShAh took alas111 at some open Ilostilities of the British
on the Pcrsian coast, and suddenly withdrew his forces,
being careful, howcver, before his departure, to saw
asunder the seventy-pounder guns which were to have
accomplished such wonders, each weighing five tons,
and which he was unwilling to leave bel~ind as an
additional trophy for the now exulting 13ii3htis.
As Eldred Pottinger, whom history will always
celebrate as the " I-Iero of Hirht," was sul~sequcntly
my honourcd friend and associate in the eventful
episode of my own early experiences cluring the Kibul
troubles, I have been unable to rcsist the temptation,
at the risk of repeating what some may deem a tkrcadbare tale, 01 entering into tlic above details (partly
obtained from original sources) relating to the first
great drama wherein he so conspicuously arid so
honourably figured, and whereupon, in fact, the chief
interest of the war was so long concentrated. Should
any similar crisis occur, whether in India or elsewhere,
let us hope that arlother such British hero as Eldred
2
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Pottinger may as oyportui~elystart forth into the full
blaze of fame, fired by his example, animated by his
apirit, and as competent to uphold the glory of his
conntry, and to disconcert the ambitious schcmes of
its enemies.
It is time I should now return to Lord Auclrland
and his new project, whereby the future safety of our
north-west frontier was to be secured against the desigps
of linssian and Persian ambition. This 'consisted
originally of a tri-partite trcaty, mherein the British
Indian Government, ltanjit Singh, the ruler of the
Panjiib, and Shhh Shujii, the long-dethroned monarch
of AfghAnistAn, wcre the principal parties concerned.
Thirty ycars had elapsed since the last-named personage had been clriven froin his throne to find, d t e r
some ycars of perilous adventure i p Kashmir and the
Panjiib, a hospiliable asylum in British territory; E~om
which he twice issued forth at long intervals to engage
in ineffectual efforts to regain his lost dominions.
Meanwhile, Dost Muhammad, n younger brother of
the murdered Path IChki, had risen to supreme power
through his military ability and irrepressible force of
character. Since 1826, he had contrived to hold his
o w n against all antagonists, and had, by his frank
urbanity of demeanour, his aptitude for business, man- ,
liness, and uniform success in the attainment of his
aims, acquired a strong hold on the hearts and minds
of the great mass of the AfghSin people. Sh6h Shuj&,

on the contrary, was remeinbered chiefly for the absence
of all those high qualities as a mau and a ruler which
shone so conspicuously in his rival ; ~ 0 1was
% his return
$0 power a subject of desire to any save a, few selfinterested'.pa,rtizans and needy relativcs. I n spite of
these d~,awbaclrs,however, it had been determined by
the British Inclian Goveruncnt to suit tlieir own policy
by dispossessing the one and reinstating the other,
without; any real deference to the wishcs and aspirations
of the people most interested i n the mattcr.
Accordingly, in a manifesto tlated tlle ].st October,
1838, this new policy was publicly sct forth, whereby
our Sikh ally, Ranjit Sin$, bcing " gu:~ranteed in his
present possessions, bouncl himself to co-operate wit11
the British for the restoration of SliB1.1 ShujB to the
throne of his ancestors." On tlie 8th of November
following, the news of the retircmcnt of the ~ e r s i a n s
from Hirilt mas published by Qovemmcnt, but mas not
allowed to alter the political programlnc which had
been already cletermined, further tllail by causing a
diminution of the numerical strerigtll of the British
force to be employed, which. afforcled tllc Commaude~in-Chief, Sir Hen17 Fanc, a prctest for withdrawing
from i l ~ epersonal command of thc expcclition, the
policy of which he had never npprovcd, his place being
filled by Sir John Iceane.
On the 10th Decembcr the I3engnl force, under Sir
Willoughby Cotton, marched from Pnruzpur, proceed-
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ing by the left bank of the river Satlaj to Rohri, where
that river joins the Indus. Sh&h Shuji had already
started in advance to Shik&pur,escorted by I-IindiistBni
levies numbering six thousand men, raised and disciplined by British officers for his special ,ser%ce. He
was accompanied by Sir William MacNaghten, who
had been appointed envoy and minister at his court,
and who had been one of the chief promoters of the
expedition. Another force, five thousand six hundred
strong, moved from Bombay through Sindh to the
same point, whcre an admirable brid\gc of boats had
been przpared by officers of the Bengal Engineers for
the passage of the whole over the great river Indus.
The entire invading force, when combined, amounted
to twenty-one thousand, together with about Pour
times that number of camp followers and upwards of
This long miscellaneous
thirty thousand camels.
array, consisting of cavalry, infantry, artillery, with
their attendant impedimenta of wheeled carriages and
laden animals of every description, filed over the bridge
i n perfect order, presenting a picturesque and memorable spectacle.
Owing t o the undisguised dislike manifested by the
Amirs of Sindh to the passage of so many British
troops through their country, there seemed every probability of hostilities breaking out i n that quarter at
the very commencement of the campaign, which must
necessarily have delayed the onward progress of the
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army towards Afgh6nistfil~; but yielding to the force
of circumstances, backed by the undeniable arguments
of strong battalions eager for the plunder of the rich
capitd of I-Iaidarrtib&d, they had the good sense to
succumb before compromising themselves too far,
although they thereby obtained but a brief respite
from the hard and inevitable fate in store, and which
overtook them about four years later.
I t is needless that 1 should dwell minutely on the
military events of a campaign SO well known as that
which replaced Shah Shujd on his throne ; but i t may,
nevertheless, be useful to glance, en passant, at some
of the physical difficulties which the country opposed
t o thc passage of our army. ETaving safely crossed
the Tndus, the vast invading host dragged its seemingly
interminable length over one hundred and forty-six
miles of dreary desert, bordering Biluchistfin on the
east; and there many hundreds of poor horses, camels,
and bullocks perisbed from weariness and thirst, leaving their skeletons to mark unmistakably to future
travellers the traclr of the invaders.
Then came the formidable B o l h Pass, sixty miles
i n length, where fortnnately no enemy occupied the
heights; although stragglers ran considerable risk from
stray Bilu'chi robbers, ever on the match behind the
rocks for passing prey. Here the animals suffered
severely, and peiislaed by hundreds. Emerging from
this dismal gorge into the lovely and inviting valley of

i
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Shawl, seemed like passing from purgatory to paradise ; but here, owing partly to a scanty harvest and
partly to the wanton devastation caused by some of
the troops themselves, provisions re11 alarmingly short
for so great a multitude, and famine prices prevailed.
The neighbouring IChdn of Kal&t was suspected of
aggravating these difficultics, and was marked for
future punishment.
Pushing on, therefore, with the least possible delay,
the Khujalr Pass was reached, presenting a long succession of steep and difficult ascents and descents, with
some exceedingly narrow gorges wherc no draught
cattle could work with eft'ect. The artillery, including
a heavy battering-train, was therefore dragged up and
lowered down by the persevering manual labour of the
Bnglish soldiers, occupying five days. The summit of
the pass is scven thousancl four hundred and forty-nine
feet above the sea. Here, too, much loss was sustained
in commissariat baggage-animals, and mnch valuable
property sacrificed in consequence. Portunately, the
MghAns were too disunited among themselvcs to offcr
any organized resistance, and the army reached ICandah6s on the 25th April, 1839, without any show of
opposition. The Kandahh chiefs had fled for refuge
to Pcrsia without striking a blom, and the inhabitants
tendered thcir reluctant homage to the old monarch,
mIlo was thus unceremoniously thrust upon them by
foreign bayonets.

On the 27th June died Ranjit Singh, the famous
old " Lion of thc Panj$b," and our ally in the present
expedition. On the self-same day Sir John Keane,
leaving behind him a strong garrison at ICandahLr, and
even the siege-train which had been brought so far
with such heavy cost and labour, pursued his march to
Ghazni, where he encountered his first openly defiant
foe in the person of Prince Haidar, a son of Dost
Muhammad, who, with a garrison of three thousand
five hundred Afghsins, defended the fortress and
citadel, which were of formidable strength aud susceptible of a prolonged defence. Now was discovered the
extraordinary blunder that had been committed i n
leaving behind the battering-train, without the aid of
which the risk of utter failure seemed imminent. At
this crisis Major George Thomson, of the Bengal
Engineers, came to the rescue with the happy proposal
to blow open the only accessible gate with gunpowder.
This was successfully accomplished in the partial
obscnrity of early dawn by a party of sappers, headed
by Lieutenant Durand, of the Bengal Engineers, who
volunteered for the duty, and who survived the dangerous hazard to attain high rank and distinction among
those illustrious soldier-statesmen whd have contributed so largely to the maintenance of our national
honour in India.*
+ He bec~mo
wiiloly known to farno a8 Sir Henry Durand, and
maa Governor of (;hePanjib, when an accidental death ovortook
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such was the panic protlnccd :~nloiigtllc troo1)s of I)ost
Ml~hxrnniad,wlio hail t:11~~11
up n 110siti(1nat :irgli:~~i~li
to clispute the British atlvnilce to Ii:il)ul, tl~:it, nI):r~l.
doning for the tirnc all liopc of n~aitltni~lilighis
sovercignty, he fled with xhont two thousalid i'i~itliful
adllercllts tomards B:imi:in. A scleot party of Ijritisli
oftcers, licndecl by the since illustrious Outrinn, lid CYcorted by two tl~ous:~l~d
iifgllii~iliorvc u~ltlerconlmarltl uf
IItiji Iillliu I<:ilr:~r,a ilotorious t~~rrico:~t,
vol~~titt~r(:d
t o s t a r t ill pu18snit, nu], pusliiiig tlloir w:ly lry ftrr(*ctl
marches over stupcndous mouuti~inp:~sscs,ul~lstIlilve
ovcrtnkcn tlie fugitive Amir, cncui~il)~~rctl
:ii; hc IV:LS
wit11 liis fnniily niid bagg:lge, before lle 1*011ld rtl:lt*li
the fl+oiitiel; 1it~c1riot tllc nforcvnitl " II;i,ji" ~jrovctl
llimsclf a traitor, whose real ol)jact 7v:u tu illrow (wry
obstacle in tlie may of tlieir progress a11d sltr*c.cb'-s.'~'ILIL~
Dost Muh:~min:icl csr:npccl to Tl~~klrLrii,
not witllont tllc
sympatliics oE niaily Uritisl~Iit:nrts, lliitil t l ~ H.IIc~~I
:
uf
l'ortunc sliould oncc morc giyfivc a rcvolutioii ill llis

favour.
On tile 6th of A u p s t , Slrilli Shiiji, nttc*~itlc'tl1 1 Sir
~
WiIlia1,rn M:lcNaglltcn, :uid csc:ortcd 1 ) ~thc2 Ikitish
troops, lna(lc llis triuuq)lial entry irkto K:ibul, :~tltlt l ~ k
up his nbotle in tile Bhli IIisCr, or iLoy:~l ('it:icicl,
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eldest son, Prince Tim6.l; who hacl meanwhile penetrated tllrough the IChaibar Pass from PeshLvar, under
the escort of a Sikh contingent furnished by Ranjit
Singh, ancl under the political control of Colonel, afterwards Sir Cla~lde,Wade, encountering but little opposition. And thus was the first act of this wonclrous
drama of real life brought to a successf~lltcrminntion.
Sir Henry Pane, tllc experienced general .to whom
the conduct of the Afghrin expedition had bcen originally offered, hacl bcen also among the first to cautioll
I~ol*clAuclrland of tlie clangers and difficulties that
would inevitably beset the British troops in that
country after the first successful result shoulcl haye
heen achieved. Sir VITilliam MacNnghten, the British
envoy, upon whom the chief political management of
affairs was thenceforth to fall, mas not long in experiencing the prophetic nature of that couilscl. It soon
became evident that Shill S h j 5 could only 11e maintained on his throne by the continued presencc of a
British force. This was, however, recluuccd t o a moicty
by the return of nearly the whole Bombay and a portion of the Bengal divisions to India. Wit11 tlie latter
went Sir John Iccaue, soon to be made a pcer For thc
conquest of Ghazni, leaving Sir ~MrillongLbyCotton in
chief command of the remaining troops across the
Indus, amounting to about ten thousand men, distributed over a wide extent 01 country, to garison the
chid cities and such other places as required their
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protecting presence. Advantage was talren of the
return 05 the Bombay column to punish Mihrjb ICh$n,
the unluclcy I C h h of Icaliit, for his so-called refractory
conduct, to which allusion has already been n~ade. EIe
now offered a11 obstinate but ineffectual resistance to
the attack on his stronghold, which was talcen by
assault by General Wiltshire on the 15th October,
wherein the brnve chief himself was killecl. His death
must have occasioned somc pangs of remorse to Shrih
Shujg, whom he had formerly befriended, in distress.
The two years which followed the establishment of
Sh611 Shujli at K&hulmere chieily remarkable for the
activity of our political officers, great and small, who
were scattered far and wide over the land to assist in
carrying out, as Far as in them lay, the policy of our
Government, which secms to have mainly consisted in
consolidating the power of the Shlih, and in extending,
as Lord Auclcland himself expressed it, " the salutary
influence of the British name.'-' The most prominefit
of these political agents, both in ability ancl influence,
were D'Arcy Todd at Hirlit; Rawlinson (now Sir
Henry) and Leech ai I<andldah&r; Eldred P o t t i n p in
ICoT~istrin;Macgregor (now Sir Qeorge) at JalllilfibBd;
Arthur Conolly, on a special mission at Khukancl;
and Sir Alexander Burnes at I<:ih111. But besides these
was a host of minor stars, each of mliom added his
vats to the grand morlc of "consolidation," which
was not always synonymous with pacification," and

4

very generally ended in carving out some active work
for the military in his immediate vicinity.
Foremost of those worthy of honourable mention
was D'Arcy Todd, who had succeeded Pottinger as
British representative at XIirht, on the departure of
the latter to recruit his health after the siege. Of
Todd's long series of political encounters with the
arch-intriguer Ybr Muhammad, whose sole object
seemed to be to extort money by working on our political fears and jealousies, I refrain from entering into
the unedifying particulars ; but that which really
formed the distinguishing feature of his mission to
IIir&twas his successful effort to induce the k h ~ 01
n
Iaaiva to set at liberty some four hundred and sixteen
unfortunate Russian captives whose detention as slaves
in Khaiva had been made a convenient and, it must
be admitted, a perfectly just, prctexz By Russia for
invading that country. This noble triumph of humanity
and. of sound policy he accomplished by twice deputing
a British officer, entirely on his own responsibility, to
work on the fears and hopes of the Ichaivan chief.
The negotiations auspiciously begun by James Abbott
were judiciously followecl up and brought to a successful issue by Richmond Shakespear, both being at that
time subalterns of the Bengd Artillery; and to the
latter fell the enviable lot of escorting the whole party
of emancipated cnptives to the Russian frontier at
Oranburgh, where they were safely delivered over to
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the commandant for restoration to their friends. The
Russians, not to be outdone in acts that grace humanity, restored t o the Khaivans me~chaadizevalued
at two millions sterling, and, more prccious than all
beside, forty p~isoners, among whom were representatives of the wealthiest families i n Ichaiva. Seldom,
if ever, has a negotiation been effected in the Bast so
creditable to all parties concerned; nor since the
brightest days of chivalry have the honou3s of knighthood which rewardcd Shalcespear been more worthily
won. Sir Richmond Shakespear amply fillfilled the
promise of his youth, and rose to high political position
in India ; dying i n 1861. But James Abbott is still
o the fore, with the rank of general ill the army,
and during our subsequent struggles with the Sikhs
in the Panjkb rendered eminently good service at
a. critical period and in a manner well deserving
of honourable remembrance.
Thus thc Afgh5n campaign, with all its faults and
drawbacks, bore some rcally good fruit, and evidenced
in a remarkal~lemanner what a store of excellent raw
matdriel for the manufacture of heroes mcl statesmen
had been previously lying dormant in the Indian army.
I n this respect, indeed; it may be said to have amalcened
$0 n e l ~life the latent but laudable ambition of our
officers, young and old, and to have transmitted a forward impulse even to the present gene~ation-an impulse which I earnestly hope may never cease,to operate

4 *
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for their own and the public good. Many remarkable
episodes, accompanied by gallant deeds and victorious
issues, imparted an interest to t.he first year of our
occupation of Afghtinistjn, and the temporary success
of our policy may be said to have reached its culminating point on the defeat of Dost Muhammad at
B&miAn, and his subsequent unconditional surrerlcler
on the 3rd November, 1840. As an old Bengal artilleryman, I cannot pass by in silence the successful
'passage of Major GarbettJs troop of horse artillery
over the stupendous passes of hind^ Khush, at an
altitude little below that of Mont Blanc, although the
feat (of which we were then so proud) has very recently
been creditably rivalled by some British batteries in
Lord NapierJs glorious Abyssinian expedition.
The year 1841 opener1 with a smiling prospect of
peace and tranquillity, to bc soon rudely disturbecl by
rebellious risings in various directions. The faults of
our policy nnd the real wealrness of our position began
to grow more and more manifest to friends and foes.
Had but ShAh Shujii, our puppet king, proved himself
a proper man for the position into which we had thrnst
him, all might have gone on swimmingly until such
time as we could, with a goocl grace, have left him to
the loyal care of his own subjects, with all the Cclat
due to our own success and moderation. But his unpopularity naturally extended to us as his supporters,
although our political lcaders were wilfully blind to
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the fact ; and, in the fulness of time, just as a winter
of Siberian severity was setting in, the *popularvolcano
suddenly burst forth, and found us unprepared. The
result is too well known and too bitterly remembered
to need repetitioh here. I t was my own youthful fate
to be the first to narrate the dismal tragedy to my
countrymen in all its miserable details. I have been
since informed, by competent authority, that my
humble volume had the unprecedented and perhaps
unpardonable effect of depriving the great Duke of
Wellington of a whole night's slumber; and severe
might have been the penalty for the author (then only
a youthful subaltern of artillery) had not his statements, wherein many unwelcome truths were faithfully
though perhaps indiscreetly blurted out, been so abundantly confirmed by the concurrent testimony of trustworthy witnesses as to have held their ground in the
pages of history down to the present day.
I have often since thought that perhaps too much
importance has been attached to the Kibul disaster,
viewed i n its military aspects. Politically and morally
its awful lessons can never be over-rated, and certainly shoulcl never be forgotten ; but regarded simply
as a military discomfiture, it was in fact the result of
o, surprise, somewhat like that whereby the celebrated
Gulliver found himself tied and bound during sleep,
and at the mercy of the Lilliputians. We English
went on slumbering contentedly, as though the
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Afghjns, whose country we had so coolly occupied,
mere our very best f~<endsin the world, and quite content to be om obedient servants to boot, until one cold
morning in November we woke up to the unpleasant
sounds of bullets in the air, and an infuriated peopleJs
voices i n revolt, like'. the great oceanJs distrwlt, angry
roar, in a rising tempest. The best troops and the
ablest generals in the world must ever find themselves
placed at a great disadvantage under such circumstances. I t should always be remembered that our
minter supplies of food, and firewood, and forage, had
not yet been laid in; that the few daysJ supply' in
store was indifferently
and fell an easy prey
to the enemy before we had quite recovered our senses
from the first scare of our rudeawakening; that thenceforward we had to turn out and fight daily against
greatly superior numbers, backed by the strong forts
wherewith the U b u l valley was studded, and which
latter we had to batter and carry by storm one after
the other, in order thereby to obtain the needful
supplies for our daily wants ; so that, while our position
was in a general sense defensive, we were obliged, in
point of fact, to act continually on the offensive,
which we nevertheless contrived to do with success
until such time as w e . had exhausted the supplies laid
I ~ in
I the forts mithin our reach. Then, indeed, our
position became, for the first time, hopeless ;for even
soldiers cannot sustain life on cannon balls and leaden
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bullets; and so it came to pass that our destiny became
eventually dependent on the persuasive powers of our
political officers in their attempts to treat with wily
and embittered Afghkn chiefs.
And this induces me to say that my own historical
recollections and experiences have not impressed me
with a profound confidel~cein the efficacy of mere
diplomacy, conducted by even the most talented an$
sagacious of political agents, with Oriental potentates.
These latter are far greater proficients than oursclves
in that peculiar use of language which consists in
successfully " concealing the thoughts and I entirely
coincidc with the view taken of snch matters by the
honest artillery gunner who was overheard, during
one of our Indian campaigns, to say to a comrade,
while pointing cxultipgly t o a ficld battery of big guns
d~tawnby elephants, " I say, Bill ! Tl~em'sthe Politicals 1"
At all events, matters fared very badly with us at
K 6 b d when the arguments of big guns ceased to
prevail: and we were soon made to experience the
truth long ago enunciated by the old Roman poet :;jJ

"Donee eris felix multos numerabis amicos,
Tempora si fuerinti nubile, sohls eris ! "

While, therefore, I freely concede all clue honour
t o t h e ilIustrious garrisons of K a n d a h r and JaUAl&b&d,
which, under Nott and Sale, so gallantly held those
important posts against all opponents during the revolt,
I claim for the defenders of K6;bul that fair allowance

for t h e serious disadvantages under
sllould be
which they struggled f r o m the very first, and beneath
which they
succullfiecl, SO far at least as
to become the unconsenting victims of a hollow treaty
formed with the assasvin of our envoy-a trenty whose
sole object on his p a r t was to
our garrison
outside of its defences i n t o those savage and formidable
passes which form the highway from Ic6bul to PeshAwar,
and
t~eachery, cold, and famine woulcl, they
well lmew, effectuaIly combine for its destruction.
Still, their triumph was but of brief duration:-a few
sufficed t o place IChbul again i n our
short
possession. Sir George Yolloclr, with his noble army
of retiibution, amply retrieved past disasters, and
happily effected the liberation of those British captives
(myself included) who had meanwhile beell the unwaling recipients of rough AfghLn hospitality-sometimes confined closely t o lofty forts, sometimes hurried
about from spot to spot on thc baclcs of horses and
camels in narrow valleys, as nomaclic wandere~s amid
precipitous mountain-passes ; lodging the while in
such mde huts as they could construct for themselves
from the branches of juniper bushes, or i n the mud
hovels of the primitive inhabitants ; sometimes treated
with friendly deference, at others mith systematic
rudeness ;and finally, when General Polloclr approached
Khbul, forced t o fly, escortecl by a strong guard of
soldiers, over those self-same lofty mountain-passee
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leading to Kullum, in Uzbeg Tartary, across which
Major Garbett had in happier times, as previously related, dragged his horse-artillery guns. Had we once
got into the clutches of the Uzbegs, I opine this chapter would never have been mitten, but, in a happy
moment of inspiration, my old hero Pottinger (for he'
was of the party) betook to mesmcrising our keeper with
the prospect of a sufficiency of gold to keep him in
comfort for the remainder of his life; and one fine
morning, in the valley of Brimitin, within sight of those
gigantic images cut in the perpendicular rock which
excite the wonder of travellers, we found ourselves all
at once in the position of free agents. Gcneral Pollock,
learning how affairs stood, despatched Sir Richmond
Shakespear to our aid with six hundred I<azzilbbsh
horsemcn from KAbbul; and thus the latter officer
enjoyed once more the triumph and e'clat of talring a
conspicuous part in proclaiming "liberty to the captivcs;" his own countrymen and countrywomen being
this time the favoured objects of his zeal.
Khbul reconqucrea, me might possibly have maintained
our military hold upon AfghAnistin even to the present
day; but our game there had been played out. Shhh
Shnj.jb was dead, having been bascly murdered by one
of his own trusted followers about two months after
t h e British retreat from his capital. There was no
longer any objcct to gain by remaining against the
shes of the people, whilst the drain upon our Indian

financcs caused by this war h'ad already swelled the
public cleht by fifteen millions, and evcry month's delay
threatened but to accelerate our financial ruin. Lord
Ellenborough, therefore, wisely determined t o evacuate
the country, and to restore the exiled Amir Dost Muhammad Kh;in; an act of retributive justice which we
have never hacl cause to ivcpent ; for he proved himself
a most able and politic ruler till his death, which took
place so late as June $863.
No one now doubts that our position i n AfghinistAn
was a false one-and fiaught with danger in Inore
ways than one. Apprehensive of Russiati aggression
and intrigue, and counting on the fears and forbearance
of our powerful neighbours and rivals, the Sikhs, we
had the temerity to march an army past their country
into the wild and unknown regions of Mgh~inistiin,
niid thus to risk our force being cut off from its base
of operations, and from its nearest available supports;
and although no such catastrophe actually occurred,
and temporary success attended the hap-hazard invasion of a friendly country, still we eventually were
taught a lesson in the school of adversity which ought
assuredly to su6Eice as a salutary caution i n the future.
But matters have meanwhile become very much
altered for the better on our north-western frontier.
The great Sikh army no longer exists ; and British
rule extends throughout the PaqjAb, even up to the
very borders of AfghAnietAn.
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But it may be urged that Russia might possibly
count on the near approach of her army being the
signal for a general revolt and rising among our own
native soldiers ancl subjects. If so, I firmly believe
she would reckon without her host. The character of
Russian rule, as popularly described, has not failed to
reach the ears of the inhabitants of India, who are
gencrally very shrewd judges of their own worldly
interests ; and when the question merely turned on a
change of European masters, I believe their answer
would be somewhat similar to that given by our own
Charles ,II. to his brother James, when the latter remonstrated with the former for heedlessly exposlng
his life by walking unguarded about the London parh.
" Brother," rcplied the merry monarch, "don't distress
yourself ! Rest assured that my subjects will never
take my life to make you king ! " It may suffice to
recur to the formidable Sikh invasion of 1845-46, and
our subsequent desperate struggles with that nation in
1848-49, which offered such favourable opportunities
to our native subjects for revolt, had any such disposition been widely prevalent; yet, even with such tempting opportunities, they remaincd perfectly quiescent.
No stronger proof could bc required that, for the mere
alternative of a change of masters (and that a change
for the worse), an insurrectionmy movement, as an
aid to invasion, would be a very unwise and unsafe
dependehce.
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It cannot, however, be denied that the Russian pro.

I
I

i
I

1
I

gress i n Central Asia since the Crimean war, and especially during the last' ten years,'has been of a startling
and even of an aggressive character, so far as British
India is concernecl. But the conditions of warfare nnd
the ca$acity of India to resist an invader have materially altered since Tim& and B6bar obtained their
easy tl-iumphs, at the head of rude, undisciplined
T&t&rhordes. They had no siege guns, mith their
cumbrous appendages of heavy ordnance-stores, to
impede their progress across the long succession of
mountain ranges that intervene between Central Asia
ventnre to predict a successful issue to any modern
invading force from that quarter must altogether
ignore or undervalue not only the formidable physical
clifficultiesbut also the strength and efficiency of our
magnificent army in India, which I believe to be more
than a match for the best troops that' could be brought
into the field against us.
To attack a country so situated, with any chance of
success, an overwhelming force would be necessary,
accolnpanied by heavy artillcry, and with supports and
arsenals within moderate clistancc in its rear. But it
has been well said by an able miter in the "Edinburgh
Review," when referring to the clifficulty of conducting
military operations in AfghSnisttin : " Take a small
force, and you are beaten ; take a large one, and you
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scrupulous and restless ambition wherewith Russia is
accredited by the world at large, it may be fairly admitted, on the other hand, that the legitimate objects
of opening out nem sources of commerce, and its attendant civilized advantages, are suficienily worthy in
themselves to enlist our sympthy as the consistent

I

discount than in the savage wilds aud among the cruel
slave-mnlring Khanates of Central Asia.
With these advantages secured, and with the increased protection to life and property which the continued presence of a dominant civilized power cannot
fail t o realize, it may be confidently expected (and we
English should rejoice in the expectation) that the
long-dormant, though fertile resources of BukhRrri,
Sama~lmnd,Rhnks~nd,and neighbouzing states, will be
rapidly developed, and therewithnl open out new fielcls
for enterprise and new triumphs for civilization.
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CHAPTER 111.
CONDITION O F ADGHANISTAN I N
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EUROPEANS EVINCED BY T H E AFGHANS.
GENERAL

SYilfPTON8

TITP

KABUL.

WHENM~jor-GeneralElphinstone assumed the command of the troops in AfghBnistiin in April, 18-41, the
country enjoyed a state of apparent trallquillity to
which it had for many years been a stranger. This
remark applies more particularly to those povinces
which lie north-eaet of Ghazri, comprehending Ktibul
proper, Kohist An, Jall616bbBd, and the neighbouring
districts. The Ghdd tribes, occupying a large portion
of the country between Ghazni and 'Kandahdr, had
*

5

.

never been prope~blysubdued, and the permanent occupation of ICalivt-i-Ghalzi by our troops hacl so alarmed
their jealous love of independence, as to cause, during
the months of JuIy and August, a partial rising of the
tribes, which, however, the valour of our I-IindristBni
troops under Colonel Wymer at Haft-asir, and of the
5th Bengal Cavalry under Colonel Chambers at Mulriir,
speedily suppressed. Some of the principal chiefs
delivered themselves up as hostages, and quiet was
restored. To the west of ICandahsir, a notorious beebooter, named Nrtar KMn, having collected about
seven thousand followers, horse and foot, was signally
defeated ncar Girishk, on the banks of the I-Ifrmand,
in the month of July, by a dctacl~ment of the Sh6hJs
regular troops under Captain Woodburn, consisting of
only one infantry regiment, two horse-artillery guns,
.under Lieutenant Cooper, besides two regiments of
Janbliz, or Afgh&nhorse : the lattcs, however, behaved
ill, and can hardly be said to have sham& in the glory
of the unequd conflict. Captain Grifiin, with the
Bengal 2nd Native Infantry, was, a few days after,
equally successful in an attack on the enemy in the
same quarter. Alrtar KhBn fled to the hills with n
few followers, and the land again enjoyed repose.
ICohisthn, whose vild and turbulent chiefs had sturdily
maintained their independence against the late ruler,
Dost Muhammad Khhn, seemed at last to have settler1
down into a state of quiet, though unwilling, subjec-
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adapted for malring a protracted defence, as was afterwards proved. The Major was, however, considered in
the light of an alarmist, and he only succeeded in procuring a fern H6zirbish horsemen and a 17-pounder
gun, with a small detachment of the ShfihJs Artillery,
and a. very scanty supply of ammunition.
About the end of September, Major Pottinger came
t o X6bul for the purpose of impressing on the Envoy
t h a t , unless strong measures of pl-evention were specdily
adopted, he considered a rise in ICohistiin as in the
highest degree probable. His apprehensions were considered by the Envoy as not altogether unfounded, and
he was ernpoweyecl to retain as hostages the sol~sof the
leading cl~iefswhose fidclity he suspccted. The first
interruption to the state of outward tranquillity, which
I have described above, occulrred early in September.
Captain I-Iay, in colnmalld of some 13Bzirb5shesJ and
Lieutenant Maule, with his Kohistiini regiment (which
bad been relievcd at ChjLl'ikir by the Giirlrah, or 4th
Regiment, Sh,ihJs Subsidized Force, officered from thc
line, under Captain Codrington), and two 6-pounder
guns, had been sent into the Zurrnat vallcy to collect
t h e annual rcvenue, with orders likewise to make an
a t t e m p t to seize cci-tain noted plunderers, among whom
were some of the murderers of Colonel I'erring; who
had long infested the road bctween Ghazni and ICgbul.
The revenue was in the course of being quietly paid,
w h e n Captain Hay was mischievously informed by
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Mull6 Mumin, collector of revenue in Zurmat (who
shortly after distinguished himself as one of our bitterest foes), that the men whom he wished to seize
were harboured in a certain neighbouring fort of no
strength whatever, and that the inhabitants would
doubtless give them up rather than risk a rupture
with the Government. Captain Gay immediately proceecled thither, but found the place much strongcr
than he had been led to expect, and the people obstinately prepared to resist his demands. 01 approaching the fort he was fired upon; and finding the
6-pounder shot, of which he gave a few rounds in
retu~n,made no impression on the mud walls, he had
no alternative but to retrcat.
Thc Envoy, on receiving Captain Hay's report,
immediately despatched a sufficient force to punish the
rebels. I t consisted of two hundred of Her Majesty's
44th Infantry, 5th Native Infantry, 6th Regiment
Shah's Subsidized Force, four guns of Abbot's battery,
two iron 9-pounders Mountain Train, two companies
of Slifih's Sappers, and two squadrons of Anderson's
Home. These were under the command of LieutenantColoncl Oliver, and werc accompanied by Captain G,
13. Macgregor,* the political agent at Gandkmak, who
happened to be then at Kkbul on business. The force
commenced its march on the 27th September, and

* Now Major-General Sir George H. Maagregor, K.C.B.

reached the Zurmat valley without the slightest interruption. On the approach of our troops the rebels had
fled to the hills in the greatest consternation, leaving
their forts at our mercy. The principal strongholds
were destroyed with powder, and the force
to
return to Ickb~~l.
Meanwhile the hydra of rebellion had reared its bead
in another far more formidable quarter. E a r l y i n
October three Ghalzi chiefs 01 note suddenly quitted
Khbul, after plundering a rich k&filaat Tiein, a n d took
up a strong position in the difficult defile of IChurdKtibul, about ten miles from the capital, thus blocking
up the pass, and cutting off our communication with
Hindfistfin. Intelligence had. not very long previously
been received that Muhammad Akhar IChiin, second
son of the ex-ruler Dost Muhammad KhAn, had arrived
purpose of
at B6miin f ~ o mKllulum for the s~~pposed
carrying on intrigues against the Government. It is
remarkable that he was nearly connected by marriage
with Muhammad Sh6h IChh and Dost Muhammad
Khgn,* also Ghalzis, who almost immediately joined
the above-mentioned chiefs. IXuhammad Akbar had,
since the deposition of his father, never ceased t o
foster feelings of intense hatred towards the Englisll
nation ; and, though often urged by the fallen ruler t o
deliver himself up, had resolutely preferred the life of
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a houseless exile to one of mean dependence on the
bounty of his enemies. I t seems therefore in the
highest degrce probable that this hostile movement on
the part of the Eastern Ghalzi's was the result of his
influence over them, combined with other causes which
will be hereafter mentioned. Tlie march of General
Sale's brigade to their viriter quarters at JallLlfibbLd,
and ultimately to India, had only been deferred until
the r e t u ~ nof the force from Zu~mat,but was now
hastened in consequence of this unwelcome news. On
the 9th October the 35th Regiment Native Infantry,
under Colonel Monteath, C.13., onc hundred of the
ShQIJs Sappers, under Captain G. BToad£ootJ a squadron of the 5th Cavalry, under Captain Oldfield, and
two guns of Captain Abbot's battery, under Lieutenant
Dawes, were sent on in advance to the entrance of the
pass at Biita-i-lrhAk, where, on the following night, they
were attacked by a large number of rebels, who, taking
advantage of the high ground and deep ravines i n the
neighbourhood of the camp, maintained a sharp fire
upon them f or several l~ours,by which thirty-five Sepoys
were killed and wounded.
On the morning of the 11th General Sale marched
from Kcibul with ZIer Maj estyJs 13th Llght Infantry
to join the camp at B6ta-i-lrh&l~,and on the following
morning the whole proceeded toforce the pass of KhurdK6bd. Intelligence had been received that the enemy,
besides occupying the heights of this truly formidable
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defile, which in many places approach t o within fifty
yards of each other, rising up almost perl~elldicularl~
to
an elevation of five hundred or six hundred feet, had
erected a sunga, or stone breastwork, in tlie nayrowest
part of tlie gorge, flanked by a strong tower. The
advance guard, consisting of the Shbh's Sappers, a
company of I-Ier Majesty's 13th Foot, another of the
35th Native Infantry, and two guns urlder Lieutenant
Dawes, was met about midway through the pass, which
is nearly five miles long, by a sharp and continued
discharge of jaz6ils from the strong posts of the
enemy. This was returned by our men with precision
and effect, notwithstancling the disadvantages of their
situation; flanking parties gallrtlltly strngglecl up the
height to dislodge the enemy from thence, while the
Sappers rushed on t o destroy the above-mentioned
breastwork. Through this, however, the stream which
flows down the midcue of the defile had already forced
a passage, and, as the enemy abandoned it, as well as
the flanking towel-, on the approach of OIIP troops,
Lieutenant Dawes passed his guns through the interval
at full speed, getting them under the shelter of a rock
beyond the sustained and muTclerous fire of the
enemy's jaziiilchis, i t being impossible to elevate the
guns sufficiently to bear upon them. The flanlters did
their duty nobly, and the fight had lasted for about
half an hour, during which the conduct of the Sh&hJs
Sappers, under Captain Broadfoot, wks creditable i n
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the highest degree, when the approach of the main
column, under General Sale, who had been already
shot through the leg, enabled Captain Seaton* of the
35tli Regiment, who commandccl the advance guard, to
push on. This he did, running the gauntlet to the end
of the pass, by which time the enemy, fearful of being
talren in rear, abandoned thei~.position and retired
towards IChabar-i-JabAr, on thc road to Tizin. The
35th Regiment, ShdllJs Sappess, Lieutenant Dames's
guns, and a party of HRzirb&shunder Captain Trevor,
encamped at Ichurd-ICkbd, I-Ier Majesty's 13th Light
Infantry returning to Bdta-i-lrhbk. During their
return, parties who still lurlred among the rocks fired
upon the column, thereby doing some mischief.
I n these positions the divided force remained encamped for several days, awaiting the return to K4bul
of the troops from Zwmat. During this time several
shab-khtins, or night attacks, were made on the two
camps, that on the 35th Regiment at Khurd-IC4bul
being peculiarly disastrous from the treachery of the
Afghzin IIorse, who admitted the enemy within their
lines, by which our troops were exposed to a fire from
the least suspected quarter : many of our gallant
Sepoys and Lieutenant Jenlrins thus met their death.
On the 20th October General Sale moved with his" ,
force to 1Chul.d-1C6bbulJhaving been previously joined

* Afterw[~l.deknown ns Major-Gonerd Sir T. Seaton, K.C.B.
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by the 37th Regiment under Major Griffiths, Captain
Abbot's guns, tlie Mountain Train under Captain
Backhouse, one hundred of Anderson's Irregular Horse
under Lieutenant Mayne, and the remainder of the
Shdh's Sappers and Miners. About the 22nd the
whole force there assembled, with Captain Macgregor,
political agent, marched to Tisin, encountering much
determined opposition on the road.
By this time it was too evident that the whole of
the eastern Ghalzis had risen i n one common league
against us. Their governor, or viceroy, EIuruza KhLn,
had in the interval gone forth under pretence of
bringing, back the chiefs to their allegiance; on his
return, however, which took place nearly at the time
at which General Sale marched from Khurd-Kkbul,
the treacherous nature of his proceedings had been
discovered, and he was placed by the ShLh in confinement; he had been suspected, indeed, before. General
Sale remained at Tizin until the 26th October.
I t must be remarked that, for some time previous to
these overt acts of rebellion, the always strong and illrepressed personal dislike of the Afghjns towards
Europeans had been manifested in a more than usually
open manner in and about Kgbul. Officers had been
insulted and attempts made to assassinate them. TWO
Europeans had been murdered, as also several camp
followers ; but these and other signs of the approaching storm had unfortunately been. passed over as mere
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,
ebullitions of privatc angry feeling. This illcredulity
and apathy is the more to be lamented, as it was prclty
well known that on the occasion of the sAn2i-lch6nin,or
first night attack on the 35th Native Infantry at
B6ta-i-khBk, a large portion of our assailants consisted
of the armed retainers of the different men of conscquence in ICAbul itselfJ large parties 01 whom had
been seen proceeding from the city to the scene' of
action on the evening of the attacl~,and afterwards
returning. Although these men llad to pass cithcr
through the hcart or round the skirts of o u ~cam11 at
Siygh Sang, it was not deeined expedient even to question them, far less to detain thcm.
On the 26th October, General Sale started in the
direction of Gandhmalr,-Captain Macgregor, political
agent, having, d u ~ i n gthe halt at Tizin, half frightened,
half cajoled, the refractory Ghalzi chiefs into mliat the
sequel proved to have been a most hollom tiuce; for
the term tqseaty can scarcely be applied t o any agrcement made with men so proverbially treacherous as tlzc
whole race of AfghLns haye proved themselves to be
h o m our first knowledge of their existence up to thc
present moment. Of the difficulties experienced by
General Sale during his m a ~ c hto Gandbmalc, 'md of
the necessity which induced him subsequently to push
on to Jallhlkbbftd, the public are awwe. On the day of
his departure from Tisin the 37th Native Infantry,
three companies of the Shh11's Sappers, u n d e ~Captain

I

i"
I

Walsh, and three guns of the Mountain Train, under
Lieutenant Green, retraced their steps towards Kgbul,
and encamped at Ichabar-i-Jabhr, to wait as an escort
to the sick aud convalescent. The Sappers continued
their march back to Kibul unopposed; the rest remained here unmolested until the 1st November, when
they brolre ground for IZhurd-Icibul. I-Iere, in the
afiernoon of the 2nd, Major Griffiths, who commanded
the detachment, received a peremptory order from
General Elphinstone to force his way without loss of
time to I<ibud, where the insurrection had already
broken out in all its violence. Wliile striking his
camp he was attacked by the mountaineers, who now
. began to assemble on the neighbouring heights in great
numbers, and his march through the pass from Bfita-ib
khik to I<ibul was 'one continued. conflict, nothing
saving him from heavy loss but the steadiness ahd
gallantry of his troops, and the excellence of his own
dispositions. He arrived i n cantonments before daybrealr on the morning of the 3rd November.
The two great leaders of the rebellion were Aminullah Khin, the chief of Logae, and Abd-ullah KhGn,
Achakzoe, a chief of great influence, and possessing a
large portion of the Pishin valley.
Amin-ullah I<h,in had hitherto been considered one
of the staunchest friends of the existing Government ;
and such was the confidence placed i n him by the
Wazir, that he had selected him to take charge of
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Humza IChfin, the lately superseded governor of the
Ghalzis, as a prisoner to Ghazni. This man now
distinguished himself as onc 01 our most invetey?te
enemies. To illustrate the character of his coadjutor,
Abd-ullah IChgn, it will be sufficient to relate the following anecdote. I n order t o get lid of his elcler brother,
who stood betweeu him and the inheritance, he caused
him to be seized and buricd up to the chin in the earth.
A rope was then fastened round his neck, anrl to the
encl. of it was haltered a wilcl horse : the animal was
then driven round in a circle, until thc unhappy
victim's head was twisted from his shoulders. This
same man is also mentioned in terms of just abhorrence
by Captain A. Conolly in his Travels.
But though the tmo above-named chiefs took a
leading part in the rebellion, there can bc little doubt
that it had its origin in the deep offence given to the
Ghalzis by the ill-advised reduction of their annual
stipcnds-a measure wliich had appa~entlybeen forccd
upon Sir William ~ a c n a g h t e nby the pecuniary necessities of the king. This they considered, and with
somc show of justice, as a breach of faith on the part
of our Government: at all events, that was swely
mistalten economy which raised into hostility men
whose determined spirit under a sense of wrong the
following anecdote may illustrate. When oppressed
by NBdir Sh&, the Ghdz? tribes, rather than succumb
to the tyrant's will, took refuge in the mountains

amidst the snow, where with their families they fed for
months on roots alone: of these they sent a handful
to Nidir, with the message, that, so long as such roots
could be procured, they would contillue to resist his
tyranny. Such were many of the men now leagued
together by onc common feeling of hatred against us.
A passage occurring in a posthumous memormidum
by the Envoy, now in Lady Macnaghten's possession,
requires insertion here.
"The immediate cause of the outbreak in the
capital was a seditious letter addressed by Abcl-ullah
I<h$n to severd chiefs of influence at IGibul, stating
that it was the design of the Envoy to scize and send
them d to London ! The principal rebels met on
the previous night, and, relying on the inflammable
feelings of the people of I<&bul, they pretended that
the king had issued an o ~ d eto
r put all infidels to death;
having previously forged an order from him for our
destruction, by the common process of washing out
the contents of a genuine paper, with the exception
of the seal, and substituting their own wiclred inventions.')
Such at least is the gcne~allyreceived version of
the story, though persons are not wanting who would
rashly pronounce the king guilty of the design imputed
to him.
But, howevcr that may be, i t is certain that the
events which I have already narrated ought to have

PIIEST DISTURBANCES.

been enough t o arouse the authorities from their blind
security. It ought, homevey, to be statcd that, alarmed by
certain symptoms of disaffection in different parts of the
country, ancl conscious of the inadequacy of the means
he then possessed t o quell any cleterini~iedand general
insurrection, Sir William had, a fern months previously,
required the peesencc of several inore regiments:
he .was, liowcver, induced t o cancel this wise precautionmy measure. But, even hacl this aclditiond force
arrived, it is next to certain that tlie loss of British
honour, subsequently sustained, co~~lcl
only ]lave beeu
deferred for a period. A fearfully sevcre lesson was
necessa1-g t o rcmove the veil from the cyes of tllosc
who, drawing their conclusions from their wishes,
2"ould consider Afgh5nist:in as a settled country.
It is but justice t o Sir IVillimn MaenngMen to say
that such recommendations from him as mere ineompatible with the retrenching system were not rcccived
at head-quarters in n way encouraging to him as a
public officer.
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CHAPTER IV.
POPULAR OUTBREAK I N XABUL. -MURDER
ANDER BURNIS.-UNHAPPY
CHECZING

THE

OX SIR ALEX-

WANT OF PROMPTITUDI I N

IZIBELLION. -ATTACK

ON CAPTAIN

LAWRENCIE AND LIEUTENANT 6TURT.-CHARACTER
C+JjlNB.RAL ELPEINST0NE.-UNMILIThnY

OF

POSITION AND

c'oNsTRU~TION O F TIIB OANTONMENT AT KABUL.

ATovember Snd, 1841.-AT an early hour this morning
the startling intelligence was brought from the city
that n popular outbrealc had talcen place; that the
shops were all closed ; aud that a general attaclrhad been
made on the houses of all British officers residing in
KBbul. About 8 A.M. a hurried note was received by
thc Envoy in cantonments from Sir Alexander Burnes,*
stating that the minds of the people had been strongly
#

aity.

Tho Envoy livod in tho oankonmont, and sir A. Burues in the
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excited by some mischievous reports, b u t expressing a
hope that he should succeed in quelling t h e commotion.
hbout 9 A.M., however, a mmow was circulated, which
afterwards proved but too well founded, t h a t Sir Alexander had been murdered, and Captain .Johnson's
treasury plundered. Flames were now seen to issue
from that part of the city where they dwelt, and it was
too apparent that the er~denvoui*
to appease the people
by quiet means had failed, and that it would be necessary to have recourse to strorlger mcasures. The report of fire-arms was incessant, anrl seemed to extenrl
through the town froin end to end.
Sir William Macnaghtcn now called upon General
Elphinstone t o act. An ordcr was accordirlgly sent to
Brigadier Shelton, then encainpcd a t SiyAh Sang,
aboui; :i mile and a half distant from cantonments, to
march forthwith to the Bdld R . i s d ~ ,01- coynl citadel,
where his Majcsty Shkh ShujA rebided, comnlandilzg a
large portion OF the city, with the following troops,
viz., one company of Her Majesty's 4!49thFoot, a wing
of the 548th llcgimeiit Nativc Infantry under Major
Ewart, the 6th Regiment Sl~Ah's Infantry under Captain EIoplrins, and four Horse Artillery guns unrler
Captain Nicholl; and on asrival there to act according
to his own judgment, aftcr consulting w i t h the king.
The remaixlder of the troops encamped at Siyhh
Sang were at the same time ordered into cantonmerlt~;
viz., I-Icr Majesty's 44th Boot under Lieutenant-

6
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Colonel Maclcerell, two Horse Artillery guns under
aieutenant VCraller, and Anderson's Irregular Horse.
A messenger was lilrewise despatched to recall the 37th
Native Infantry from IChurd-Khbul without delay.
The troops at this time in cantonments were as follows :
vie., 5th Regiment Native Infantry, ilndcr LieutenantColonel Oliver; a wing of 541th Native Infantry;
five 6-pounder field guns, with a detachment of the
ShLh's Artillery, under Lieutenant Wayburton; thc
EnvoyJs body-guard ; a troop of Slrinner's IIorse, m d
another of local Horse, under Lieutenant Wallrer;
three colnpanies of the ShBh's Sappers, .under Captain
Walsh; and about: twenty men o.E the Company's
. Sappers, attached to Captain Paton, Assistant Quartermaster-~eneral.
Widely spreacl and formidable as this insurrection
proved t o be afteraards, it was at first a mere insignificant ebullition of discontent on the part of a few
desperate and restless men, which military energy and
promptitude ought to have crushed in the bud. Its
comrnencemerlt was an attack by certainly not t h e e
hundred men on the dwellings of Sir Alexander .Burnes
and Captain Johnson, paymaster to the Sh;ihJs force;
and so little did Sir hlcxander himself apprehend
serious consequences, that he not only refused, on its
fisrt breaking out, to comply with the earnest entreaties
of the wazir to accompany him to the Brild Hish, but
actually forbade his guard t o fire on the assailants,

i
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attempting to check what he supposed to be a mere
riot by haranguing the attacking party from the gallery
of his house. The result was fatal to hirnsclf; for, in
spite of the devoted gallantry of the Sepoys, who cornposed his guard mid that of the payldasterJs officc and
trcasury on the opposite side of the street, who yielded
thcir trust only with their latcst breath, the latter were
plundered, and his two companions, Lieutenant William
Broadfoot, of the Bengal European Regimcnt, and his
brother, Lieutenant Bu~nes,of the Bornbay Army, wcre
massacred, in common with every man, woman, arid
child found on the premises, by theuc bloodthirsty
miscreants. Lieutenant Br~adf'ootlrilled five or six
mcn with his own hand before he was shot down.
No man, surely, in a highly responsible public situation-cspecially in such a one as that held by tlie late
Sir Alexander Burnes -011ght ever to indulge in a state
of blind security, or to ncgleet stilutary warnings, however small. I t is indisputable that such warnings had
been given to him; espccially by a respectable AfgIl61i
named T6j-Muhammad, on the vcry previous niglit,
who wcnt in person to 8ir A . 13urnes to put him on
his guard, but retired disgusted by the incredulity
with which his assertio~lswere received. It is not for
me to comment on his public character. I t is the property of the civilized portion of the world; but it is
due t o another, little known beyond the immediate
sphere in which he moved, to say that, had this out-
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break been productive of no eBects beyond the death
of Lieutenant William Broaclfoot, it could not be
sufficiently deplored : in him was lost to the Statc not
only one of its bravest and rnost intelligent oBcers,
but a man who for honesty of purpose and soundness
of juclgrnent, P may boldly avel', could not be surpassed.
Tlle Icing, who was in thc Bk15 Hisk, being somcwhat startled by the increasing number of the rioters,
although not st the time aware, so far as we can judge,
of t h e assassination of Sir A. Burnes, despatched one
of his sons with a rlurnber of his im~nediateAfghsn
retainers, and that corps of Hind6stknis commonly
called Campbell's Regiment, with two guns, to restore
o r d e r : no support, however, was renilered to these by
our troops, whose leaders appeared yo tl~xmderstruclc
bv t h e intelli~enca
of the outbrealc, as to be incallable
*
of adopting inore than t l ~ cmost. puerile defcnsive rncasures. Even Sir William Macilaghtcn sccmed, from a
note receivecl at this time from him by Captain Trcvor,
t o apprehend little danger, as he therein expressed his
perfect confidence as to the speedy and complete
success OF B=anipbellJsHiiiddst&iiisin putting an end to
the disturbance. Such, however, was not the case ;
for the enemy, encouraged by our inaction, increased
rapidly in spirit. and numbers, and drove baclc tlle
Iring's guard with p e a t slaughter, the guns being with
difficulty saved.
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It must be understood that Captain Trevor lived at
this time with his family in a strong bu'rj, or tower,
situated by the river side, near the Kazilbfish quarter,
which, on the weat, is wliolly distinct from the remainder of the city. Within musket shot, on the
opposite side of the river, in thc direction of the strong
and populous village ol Dih AfghLn, is a fort of some
sizc, then used as a goclown, or storehouse, by the
ShhhJs commissari3;tJ part of it being occupied by
Brigadier Anquetil, commanding the ShLhJs force.
Close to this fort, divided by a narrow watercourse, mas
the house of Captain Troup, brigade majoy of the
ShiihJs Porce, perfectly defensible against musketry.
130th Brigadier Ariquetil and Captain Troup had gone
out on horsebaclr ealbly in the morning towards cantonments, arid were unable to return ; but the above fort
and house container1 the usual guard of Sepoys; and
in a garclcn close at hand, called the YdM-IClidna, or
lines of the baggage-cattle, was a small detachment of
the Sh6b's Sappers and Miners, and n party of Captain
Ferris's jazailchis. Captain Trevor's tower was capable
of being made good against a much stronger force
than the rcbels at this prcsent time could havc collected, had it beerr properly garrisoned.
As i t was, the fIRzirbtish, or Icing's Life-guards,
were, under Captain Trevor, congregated round their
leader, to protect him and his family ; which duty, i t
will be seen, thcy well performed under very trying
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circumstances., For what took place in this quarter I
beg to refer to a communication made to me at my
request by Captain Colin Macltenzic, Assistant Political
Agent at PeshBwar, who then occupied the godown
portion of the fort above mentionect, which will be
found hereafter.
I have already stated that Brigadier Shclton was
early in the day directed to procccd with part of the
Siyiih Sang force to occupy the 13515 IIisAr, and, if
requisite, to lead liis troops against the insurgents.
Captain Lawrence, military secretary to the Envoy,
was at the same timc sent forward to prepare the king
for that officer's reception. Taking with llim four
troopers of the Body-guard, he was galloping along the
main road, when, shortly after crossing thc river, he
was suddenly attacked by an Afghbn, who, rushing
from behind a wall, made a desperate cut at liim with
a large two-handed lmife. I-Ie dextcrously avoidcd
the blow by spuming his horse on one side ; but, passing onwards, he was fired up011 by about fray men,
who, having seen his approach, ran out from tlle
Liihor gate of the city to intercept him. I-Ie reached
the B616 H i s k safe, where he found the king apparently
in a state of great agitation, he having witnessed the
assault from the window of liis palace. EIis Majesty
expressed an eager desire to conform to thc Envoy's
wishes in a11 respects in this emergency.
Captain Lawrence was still conferring with the king,
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when Lieutenant Sturt, our executive engineer, rushed
into the palace, stabbed in three places about the face
and neclr. He had been sent by Brigadier Shelton to
make arrangements For the accommodation of the
troops, and had reached the gate oE the Diwhn Ichina,
or hall of audience, when the attempt at his life was
made by some one who had concealed himself there
for that purpose, and who immediately effected his
escape. The wounds were fortunately not dangerous,
and Lieutenant Sturt was conveyed back to cantonments in the king's own palanquin, under a strong
escort. Soon after this, Brigadier SheltonJs force arrived; but the day was suffcred to pass without anything beirig done demonstrative of British energy and
power. The rn~wderof our countrymeu, and the spoliation of public and private property, was prepetrated
with impunity within a mile of our cantonment, aud
under the very walls of the 13616 IIiuAr.
Such an exhibition of wealcness on our pnst taught
the enemy their strenglll--confimn~cd against us those
who, however disposed to join in the rebellion, had
hitherto kept aloof from prudential motives, and ultimately encouraged the nation to unite as one man for
our destruction.
It was, in fact, the crisis of all others calculated to
test the qualities oE a military commander, to bring
forth genius from its lurking place, or t o detect the
absence of that rarest of nature's gifts. It would be

the height of injustice to a most amiable and gallant
officer not to notice the long course of painful and
wearing illness, which had materially affected the
nerves, and probably even the intellect, of Generill
Elphinstone; cruelly incapacitating him, so far as hc
was personally concerned, from acting in this sudden
emergency with the promptitutle and vigour necessary
for our preservation. lfajor-General Elphinstone had
some time before represented to Lord Auclrland the
shattered state of his Iical.lt11, stating plainly and
honestly that it had unfitted him to co~itiriuein command, and requesting permission to resign. Lord
Auckland acceded to his wishcs; and the General was
on the point of returning to India, thence to cmbark
for England, when the rebellion unhappily broke out.
No one, who knew General Elphinsto~ie,could fail to
ic
esteem his many excellent qualities both in p ~ ~ b lanrl
private life. 'To all under his command, not excepting
the youngest slibaltern, he was cver accessiblc, and in
the highest degree courteous and considcrate : nor did
he ever exhibit, either in word or practiceJ the slightest
partiality for officers of his own service over those of'
the Company. His profcsvional Imomlerlge was extensive; and, before disease had too much impared his
frame for active exertion, he llad zealously applied
himself to improve and stimulate every branch of the
service. I-Ie had, indeed, but one unhappy fault as
general-the result, probably, of age and infirmity-
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and this was a want of coi~fidencein his own judgment,
leading him too often to prefer the opinions of others
to his own, until, amidst the conflicting vicws of a
mullitude of counsellors, he was at a loss which course
to take.-% Hence much of that indecision, procrastination, and warit of mcthod which occrtsionally paralyzed our efforts, gradually disheartened the troops,
and ultimately proved a source of calamity to all concerned. I will nevestheless add, that during the siege
no one exposed himseu n o r e f'~a~1essl-y
or frequently
to tlie enemy's fire than General Elphinstone : but
his gallarltry was never doubted, Unhappily, Sir William Macuaghten at first rnade light of the insurrection, and, by his representations as to the general
feeling of the people towards us, not only deluded himself, but misled thc General in council. The unwelcome truth was so011 forced upon us, that in the whole
1lfgh6n nation we could not reclron on a single friend.
But though no active measures of aggression were
taken, all necessary preparatious were made to secure
the cantonment against attaclr. I t fell to my o m lot

* Lady Sale writes t o the sume effect :-"We nro now in oircumfltances which r o q u i ~ ea man of energy to cope with them. Major
Thain is said t o be a good adviser, but, unfortunately, it is not
always in tho multitude of connsellors that there is wisdom; and
so many proffered their advice and oros~edhis, that Thain withdrew
his, and only now answers such questions as are put t o him." .
" General Elphinstone vacilhtes on every point.
His own judgment appoms to be good, but he is swayed by the lnsb speaker."

..

;
I

to place every available gun in position round the
works. Besides the grins already mentioned, we had
in the magazine six 9-pounder iron guns, thrce 24~ o ~ i n d ehowitzers,
r
one 12-pountler ditto, and thrce
54-inch mortars : but tlle detail of artillel-ymen fell
very short of what was 1-equircd to ninn all thesc
efficiently, consisting of only eighty Parljlibis bclongirig
to the ShBh, under Lieutenant Wasburton, very insufficiently instructed, an? of doubtful fiilelity.
To render our position intelligible, i t is necessary
to describe thc cantonment, or fortified lines so called.
It is uncertain to whom the blatnc justly attaches
for the faults which I am about to dcscribe, but the
credit of having selected a sitc for the cantonments,
or controlled the execution of its works, is not a distinction now lilrely to bc claimed cxclusivcly by any
one. But it must always remain rt wonder that any
Government, or any officer or set of officcrs, who had
either science or cxperience in the field, should, in a
half-conquered country, fix their forces (already inadequate to the services to which thcy might bc called)
in so extraordinary and injudicious a military pbsi- ,
tion. Every engineer officer who had bccn consulted,
since the first occupation of Kiibul by our troops, had
pointed to the BBb IlisBr as the only suitable place
for a garrisou which was to lrecp in subjection tile
city and the surroullding country; but, above all, it
was Burel$ the only proper sitc for the rnagazi~ze,

.
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on which the army's efficiency depended. In defiancc,
however, of rule and precedent, the position eventually
fixed upon for our magazine and cantonment was a
piece of low swampy ground, commanded on all sides
by hi119 or forts. It consisted of a low rampart and a
narrow ditch in the form of a
thrown
up along the line of the ICohistgn road, onc thousand
yards long and six hundred broad, with rounrl flanking
bastions at each corner, every one of which was commanded by some fort or hill. To one end of this
work was attached a space nearly half as lailge again,
and surrounded by a simple wall. This was callcd the
"Mission Compound: half of it was appropriated
for tlle residence of the Envoy, the othcr half being
crowded with buildings, erected without any attempt
at regularity, €or the accommodation of thc officers
and assistants of the mission, and 'the Envoy's bodyguard. This large space required in timc of siege
to be defended, and thus materially wealcened the
garrison; while its very existence rendered the whole
face of the cantonment, to which it was annexed,
nugatory for purposes of defence. Besides these
disadvant~ges, thc lines were a great deal too extended, so that the ramparts could not be properly
manned without harassing the garrison. On the eastern side, about a quarter of a mile oil, flowed the
KAbul river in a direction parallel with the Koliistjn
road. Between the river and cantonments, about
jJ

,

'
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one hundred and fifty yards from the latter, w a s a
widc canal. General Elphiastone, on his arrival in
April, 1841, perceived at a glance the utter u n f i t n e s s
of the cantonment for purposes of protracted dcfence,
and when a new fort was about to be built for the
magazine on the south side, he liberally offered t o
purchase for the Government, out of his own f u n d s ,
n large portion of the land in the vicinity, with t h e
view of removing some very objectionable inclosures
and gardens, which offered shelter to our e n e m y
within two hundred yards of ourramparts; but n e i t h e r
was his offer accepted, nor were his reprcsentatione
o n the subject attentled wit11 any goocl result. H e
lost no time, however, in throwing a bridge over t h e
river, in a direct line between the cantonments a n d
the Siy6h Sang camp, and in rendering the bridge over
t h e canal passablc for guns ; which judicious m e a s u r e
shortened the distance for artillery and infantry by at
least two miles, sparing, too, the necessity which
existcd previously of moving to and fro by t h e main
road, which was commanded by three or four f o r t s
as well as from the city walls. Moreover, t h e K & b u l
River being liable t o sudden riscs, and almost always
unfordable during the rainy season (March and April),
it will easily be understood that the erection of t h i s
bridge was a work of much importance. But t h e most
unaccomta~leoversight of all, and that which m a y
b e said to have contributed most largely to our sub-
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sequent disasters, was that of having the commissariat
stores detachedfiov~cantonmeuts, in an old fort which,
in an outbreak, would be almost indelensible. Captain Skinner, the chief commissariat oofccr, at thc time
when this arrangement was made, earnestly solicited
from the authorities a place within the cantonment for
his stores, but received for answer that ("0 such place
could be given him, as they were far too busy in
erecting ban.aclrs for the men, to think of commissariat
stores." The Envoy himself pressed this point very
urgently, but without avail. At the south-west angle
of cantonments was the biimlr village, swrounrled by
low wall, and so crowded with mud lluts as to form a
pe~fect maze. Ncarly opposite, with only the high
road between, was thc small fort of Mllhamrnad Sharif,
which perfectly comn~anded our south-west bastion.
Attached t o this fort was thc Sh6h Bhgh, or Iring's
garden, anrrounded by a hi& wall, and comprising a
spaceof about I~rtlfa s q u a i ~mile. About t~vohur~dred
yards highcr up the road towards the city, was the
commissal.iat fort, the gate of which stood very nearly
opposite the entrance of the Shtih Btigh. There were
variocs other forts at different points of our works,
which will be mentioned in the course of events. On
the east, at the distance of about a mile, was a range
of low hills dividing us horn the Siy;ih Sang camp;
and on the west, about the same distance off, was
another somewhat higher range, at the north-east
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cantonment appears to have becn purposely surrounded
with difficulties ; indeed, a stranger might suppose that
many of thc mud forts, approacliing so closely to the
walls, must have been built for the express purpose of
besieging it. With this full lcnowledge of the tlifficulties of their position, it is a matter of surprise that
our military authorities did not throw themselves into
the Biilti I-Iislir, a movement that might have been
effecter1with littlc loss at any period of the siege, by
holding the heights of Siy:ih Sang whilst passing the
munilions from place to place ; and even had carriage
been wantir~gfor the commissariat stores, our troops,
holding the town of IChbul at their mercy, could have
secured provisions to any amount."
No highcr corroborative testimony than the above
could be wished or cupected. I t may, however, now
bc stated, without hesitation, that what have been
deemed " milita~y" errors had a " political" origin,
and were the natural result of regarding Afghbistjn
as a settled country, and the British force as a mere
police establishment. When cmployed against an
open enemy in the field, military commanders lcnow
what is expected of them, and arrange their plans accordingly, but when thcir every action, involving expenditure, is subject to civil control, so that not cven
the simplest field-worlc can be undertaken without a
reference to that controlling power, which, in its turn,
must perhaps refer the matter to a thrifty Gove~nment

.

some two thousand milcs distant, and when they are
autl~oritativelyasn~rcdthat all around them breathes
peacc and lasting quiet, even the wisest generals may
be tempted by a love of cnsc, or by a distaste for petty
interference, to become callolls in allowing that which
they secretly disapprove ; and, being dependent on the
civil authorities for information, may be imperceptibly
ensnared into a state of fatal security.
And thus it was at KAbul, and l;o that fruitfi~lsource
of mischief may be traccd those faulty military ar~angementswhose disastrous tendency was but too

I
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i
I
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truly foreseen and honestly pointed out by Brigadier
Roberts and others, while yet thcre was time to
the evil.
When Sir Willoughby Cotton, on his rctuTrt march
from KAbul, met his successor, ~ e n c Elphinstone,
d
in the Panj;ib, he congratdated the latter on. having
obtained so pleasant a post, where all ~vxsin a state of
peaceful repose, little dreaming that the pal-adisc of
ease and quiet he thus conf dently bequeathed was like
that of a mine of gunpowder to which the lightecl slowmatch liad alrea.dy been applied.]
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November 3rd.-AT 3 A.M. the alarm was sounded at
the castern gate of cantonments, in consequence of a
brisk file-firing in the direction of Siy& Sang, which
turned out t o proceed from the 37th Regiment Native
Infantry on its return from Khurd-Kcibul, having been
closely followed up the whole way by a body of about
three thousand Ghalzis. The regiment managed, nevertheless, to save all its baggage excepting a few tents,
which were left on the ground for want of carriage,
and to bring i n all the wounded safe.

A more orderly march was never made under such
trying circumsta~ices,and it reflects the highest credit
on Major Griffiths and all concerned. This regiment
was a valuable acquisition to om* garrison, being deservedly esteemed one of the best in the service. Three
guns of the Mountain Train, under Lieutenant Green,
accompanied them, and were of the greatest use in
defending the rear on the line of march. I n consequence of their arrival, a rcinforcemcnt was sent into
the BBlB I-Iisk, consisting of the left wing 54th Native
Infantry, with Lieutenant Green's guns, one iron
9-pounder, one 24-pounder howitzer, two 5$-inch
mortars, and a supply of magazine stores. They all
reached it in safety, though a few shots were Gred at
thc rear-guard from some orchards near the city.
nrigadier Shelton was ordered to maintain a sharp
fire upon the city from the howitzers and guns, and to
endeavour to fire the houses by means of shells and
carcasses from the two mortars ; should he also find
it practicable to send a force into the city, he was t o
do so.
Early in the aftelnoon a detachment under Major
Swayne, consisting of two companies 5th Native Infantry, one of Her Majesty's 44th, amd two I-Iorse
Artillery guns under Lieutenant Waller, proceeded out
of the western gate towards the city, to eflect, if possible, a junction at the Ljhor gate with a part of Brigadier Shelton's force from the B618 Hisk. They
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drove back and defeated a party of the encmy who
occupied the road near the Sh6h BBBgh, but had to encounter a sharp fire from the I<ohist&n gate of the
city, and from the walls of various enclosures, behind
which a number of marksmen had concealed themselves, as also from the fort of Mahrndd KhBn commanding the road along which they had to pass.
Lieutenmt Waller and several Sepoys mere wounded.
Major Swayne, observing the whole line of road towards the Liihor gate sutrongly occupied by some
Afghtin horse and jazailchis, and fearing that he would
be unable to effect the object in view with so small a
force unsupported by cavalry, retired into cantonments.
Shortly after this, a l a ~ g ebody of the rebels having
issued from thc foyt of Mahmhl K h h , nine hundred
yards south-east of cantonments, extended themselves
in a line dong the bank of the liver, displaying's flag;
an iron 9-pounder was brought to bear on them from
our south-east bastion, and a round or two of shrapnel
caused them to seek shelter behind some neighbouring
banlrs, whence, d t e r some desultory firing on both
sides, they retired.
Whatever hopes may have been entertained, up to
this period, of a speedy termination to the insurrection,
they began now to wax fainter every hour, and an order
was despatched to the officer commanding at Kandahtir
to lose no time in sending to our assistance the 16th and
43rd Regiments Native Infmtrg (which were under

7 "
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orders for India), together with a troop of Horse Artillery, and half a regiment of Cavalry; an order was
likewise sent off to recall General Sale with his brigade
from Gandftmak. Captain John Conolly, political
assistant to the Envoy, went into the BQlB Hisgr
early this morning, to remain with the king, and
to render every assistance in his power t o Brigadier
Shelton.
On this day Lieutenant Richard Maule, commanding
the Kohistrini Regiment, which on its return from
Zurrnat had been statione8 at Kaedara in Rohistin,
about twenty miles north-west of K&bd,with the object of keeping down disaffection in that quarter,
being deserted by his men, was, together with local
Lieutenant Wheeler, his adjutant, barbarously murdered by a bancl of rebels. They defended themselves
resolutely for several minutes, but at length fell under
the fire of some jazails. Lieutenant Maule had been
previously informed of his danger by a friendly nativc,
but chose rather to run the risk of being sacrificed
than desert the post assigned him. Thus fell a noblehearted soldier and a devout Christian.
Novernbe~ 4th.-The
enemy having taken strong
possession of the SIidh Bdgh, or King's Gasden, and
thrown a gamison into the fort of Muhammad Sharif,
nearly opposite the b h k , eflectually prevented any
communication between the cantonment and commissal-iat fort, the gate of which latter was commanded
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by the gate oE the ShBh BBgh on the other side of the
road.
Ensign Warren, of the 5th Native Infantry, at this
time occupicd the commissariat fort with one hundred
men, and having reported that he was very hard
pressed by the enemy, and in danger of being cornpletely cut off, the General, either forgetful or unaware
at the moment of the important fact that upon the
possession of this fort we were entirely dependent for
provisions, aud anxious only to save the lives oE men
whom he believed to be in imminent peril, hastily gave
directions that a party under the command of Captain
Swayne, of IJer Majesty's 44th Regiment, should proceed immediately to bring off Ensign Warren and his
garrison to cantonments, abandoning the fort to the
enemy. A few minutes previously an attempt to relieve
him had been made by Ensign Gordon, with a company of the 37th Native Infantry and eleven camels
laden with ammunition; but the party were driven
back, and Ensign Gordon killed. Captain Swayne
now accordingly proceeded towards the spot with two
companies of Her Majesty's 44th; scarcely had they
issued from cantonments ere a sharp and destructive
fire was poured up011 them from Muhammad SharifJs
Eort, which, as they procccdcd, was taken up by the
marksmen i n the ShBh BAgh, under vhose deadly aim
both officers and men suffered severely; Captains
Swayne and Robinson of the 4 t h being killed, and

Lieutenants Hallahan, Evans, and Fortye wouncled, in
this disastrous business. It now seemed, t o the officer
on whom the command had devolved, impracticable to
bring off Ensign Warren's party, without risking the
annihilation of his own, mhich had alreacly sustainecl
so rapid and severe a loss in officers ; he thereEore returned forthwith to cantonmcnts. I n the course 01
the evening, another ilttcmpt was made by a party of
the 5th Light Cavalry ; hut they encountcrccl so sevcre
a fire from the neighbouring en'closures as obliged
them t o return without effecting thcir dcsircd object,
with the loss of cight troopers killed and fourteen 11acUy
wounded. Captain Boyd, the Assistant CommissaryGeneral, having mcanxrhile been made acqnaintecl with
the General's intention to give up the fort, hastenecl
to lay helore him the disastrous consequences that
would ensue Prom so cloing. H e stated that the place
contained, besides layge supplies of wheat and iLt6, all
his stores of rum, mcdiciue, clothing, kc., the value of
which might be estimated at Eour lacs of rdpis ; that
t o ahandon such valuable property would not only
expose the force t o the immediate want of the necessaries of life, but would infallibly invpirc the enemy
with tenfolcl coupage. IIe addecl that we had not
abovc two daysJ supply of provisions in cantonmcnts,
anrl that neither himsclf nop Captail] Jolinson, of
the Shall's commissariat, had any prospect of procuring tliem elsewhere under existing circumstances.
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In consequence of this strong representation on the
part of Captain Boyd, the General sent immediate
orders to Ensign Warren to hold out the fort to the
last extremity. (Ensign Wanen, it must be remarked,
denied having received this note.) Early in the night
a letter was received from him to the effect that he believed the enemy were busily engaged in mining one of
the towers, and that such was the alarm among the
Sepoys that several of them had actually made their
escape over the wall to cantonments; that the enemy
merc making preparations to burn down the gate ; and
that, considering the temper of his men, he did not
expect to bc ablc to hold out many hours longer,
unless reinforced without delay. I n reply to this he
was informed that he would be reinforced by 2 n . n ~
At about 9 o'clock P.M. there was an assembly of
staff and other officers at the General's house, when
the Envoy came in and expresscd his serious coilviction
that, unless Mtlhammad Sharif's fort mere taken that
very night, we should lose the commissariat fort, or
a t all events be unable to bring out of it provisions for
the troops. The disaster of the morning rendered the
General extremely unwilling to expose his officers and
men to any similar peril; but, on the other hand, it
was urged that the darkness of the night would nullify
the enemy's fire, who would also most likely be
taken unawares, as it was not the custom of the
Afghrins to maintain a very strict watch at night. A

'

104

THE KABUL INSURRECTION OF

1841-42.

man in Captain JollnsonJs employ mas accordingly sent
out to reconnoitre the ~ l a c c ;he returned in a few
minutes with t h ~intelligence that about twenty men
were seated outside the fort near the gate, smoking and
tallring; and from what he overhcard of their conversation, he judged the garris~ilto be vel'y small, and
unal~leto l7csist a sudden onset. The debate was now
resumed, but allother hour ~ a s s c dancl the General could
not make 1113 his mind. A sccond spy was despatched,
whose report tended to corroborate what the first had
said. I was the11 sent to Lieutenant Sturt, the engineer, who was nearly recovered from his wounds, for
his opinion. I-Ic at first expressed himself in favour of
an immediate attack, but, on hearing that some of the
enemy were on the watch at the gatc, he judged it
prudent to defer the assault till an early h o w in the
morning : this decided the General, though not before
several hours had dipped away in fruitless discussion.
Orders mere at last given for a detachment to b e in
readiness a t 4 n . M . at the Kolisthn gate; and Captain
Bellew, Dcputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, volunteered to blow open the gate; another party of Her
Majesty's 44th were at the same time to issue by a
cut i n the south face of the rampart, and march simultaneously towards the commissaxiat fort, to reinforce
the garrison. Morning had, however, well dawned
ere thc m c n could be got under arms; and they were
on the point of ,marching off, when it was reported
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that Busign MTwreli had just arrivcd irl cantonments
with liis garrison, having evacuated the fort. I t seems
that thc Fnemy llncl actually set fire to the gate; ald
Ensigu Warren, sceing no prospect of a reillforcemei~t,
and cxpccti~lgthe cuemy every moment to rush in,
led out his mcn by a hole which he had prepared in
thc mall. Being called upon in n public letter fiom
the Assistmlt Adjutant-General to state his reasom for
abmdol\i~ighis post, he replied that Ile 7v:ls ready to
do so beforc :L court of inquiry, lsllicll he rcqucsted
might be asscm1)lcd to investigate liis conduct ; it mas
dccmcd cxpcdicnt to con~plyioitli his
not, Iio~~cvc~;
rcqucst.
J t isbeyoud a donht t l l d our feeble and irleircctud
defeiioc of this fort, and tlic valuable booty it yieldecl,
mas the firstJrrta1 blow to our supremacy at I<:ibul, and
at once cletc~~minecl
those cliicfs-and more particulally
the 1Cexilb;ishes-who had hitherto remained neut~*al,
to join in the general combillation to drive us fi.on1 the
country.
Captain Trcvol', having hcld out his house against
the rebcls until all hope of relief mas nt an end, was
safely escorted illto cmtonnlents this inorniiig, with
his wife and seven chilcll.eu, by his I-IliairbAsh horsemen,
who behaved faithfully, but nowJ out of regwcl for
their fi~milies, dispersed to their houses. Captain
Mackenzic, lilremise, after defending liis fort until liis
ammunition mas expended, fought his way into canton-
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,cnts late last night, having received a slight mound
tile road. His men had behaved with the utmost
bra1y=ry, and made several successfid sallies. (See his
o l r ~ laccount.)
,\rovernbcr 5tl~.-It no sooner became generally lrnorrm
tl,:,t tile commissariat fort, upon which me mere clcpclldent for supplies, had been abandoned, than o n e
uliivel-srtl feeling of indignation pervaded the garrison ;
nor car1 I describe the impatience of the ti*oops, but
espccialIy tlie native portion, to be lecl out for its recnpt~zre-a feeling that was b ~ 130
r means diminishecl by
tlleir seeing the Afghiins crossing and rc-crossing the
between thc commissaimiatfort and t h e gate of the
Shhh B6gh, laden with the piqovisionaupon which had
dcpendcd our ability to make a protmcted defence:
Observing this disposition among the troops, and feeliag the importance of checking the triumph of l;he
c11cn1.y i n its infancy, I st~ennouslyurged the Genera]
to scrlcl oxit a arty to capture Muhammad Sharif's
fort by blowing open the gate, and volunteered myself
to k c c p the road clear from any sudden advance of
cavrtlry, with two Horse Artillery guns, under cover of
w l ~ o s efirc the storming party could advance along the
road, protected from the fire of the fort by a low w a n ,
mhicll lined the road the wholc way. The G e n e r a l
tigreed ; a storming party fi-om the 5th Native Infantlqg
was ordered; tlie powder Bags were got ready; and
at a b o u t 12 mid-day we issued from the western g a t e :
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the guns led the may, and were brought into action
under the partial cover of some trees, within one hundred yards of the fort. For the space of twenty
minutes tlie artillery continued to work the guns under
an excessively sharp fire from the walls of the fort;
but the storming party, probably in uncertainty as to
an entrance having been secured, had in the meantime
remained stationary under cover of tlie w d by the
road side. The General, who was watching. pyoceediags
fi~omthe gateway, observing that the gun ammunition
was running short, and that the troops Lad from some
~mlcnown cause failed to talre advalltage of thc best
opportunity for aclvvnncing, recalled us into cantonments : thus the enemy enjoyed their triurnplx undimhished.
November 6th.-It mas now determined to talc; the
fort of Muhammacl Sharif by regular I~reachancl assault.
At an early hour, tliree iron 9-pouncler guns. were
brought t o bear upon its north-east bastion, aiid two
howitzers upon the contiguous curtain. I took charge
of the former, and Lienteaant Warburton of the latter.
I n the space of about two hours s practicable breach
. was effected, during which time a hot f i ~ was
e poured
upon the artillerymen from the enemy's sharpshooters,
stationed in a couple of Iiigh towers which completely commanded thc battery, whereby, as the embrasures crumbled away from the constant concussion,
it becme at length a difficult task to work the guns.

A storming party, composed of three companies, viz.
one company of Her Majesty's 44th under Ensign
Raban, one company 5 t h Native Infantry under
Lieutellant Deas, one company 37th under Lieutenant
Steer, the whole commanded by Major Griffiths,
' speedily cul,ied
the place. Poor Raban was shot
through the heart, when conspicuously waving a
flag on the summit of the breach.
As this fort adjoined the ShAh BBjgh, i t was deemed
advisable to dislodge the enemy from the latter, if
possible. Learning that there was a large opening in
the wall in the north side of the garden, and being left
to exercise my own discretion, I took a 6-pounder
gun thither, and fired several rounds of grape and
shrapnel1 upon parties of t h e enemy assembled within
under the trees, which speedily drove them out; and
had a detachment of infantry been ordered to take
advantage of the opportunity thus afforded to throw
themselves into the building at the principal entrance
by the road side, the place might have been easily
carlied permanently, and immediate repossession could
have been then taken of the commissariat fort opposite,
which had not yet been emptied of half its contents.
While this was going on, a reconnoitring party under
Majol. Thain, Aide-de-camp, consisting of one Horse
Artillcry gun, one troop 5th Cavalry, and two companies
of infantry, scoured the plain to the west of cantonments; and having driven the enemy from several
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enclosures, were returning homeward, when large
numbers of A f g h h horse and foot mere observed t o
proceed from the direction of the city towards the
sonth-west extremity of a hill, which runs in a diagonal
direction horn north-east to soutli-west across the
plain, t o the west of cantonments. A risA1ah of
Anderson's Horse had been stationed on the summit
of this hill all thc morning as a picket, whence they
had just been recalled, when a largc body of the
enemy's horsc reached the base, and proceeded to crown
the summit. Major ThdnJs .pmty, observing this,
came to a halt; and a few minutes afterwards a reinforce~nentoppo~tunelyarrived, consisting of one risiilah
of Irregular EIorse under Captain Anderson, one tyoop
of ditto uncler Lieutenant Wallcel; and two troops 5th
Cavalry uncler Captains Collyer and Rott. I now
considered it my duty to join the Horse Artillery gun,
which had no officer with it, and I nccorclingly left the
6-pounder gun under the protection of Captain MacIrenzie, who, with a fern of his jazailchis, had now joined
me, having been engaged in skirmishing across the
plain tomai,ds the west end of the ShAh BRdgh, vhere,
finding au opening, he had crept in with his mcn, and
cleared that part of the garden, but, not being supported, had been obliged to retire with a loss of fifteen
ldled out of ninety-five.
I now advanced with the Horse h t i l l e r y gun, supported by a troop of the 5th Cavalry, to the foot of

'
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the hill, and opened fire upon the enemy, while the
rest of the cavalry, headed by Anderson's Horse, rode
brislrly up the slope to force them off. The officers
gallantly headed their men, and encountered about an
equal number of the enemy, who advanced to meet
them. A hand-to-hand encounter now took place,
which ended in the Afghhn Horse retreating to the
plain, leaving the hill in our possession. I n this affair
Captain Anderson personally engaged, and slew the
brother-in-law of Abd-rdlah ICh6nin. Meaizwhile the
enemy began to munter strong on the plain to the west
of the Shhh BBBgh, whence they appeared to be gradually
extending tl~emselvestowards the cantonments, as if to
intercept our return; it was therefore deemed prudent
to recall the cavalry from the height, and show front
in the plain, where they could act with more effect. A
reinforcement of two companies of infantry and one
Horse Artillery gun was sent out, and the whole force
was drawn up in order of battle, anticipating an attaclr,
with 'one gun on either flank. I n this position a
distant fire was kept up by the enemy's jazailchis, which
mas answered principally by discharges of shrapnell
and rouud shot from the guns ;the heights, too, were
again crowned by the Afghan horse, but no disposition
was manifested by them to encounter us in open
fight, and, as the night gradually closeh in, they
lowly retired to the city. On this occasion about
one hundred of the enemy fell on tlie hill, while the
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loss on our side mas eight troopers lrilled and fourtcen
wounded.
It will be rcmcmbered that I left a 6-pounder gun
at the opening in the mall of the Slllih BAgh. After
my departure, large numbers of the enemyJs infantry
had filled tlie mest end of the Shill BAgh, and, stealing
up among tlie trees, and close to the high ~vall,towards
the gun, Irept np so hot and precise a fire as to render
its removal al~solutelynecessuy. Captain Mackcnzie
had been joined by a party of Hcr Majesty's 44th ;
with mllom, and vivith a f e of~ his o m men, he cndeavoured to covcr the operjtion, wllicli vas extremely
diffic~~lt,
it heing necessasy to dsng tlze gun by hand
over l a d ground. Several of the ShAhJs gunners mcre
Irilled, a~idmaiiy of the covering p a ~ t yliaoclred over,
the gun being barely saved. I may here add, that
from this time forwalqd the jazailchis, under thc able
direction of Captain Maclrenzie, wlio volunteered to
Iead them, mere formarc1 to disl;inguish themselves on
all occasions, niid continued to the very last a most
useful part of our force.
Novem6er 8th.-An attempt was made by the enemy
to minc one of the towers of the fort me captured on
the 6thJ which could not Izave happened had we talren
possession of the gate of the Sh6h 136gh at the same
time. Our chief cause of anxiety now mas the empty
state of our granary. Even with high bribes and
liberal payment, the Envoy co~ddonly procure a scanty
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supply, insufficient for daily consumption, from tlie
village of Bemhli, abont half a mile down the Kohistjn
road, to the north. The objcct of the enemy undoubtedly was to starve us out; to effect which, the
chiefs exerted their whole influence to prevent o u l being
supplied from any of the neighbouring forts. Their
game mas a sure onc; and so long as they held
firmly together, it could not fail to be sooner
or later successful. Dwing the short interval of
quiet which ensued after our capture of the fort, the
rebels managed to rig out a couple of guns which thcy
procured from the work-yard of Lieutenant Warburton
(in charge of the ShBhYsguns), situated, unfortu~ately,
in the city. These tllcy placed in a position near
MahmGd KhfLn's fort, opposite the south-east bastion
of cantonments. All this time a cannonade was
daily lrept up on the town by Captain Nicholl of the
Horse Artillery i n the BAlA IIisSir; but, though considerable damage was. thereby done, and many 01 the
enemy killcd, it required a much more powcrfill battery
than he possessed to ruin a place of such extent. On
the morning of the 2nd, when the rebellion comme~~cecl,
the two guns, which were sent with Campbell's Hindtistanie into the city, had been left outside the gate of
the B616 H i s k in the confusion and h u n y of retreat,
where they had ever since remained. So jealous EL
watch was kept over these by the enemy from the houses
of the Sh5h BBLzk, that it was found impossible to get
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them back into the fort; and it was necessary for our
troops to maintain an equally strict watch to pllevent
thcir being removed by the enemy, v h o nlade several
desperate cfforls to obtain them. An attempt of this
kind toolr place to-day, when the rebels were driven back
into the city with considerable loss.
November 9th.-The General's weak state of health
rendeying the presence of a coadjutor absolutely
necessary, to relieve him from thc cornmalld of the
garrison, Brigadier Shelton, the seconcl in command,
was, at the carncst request of the Envoy, s~unrnonetl
in from the BQ& IIisb, in tlze hope that, by heartily cooperating with the Envoy and General, he would
strengthen their hands and rouse tlze sinking confidence
of the troops. I-Ie entered cantonments tliis morning,
bringiug with him one Horse Artillery gun, one
Mountain Train ditto, one company of Her Majesty's
44thJ the Shah's GthI~ifanti-y,and a small supply of Atit.
[The following memorandum of Brigadie~ SheltoliJs services, extracted from the "Naval and Military
Gazette " of the lollowing year, bears strong evidence
of his previous exyerience in w a ~ , and gallantry in
the field :" General Sheltoll entered the Army in November,
1805. In 1808, he was p~esentat the battles of RoleiFa
and Vimiera. I n 1809, in the retreat t o Corunna, and
in the expedition to Walcheren. I n 1810, at the battle
of Busaco. I n 1811-12, at the sieges of Baclajos. I n
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1812, at the battle of Salanlanca, the taking of Maclrirl,
and in the retreat from Burgos. I n 1813, at thc battle
of Vittoria, and at the siege of San Sebastiau, where
h e lost his right arm. I n 1814, in operations before
Bayoune. In Canada (Lake Onta~io). In 1824,
employed in the operatiolls and capture of Arracan.
In 18411, he marched with a brigade to Afgl16nist6nin,
and in February mas despatched to the Nazian Vdley,
and undeytook military operations them, after which
he marched to K6bul. Except three monthsJ Ieavc
on account of his wound, he servecl during the whole of
the Peninsular war; and, as he was a Captain in 1812,
hehad more than Subaltern experience in that war !
At the end of the war he went to Sanclhurst, and
obtained the usual certificate. I-Ie has becn twenty
years in India."]
'
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CH.APTER VI.
DIFFEItENCE

OF OPINION BETWEEN BRIGADIER SHELTON

AND S I R WILLIAIC MACNAGHTEN.-ANNOYAWE

FROM

TLIE F I R 3 O F T H 3 ENEMY OUT OF SEVERAL FORTS,STORMING OF THE RIKA-BASH1 PORT, UNDER BRIGAD I E R SHELT0N.-PERILOUS

SITUATION ANSI BRAVERY

OF LIEUTENANT BIRD.-FURTHER
THE ENEMY.-SUPEXIORITY

ENGAGEMENTS WITH

OF THE AFGHANS I N THE

USE OF FIRE-ARMS.

Novenzber ~ ~ ~ ~ . - ~ - I E W C E P O RBrigadier
W A X D Shelton
bore a conspicuous part in the drama upon the issue of
which so much dcpended. I3e had, however, from the
very first, seemed to despair of the force being kble
t o hold out the winter at Kfibul, and strenuously advocated an immediate retreat to Jsilltildbfid.
Sir William Macnaghten and his suite were alto'gether opposed to Brigadier Shelton in this matter, it
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bciug. in his (the Envoy's) estimation a duty we owed
the Government to retain o u r post, a t whatsoever risk.
This difference of opinion, on a cluestioll of such vital
i m y u r t a ~ ~ c ewas
,
attended mitll unhappy rcsultq inasmuch as it deprived the General, in his hour of need,
of t h e s t r e n g t h which u n a n i ~ n i imparts,
t~
and
an u n c o m ~ ~ u u i c a t i vaei d disheartening reserve in
emergency which demanded the freest intel.ciange of
cou~lsela n d ideas.
[Actiilg on the principle audi alte~amparteln," I
Here insert the ugumellts used by one of Brigadier
Shelton's ablest apologists :ccTTe arc told that he fi-om the first advocated all
immediate r e t ~ e a t o Jall&kAbiid, a n d that Sir IVilliain
Macnnghten and his suite mere altogether opposed t o
Brigadier Sbelton in this matter. We find General
Shelton never dtering this opinion, but at last
L i e u t c n a ~ t St~~zz.t,
upon 2 0 t h December, and Major
Pottingel; 28th December, advocating it, t h e chief
military authoriLies having also adopted it. Tlze Envoy
hacl, howevcr, opposed it-and
Lieutenant Eyre condemns it. But the Duke of Wellington is reported
to have said in the Honse of L o r d s : <After the first
few days, paYticulal.ly after t h e negotiations a t ICiibul
had commenced, it became hopelcss for him (Geueral
E l g l ~ i n s t o ~ l teo) maintain his position : it became evident t h a t sooner or later a movement, which might pousibly fail, t o march the troops from K&hul, mast he
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~mclertalren, and that an attempt must be made to
lnovc them to a plnce of safety.' I-Icar, also, what that
@ant soldier, Sir Robert Sale, says, ello had a few
clays previously left ICAbul, and evidently lmew that
such a move ought to have been made on JalKlribbd,
for in page 1 7 of the Blue Boolr, he writes fivom that
place, so early as the 15th November, U~lderthese
circunzstances, u regard for the Izoizour and interest
qf our Governm,ent compels me to udhere to my plan,
(flready formed, of putt in.^ this place into a stnts of
defence, and holdiwg it, $ possible, until the IidbuZ
,force ,falls baclc upon me.' The natural conclusion of
thc above is, that had General Shelto~zbcen in cornmancl, he would, regardless of the opinion of the
Envoy, have retreated at an early period on JallhlAbLbiLc1, and there is every reason t o believe that he
would have saved the greater part of the force.
" The facts appear t o be these-Brigadier Shelton
~ v a s ordered into. the cantonment by 1% supeilior
officer, Major-General Elphinstone, when the difficulties, dangers, and deranged discipline of the force under
that officer's command appear to hnve abeady attained
a power beyond the energies of his failing health to
contend with; but tlie Major-General did not resign
llis command nor quit the cantonment ; and, although
the Brigadier's advice may have been asker!, and even
talcen, yet no responsibility could have justly attached
to that aclvice, even though it were bad and unsound,

so long as his superior officer continued in the com.nand. The great fault attending the fearful crisis
appears to have been (what in moments of hazard and
danger is almost always the case) too many advisers;
and it is a surprise to me that the step was not taken
of.removing all the non-ekl'ectives to the BBlfi Hisfir.
At the head of these was Sir W. Macnaghten. Why
cvas His Excellency in the military cantonmeilt instead
of being at the DarbAr of ShBh ShujB-ul-Mullc, at which
he was the representative of Her Majesty? I-Iad the
sick General, the Envoy, and all the womcn and chilclrerl, beer1 removed, as so many embarrassments to R
place already exposed to the constant attaclrs of a
vigorous enemy, discipline lnight have been restored to
the British forces ; but was the Brigaclier in a situation to
adopt this energctic step? or, had he suggested it, is there
any reason to believe that it would have been obeyed?
c r Some say the Brigadier ought to have assumed the
commancl. If the Envoy thouglit 'so, he might have
interfered. The assuming command must be at the
risk of an officer's commission, if he fails ! The defect
in the General, Lieutenant Eyre points out; before
Brigadier Sllelton was consulted dl our supplies were
gone-the enemy were on the 9th November too strong
to be attacked and tlie cantonment defended at the
same time. Let people recollect Ruenos Ayres, in 1807,
and a crowded city; K8bul having, also, flat-roofed
houses-fancy t h x e thousand men even (Wllitelocke had
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a much larger force), entering a city, with twenty
tl~ousandto thirty thousand men, armed to the teethguns could not fire on those oL the tops of housesthe streets migllt be clear, but even at Ghazni it was
so-but the Iionse-tops were crowded with men-we
took them by smprise. We had ei~richedthe people,
and the chiefs, become rich, could pay nurne1,ous follo~vers;the fccling against us was too strong to be
changcd after eight clays of rebellion; and soldiers become dispirited when they find the prospect of starvation, and no means of averting their destruction. Tlie
delay of' Sir John Moore's retreat, and through a
dreadful winter,-because political expediency advised
n march on Mncl~id,--in the horrors of which General
Sheltoii shared, and the tcrrible retreat from Moscow,
must have been in his recollection; and he therefore
wished to retreat before the snow should fall, and
before the last day's provisions were served out."]
B L LI~am &gressing.-About 9a.n~.on tlle 10th the
cnemy crowned the heights to the west in great forcc,
and almost simultaneously a large body of horse and foot,
s~~pposcd
to be Ghalzis, who had just arrived, made thcir
appearance on the Sjy&h Sang hills to the p s t , nncl,
after firing a feu-de-joie, set up a loucl shout, ~vhicli
was answered in a similar way by those on the opposite side of us. This was supposed to be a preconcerted
signal for a joint attack on the cantonments. No
movement was, howevor, made on the restern side to

molest 11s) but 011 the eastern quarter parties of the
.ellenlg, moviug down ipto the plain, tool< possession
of all the forts in that direction. One of these, called
tElc Rili6-bGsK fort, mas situated di~ectlyopposite thc
Missiou Compound, at thc north-cast angle of canton.merits, witlliin muslict-shot of our works, into ~vhich
tlze enemy soon began t o pour a very annoying fire ;
party of sharp-shooters at the same time, concealing
tliemselvcs among the ruins of a, housc immediately
opposite tlzc north-east bastion, took deadly aim at thc
European artillerymen who vere x~orlringthe guns,
one poor fellow being shot through tlle temple in thc
act of sponging. From two howitzers and a 54-inch
mortar, a discharge of shells into tlie fort mas kept up
for two hours.
At this time not above two days' supply of p~ovisions
remained in garrison, and it was very clear that, unless
the enemy wc1.e quickly driven out from their. new
possession, we should soon be completely hemmed in
on aU sides. At the Envoy's urgent desire, he taking
thc cntixe responsibility on himself, the Geizeral ordered
a force to hold themselves in reaclincss, uiides Brigadier
Shelton, to storm the Rik&-bdshi fort. About 1 2 ~ ~ .
the following troops assembled at the eastern gate :two 1-Iorse.htilIery guns, one Mountain Train gun,
Wallter's Horse, Her Majesty's 44th Foot under
Colonel Mackerell, 37th Native Infantry under Major
Griffiths, 6th Regiment of ShLh's Force under Captain
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Hopkins. The whole issued from cantonments, a
storming party consisting of two cornpallies from each
regiment taking the lead, preceded by Captain Bellelv,
who h m i e d forward to blov open the gate. Missing
the gate, however, he blew open a wicket of such
sniall dimensions as t o render it impossible for more
than two or three men t o enter ahyeast, aud these in
a stooping posture. This, it will be seen, was one
cause of discomfiture in tlie first instance; for the
hearts of the incn failed them allen they saw their forctnost comrades struck down, endeavouring to force an
entrance under such disadvantageous circ~~mstances,
withont being able to help them. The signal, however,
was given for the storming party, headed by Colonel
Maclrerell. On nearing the wicket, the cletacl~mel~t
encountered an excessively shaiy fire from the walls, and
the small passage, through wliicl~they enrleavoured to
rush in, merely served to expose the bravest to almost
certain death from the hot fire of the defenders. CoIoncl
Maclrerell, however, and Lieutenant Bird of Sl~ih's
6th Infafitry, accompanied by a handful of Europeans
and n few Sepoys, forced their may in; Captain Westmacott of the 37th being shot do~vnontside, and Captain MrCrae sabred in the entrance. The gal-rison,
supposing that these few gallant men were backcd by
the wllole attacking party, flcd in consternation out of
the gate, which was on the opposite side of thc fort,
and which onght t o have been the point assailed. Un-
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fortunately, at this instant a number of the Afgh&n
cavalry charged ~uddenlyround the corner of the fort
next the wicltet : the cry of Cavalry ! " was raised ; a
bugler sounclcd the retreat, and it became for the time
a scene of sauve qui peut. The officers, lmo~vingthe
fearful predicament of their commander, exhorted their
Inen to,charge forward ;but a private of the 44th, named
Stewucl, who was after~ards~romotcd
for his gallantry,
alone obeyecl the call. At this critical juncturc Brigaclier Shelton's aclrnowledged courage redeemed the day ;
for, exposing his owrl person to a, hot fire, lie stood firm
amicht the crowd of fugitives, and "by his exhortatioils
alid example at last rallied tbcm ; advancing again to
the attaclr, again our men faltered, notwithstanding that
the fire of the great guns from the cantonments, and
that of Captain MtlclrenzieJsj aeailcllis from t l ~ cnortheast angle of the Mission Compound, together with a
demonstration on the part of our cavalry, hacl greatly
abiited thc slrdour of thc Afghhn horse. A thircl time
did the Brigadier bring on his men to thc assault,
which now proved successful. We became masters
of the fort.* But what, i n tlie meantime, hail been
((

*

Tho followi~~g
r e m n ~ k sof the "Naval and Milital~yGazette"
are worthy of aonsiclorstion :" Wo would hero observo, with ro~pectto the ~ n n i camongst the
troops at the Rikh-bSshi fort, although not in~medi'atol~
connected
with o w subjecl;, that, whilst it is the o S p ~ ~ i &
ofice
l
of dis~ i l l l i nto~ correct tho tcndetlcy to such disnsto~s,instances of the
uort may be adduced, even in tho ranks of the bravost of tho brave.
Nitpior tolls us, ' t h a t no age, no nation, ever sent forth braver
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passing inside the fort, vhere, it mill be remembered,
several of our bravc brethren had been shut up, as it
were, in tlze lion's dcn ?
On the first rctres~t of our mcn, Lieutenant Bird,
with Colonel Maclccrell and scve1,al Eu~opeans,had
hastily shut the gate by which the garrison had for
the most part evacuated the place, sccnring the chain
with n bayonet; the r e p ~ ~ l soutside,
s
hotve~rer,encouraged tbc enemy to r e t ~ ~ rinn great numbers, and,
it being impossible to remain new the gate on account
of the hot fix ponrecl i n through the creviccs, our
fcw heroes speeclily had the mortification to see
their foes mot . only re-entering the wicket, but,
having drawn the bayonet, i*llsh i n with loud shouts
through the now re-opened @te. Poor Maclrerel1,having
fallcn, was literally liaclrecl t o pieces, although still
alive a t the termination of the contest. Lieuteaant
Bird, with two Sepoys, retreated into a stable, the
door of which they closccl; all the rest of the men,
encleavouriug to cscape th~oughthc wiclrct, mere met
troops to 11attle than thoso vho storu~edBadajos.' Yet, tho sumo
omineilt vritor rolatcs, that, dnrillg tho raging of that storm, 'some
of the soldiers, porcoiviug a IigLtod ma,Gch on tho ground, oried out,
A millo ! " At that word, such is the power of imagint~tiou,thoso
troops whom noithor tllo s h r o ~ ~burlie',
g
nor cloop ditch, uor tho
high walls, nor tho donclly fi1.e or tlie onemy, coulcl stop, fitnggerecl
back, appalled by a chimora of thoir own raising; and, i n this clisorder, a Frencli resorvo drove on tlleul with a firm au(l ri~pi<l
charge,
and pitching Rome men ovor the ~ d l sand
, killing others outright
again clea~eclthe ramparts, ovon to tho S t . Vhcent.' "
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and slanghtered. Bird's place of concealment a t first,
i n the con.lusion, escaped t h e observation of the tern:
-porarily triumphant AfghAns ; at last i t was discovered,
and an attack comrnenced a t the door. This, being
barricaded vith logs of wood, arid whatcver else the
tenants of tlie stal~lecould find, resisted their eflorts,
~vliile13ircl and his now solitary coinpa,nion, a Sepoy of
the 37th Native Imfantry (the other having been struclc
down), maintained as hot a,fire as they coul.d, each shot
taking deadly effect from tile proximity of the party
engaged. The fall of their compnnions deterred the
mass of tlie assailants froin a simultaneous rush, which
must have succeeded; and thus that truly cllivalrous
young officer stood at bay mith his equally brave comrade for upvards of a quarter of an hour, mhen, having
only five cartriclges left, i n spite of having riflecl the
pouch of tllc dead man, they Tvcre rescned as related
above. Our troops literally found t h e pair r r prim and
lonely there," upwards of thirty of the enemy having
fallen by theh- uullassistecl prowess.*
Our loss on this occasion was not less thm two hundred lcilled and wounded. Four neighhouiing forts
weTe immediately evacuated b y the enemy, and occupied
by ouil troops : thcy were found t o contain about one
thousand four hundred mauncls of grain; i n removing

:* Lioutenrtnt Bird's promising career was tragically closed ontho subaequont ~ e t r c a twhen
,
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which no timc was lost, but as it was not fo~uldpracticable to bring off morc than half before night-fall
Captain Boyd, tlie Assistant Commissary-Gcneral,
requested Brigadier Shelton that a guard might be
thrown into a, sinall fort, where it must be left for
tlie night; this was, homcvcr, rcfusecl, and on tlie
following morning, as might have bee11 expected, the
grain was d l gone : permanent possession was, however,
talten of tlle Riltg-bBshi and Zulfilrk Por~s,the towem
of the remainder being blown up 011 thc following day.
3Jurnbel.s of Ghalzi horse ancl foot still maintaining
their positioll on tllc SiyAlill Sang heights, Brigaclier
Shelton moved his force towards that quarter. On
reaching the base of the hill, firc was ol~enedfrom the
two Horse Artillcry guns, which, with the firm fiont
presented by olir troops, caused the enemy shortly
to i*eti.retowards the city, ancl ere we tul~nedhomeward
not a man remained in sight.
~ o u e q n b e y 13lh.-The enemy appeared in great forcc
on the western heights, xvhere, haviug posted two guns,
they fiised into cautoninents with considerable precision.
A t the earnest entreaty of the Envoy, it mas determined
that a party, under Brigadier Shelton, should sally forth
to attack them, ancl, if possible, capture their guns.
[Lady Sale observes :"lt vas with great difficulty the Envoy persuaded
the General and Brigadier to consent to a force going
out; and it was late before the troops werc ready." .

.

"The General again (as in the late attack on the
Rik&-BRsliifort) asked the Envoy if he would take the
responsibility of sending ont the troops on himself;
and, on his concecling, the force was scnt. The Envoy
had also much angry discussion on this point with
Brigadier Shelton.
But all these delays of conference lost much time,
ancl it mas between 4 ancl 5 p.nf. bcfore operations
commenced
The force orderccl for this sciivce was not ready until
3 p.nl. I t co~isistedof the following troops :-two
squadrons 5th Light Cavalry, under Colonel Chambers ;
one squadron Shiih's 211d Irrcgrdar Horse, under Lieutenant Le Geyt ;one t ~ o o pof Skinner's Horse, under
Lieutenant Walker ; tllc Bocly Guard ; six companies
Her Ivlajestg's 44tl.1, under Major Scott ; six companies
37t11, under Major Smayne ; follr compai~ies Sh611~s6th
Illfnntry, under Captain Iloplrins ; ancl one Rorse
Artilleiy gun and one Mountain nain (10. under myself,
escorted by a company of 6th SMhJs uilcler Captain
Mashall. After quitting cantoilments, the troops took
thc direction of a gorge betwceli the two hills bounding
the plain, rlistant about a mile (the enemy's horse
crowning that to the left), and advanced in separate
columns at so brisk a pace, that it seemed a race which
should arrive first at the scene of action. The infantry
had actually reached the foot of the hill, and welt on
the point of ascending to the charge, ere the Horse

.,'I
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Artillery gun, which had been detaincrl in tllc rcnin by
sticking fast in a ca~ial,could be got rcxcly for action ;
nor had more than one roulid of grape been iii.etl, crc
the advance, lcd on by the gallant Major 'L'llairi, llad
closed upon tlie foe, who rcaolutcly stood tlleir gromid
on the s ~ ~ m mofi t tllc ridge, nnd mdlincliing1,ly rrccivcrl
the rliscliargc of our musketrj, which, strmlgc to say,
even at the short rangc of tcn or twclvc yards, sccinctl
to do littlc execution l From this cause tlic enemy,
growing bolder evcry moment, advniiccd close up to
the bayomts of o ~ infantry,
~ r
upou wliuln tllcy pi~csscil
so pcrscverillgly, as to succccd in rll0iving tllcrn 11:~ckwards to thc foot of tllc Ilill, wnundirlg Major '1'11;~ill
on tlie lcft slloulder and s:~l)ringscvcrnl of tllc nlon.
Scvcral rouiids of grape rid sl.lral)ucll wort now l ~ o ~ ~ r c d
iu, and thrcw tllern into some confusion, wlic!l~cul~ona
timely charge of o11r cavalry, Auilcrson's IIorsc tnltilig
the lead, drove tlicln agnill up the llill, when our illfantry once morc advancing' cal*ricd thc heigllt, thc
enemy retreating along the ridge, closcly followctl 1ly
our troops, and ~~bnnrloni~ig
their guns t o us. Thc I-Iorse
Artillery gun now took lip a position in tlle nlidillc of
the gorge, whence it played wit11 effect on a large
bocly of horse asscmblcd on tlle plain wcst of thc hill,
who fortllwitl~retreated to a distance.
[Lady Sale, eye-witness to this scene, writcs tlms :" The Afghhn cavc~lrycharger1 furiously ~ O I V I I the
hill upon our troops in close columll. Tlic 37th Native
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Infaxtry were leading, the 441th in the centre, and the
Sh6hJs 6th in the rear. No square or balls were
formed lo receive thcm. All was a regular confusion;
my vevy Iiea~-tjeltas it leapt to m y teeth wlien I saw
the Afyhn'ns ride cba~l,tl~rouyhthem. The onset was
fearful. They looked like a cluster of bces; but we
beat them, and chove them L I ~again.
"The 5th Cavalry and Anderson's Horse charged
them up the hill again, and drove them along the ridge.
Lieuteni~ntE v e
got the Horse Artillcry gun
illto the gorge, between the Bemhrti hills and that to
the left (the gorge lcading to the plaiu towards thc
lake). From this position, he soon clearcd that plain,
which mas covered with horsemen."]
O w troops had now got into ground where it was
impracticable for Horse Artillery to follom. I accordforward with one artilleryman and a
ingly
supply of drag-ropes and spikes, to look out for the
deserted guns of the enemy ; one of these, a 4-pounder,
mas easily removed along the ridge by n party of the
ShBli's 8th Infantry; but the other, a 6-pounder, was
awkwardly situated in a ravine half-way domn the
side of the hill, our troops, with the Mountain Train
3-pounder, being drawn up along the ridge just above it.
The eveuing mas now fast closing in, and a large bocly
of Afghhn infantry occupied some enclosures on the
plain below, mhence they kept up so hot a fire upor1
the gun, as to render its l'emoval by no means an easy
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taslr; but the Envoy having sent us a message of
entreaty that no exeytions miglit be spared to coml~lete
tlie triumph of the day by bringing off 60th the
enemy's guns, and the furtller detention of the troops
being attended a i t h risk, as the enemy, though driven
from tlle hill, still maintained a threatening attitude
below, I descended with the Horse htillery gunner,
and, having driven in a spike, retusrted to assist in
making sure of the captured 4-pounder. This, from
the steepncss of the hill, and the numerous water-cuts
which everywhere intersected tlic plain, provcd % somewhat troublesome business. Lieutenant Macartney,
however, with a company of the Sh:ihJs 6th Infantry,
urged on his men with zeal, and we at last liad thc
satisfactioil to deposit our prizc sr~fewithin the cantonment gates. Meanwhile tlie enemy, favoured by the
darlmess, prcssecl hard upon our returning troops, and
by dint of incessant firing and shouting rendered their
homeward march somewhat disorderly, effecting, however, but little damage.
I t mas no s~nallclisadvantage under which we laboured, that no temporary success of ow troops over
those of the enemy could be followed up, nor even possession be retained of the ground gained by us at the
point of the bayonet, owing to the necessity of withdrawing our men into their quarters at night. On
reaching the cantonment, we found the garsison in a
state of considerable alarm, and a continual blaze of
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mzlslcetry illuminating the whole line of rampart. Tlik
had arisen from a demonstration of attaclr liaving been
by the enemy on the s ~ ~ t h - bastion,
~ ~ s t which
had been immediately checlred by a few rounds of grape
from the guns, aiid by a wcll-dirccted fire from the
jagailchis under Captain Maclrcnzie; but it mas long ere
quiet
be restored, the men corltinuil~~
to c l i s c h a ~ ~ e
their pieces at they lrnem not what.
Our infantry soldiers, both Eui~opca~l
ancl Native,
might have taken a sah"ary lesson from thc Afglikiis
in tlle use of their fire-arms; thc latter, as a general
rule, taking steady rleliberate aim, and selclorn illrowing
away a siugle shot; ~vhercnsour men sceined t o fire
entirely at random, without ally aim at all ; licilcc the
impunity with wliich the Afghhn horscmcn bravccl tlie
discharge of our nluslrctry in this day's action within
ti~lrin~
twelve yards, not oiic shot, to all a~pea~allce,
effect.
[Lady Sale rema~lrsas follows :Tllere is also a peculiarity in tllc Afglldii motla of
fighting-that
of every liorscman carrying n footsoldier behind him to tllc scene of action, wllcrc hc
is clropped, w i t h o ~ ~the
t fatigue of wallring to his post.
The horsemen have two or tlirce match-locks or jazsils
each, slung at tlicir baclrs, and arc vcry expcrt in firing
at the gallop. Thesc jazails carry much f~1rt;lierthan
our rn~slrets.~~]
I n this affair Captain Paton, Assistant Quartermaster-
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General, had the misfortune to receive a mound in thc
left arm, which rendered amputatiolz necessalSy,ancl the
valuable services of one of ouy most efficient staff officers
were tlius lost. This mas the last success our arms
were destinecl to experience. Heucefo~wardit becorncs
my weary tslslr to relate a catdogue of misfortunes and
difficulties, mhich, follovi~~g
close upon cach other, disheartened our officers and soldiers, and finally sunk
us all into irretrievable ruin, as tl~oughI-leaven itself,
for its own inscr~~tablepurposes, hail doolned our
dowilfdl. But here it is fit I should relate the scenes
that had all this while been enacting at our solitary
outpost in KohistBn.
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EVENTS I N KOHISTAN, AS RELATED BY MAJOR POTTINQER.
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OF DR. GRANT.
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OF MAJOR

HAUGHTON.

- THEY

ESCAPE TO CANTONMENT.

ON the 15th November, Major Pottinger, C.B., and
Lieutenant I-Iaughton, A rljutant of the Sh611's 4th or
' G b r l r a h Regimen%,came in from ChBril&r, both severely
wounded, the former in the leg, and the latter having
]lad his right hand amputated, besicles several cuts in
the neck and left arm. Their escape was wonderful.
The following is an outline of what Lad talren place
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in I<ol~ist,in,from the commencement of the insurrection up to the present date.
It appears, from Major PottingeyJs account of the
transactions of that period, that it was not without
reason he had so urgently applied to Sir William Macnaghten for reinforcements. Towards the end of October, premonitory signs of the corning tempest had
become so unequivocally threatening as to confirm
Major Pottinger i n his worst suspicions, and in his
conviction that order could not possibly be restored
~vitl~outa departure on the part of Government
from the long-suff erilig system which had been obstinately pursued with respect to Nijnio in particular;
bnt his conviction aloiie could do little to stem the
torrellt of coming events.
A b o ~ this
~ t time Mir Masjidi, a contumacious rebel
against the ShfihJs authority, who had been expelled
from ICohist6n during General Sale's campaign in that
country in 1840, and who hacl talrcn refuge in Nijr;io
after the fashion of many other men of similar stamp,
obstinately refusing to make his submission to the Sh&h
even upon the most favourahle terms, openly gut himself at the head of a powerful and well-organized party,
with the avowed intention of expelling the Pilingis and
overturning the existing government. He was speedily
joined by tlie most influential of the NijrfLo chiefs. A
few of these made their appearance before LaghmBni,
where Major Pottinger resided, and proffered their ser-

vices towards tlie maintenance of the public tranquillity.
I t will be seen that their object was the blaclrcst
treachery.
I shall here relate Major PottirlgerJs story, almost in
his own words, as given to me.
I n the course of the forenoon of the 3rd of November, Major Pottiiiger had an interview with a
ilumber of the more influential chiefs in his house or
fort, ancl, about nooil, went into the gardeli to receivc
those of inferior rank, accompanied by his visitors :
here they were joined by Lieutenant Charles Rattray,
Major Pottinger's Assistant. I n discussing the question of the rewards to wliich their services might entitle
them, the head men declared that, although they were
willing to agree to Major PottingerJs prol~ositions,they
could not answer for their clansmen, and the abovementioned petty chiefs, who were awaiting tlie expected
conference at some little distance. Mr. Rattray, accordingly, in company with several of the principal,
joined the lattcr, and, shortly after, proceedeil wit11
them to an adjoiliing field, wherc n ~ ~ m l ~ of
e r stheir
armed retainers were assembled, for the purpose of
ascertaining their sentiments on the subject of the confe~ence. Whilc thus engaged, this most promising ancl
brave young ofticer apparently became aware of intended
foul play, and turned to leave the field, when he was
immediately shot down. At this time Major Pottinger
was still sitting in his garden, in company with several
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of the above-mentioned chiefs, and had just received
intelligence of the purposed treachery from Muhammad
1Cgsim XhiLn, a clibRahi of I-I&sirbQsh,a small detachment of which composed a pal% of his escort: he had
with difficulty comprehended the man's meaning, which
was conveyed by hints, when the sound of firiug was
heard :-the chiefs that vere wit11 him rose and fled,
and he escal~edinto tlie fort by the postern gate ; which
having secured, he, from the terre-plein of the rampart,
saw poor Mr. Rattray lying badly wounded in the field
at the distance of some thrce lnuldred yards, and the
late pretended negotiators making off in d directions
TVith the l~lunderof the camp of the H$r~irbiishdetacliment. Of these plunderers a payty passing close to
Mr. Rattray, and observing that life was not extinct,
one of them put his gun close to his head, and blew
his brains out,-several others discharging their pieces
into diEerent parts of his body.
Major Pottinger's g~mrd,being by this time on tlie
alert, opened a fire, ~vhichspeedily cleared the open
space ; but the enemy, seeking shelter in the numerous
watercourses, aiid under tlie low walls surrounding the
fort, harassed them incessarltly until the appearance of
on,
of the Gkrlcah 1EegiLieutenant H a ~ ~ ~ h tAdjntant
ment, who, advancing from ChSrilcBr, where the corps
was cantoned, distant about t h e e miles, speedily drove
the assailants from their cover. Captain Codrington,
who commanded the regiment, chanced to be in Lagh-

,

m&ni at this very time ; and, on Mr. Haughton's ap- proach, he led out a sortie and joined him : the slshmisl~
mas sharp, and the enemy suffered severely, Captain
CocKngton remaining in possession of an adjacent
canal, the banls of which was immediately cut to supply
t h e tank of tlie fort vith water in case of accidents.
The evening had now closeci in, and the enemy hacl
retired, talciag up a position which seemed to khreateil
the ChArilrAr roacl. Captain Corlrington accordingly
left LaghmiLili in haste, strengthening Major Pottinger's
party to about one hundred men, these having to garrisoll four small forts. H e promised, however, to relieve
them the next morning, and to sencl a further supply
of ammunition, of which there only remained one
thousand five hundred rounds. Captain Codringtoil
rcached ChjLrik&r unmolested; and the enemy, retarning to their former point of attnck, casriecl off their
dead wit11 imp~mity,the gaiqrison being too weal< to
lnalse a sally. On the morning of the 4t11, Captain
Coclrington despatched four companies with a 6pounder g~m, according to promise. Their march
caused numbers of the enemy now assembled on all
sides to reheat; but one lwge body remained in position on the skirts of the mountain range to their right,
and threatened their flank. Lieutenant I-Iaugfiton, who
commanded, detached Ensign Salusbury mith a company
to disperse them, which, in spite of the disparity of
numbers, was effected i n good style. Unhappily the
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Gfk~l~ahs,
being young soldiers, and flushed mith success,
pressecl forward in pursuit with too much eagerness,
regrrsdless of tlie recalling bugle, vhen at last Mr.
Sdusbury with difficulty halted them, and endeavol~~ed
to retrace his steps. The enemy, observing the error
they had committed in separating themselves too far
from their main body, rallied and followed them in
their retreat so closely, as to oblige Mr. Salusbury
to halt his little band fi.ecl~iently, and face about;.
Lieutenant l-Iaughtoli, conseq~~ently,
in order to extricate the compromisecl company, haltecl his convoy, ancl
despatched the greatest p a ~ of
t his men in the direction
of the skirmish. All this el~couragcdthe other parties
of the enemy who had retirccl to return, against whom,
in llulnbers not less than four thousand men, I-Iaughton
maintained his gl+ounduntil rejolnecl by his subaltern,
when, seeing tlie hopelessness of making goocl his m a y
to LaghmQni, he retreated, and regained in safety the
fortified barraclcs at Chfirilcill.. Many of the men fell
in this expedition, which would have proved infinitely
more disastrous, from thc number of the enemy's
cavalry, who latterly seemecl to gain confidence at every
stage, but for the extraordina1.y grillantry and conduct
of Lieutenant Harighton, who, wit11 a handful of m e n
and a @In, protected the rear of our over-matched
troops. Mr. Salusbuy was mortally wounded, and the
trail of the gun gave may just as the party reached
Chkrikhr.

,

This disappointment lecl Major Pottinger to believe
that no second attempt would be made to relieve them ;
and as he had no nmmunition beyond the supply in the
men's pouches, he determined to retreat on Chirikkr
after dark : the better to hide his intention, he ordered
g a i n to be brought into the fort. Meantime the
C h h i k k cantonment was attacked on all sides, and in
the afternoon large bodies of the cnemy were detached
thence, and joining others from that part of the valley,
recommenced their investment of LaghmAni. That
part of the Major's garrison, which occupied the small
fort to the east of the principal one, defended by him.
self, altllough their orders were not to vacate theb
posts until after clarlr, being panic-striclren, did so at
once, gaining the stronger position, but leaving behind
several wounded comracles and their havildiir, who remained staunch to his duty : these, however, were
brought off. Major Potthger then strengthened the
garrison of a cluster of' adjacent huts, which, being surrounded by a sort of rude fortification, formed a tolerably good outworlr ; but the want of European officers
to control the men was soon lamentably apparent, and
in a short time the Gdrkahs, headed by their native
officer, abandoned the hamlet, followed as a matter of
course by the few Afghin soldiers attached to Captain
Codrington's person, who had remained faithful until
then. This last misfortune gave the enemy cover up
to the very gate of the maiu stronghold, and before
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c1a71<they had succeecled in getting possession of a
gun-shed built against its outer wall, whence they commenced mining.
AS soon as night had failsly closecl in, Major Pottinger
drew together, the G6l.kah garrison outside the postern
gate, under pretence of making a sortie, and thus scparatacl thcm from tlic Afgl~finsand their followers, who
remained insidc; he then marched for Cli,irilr&r, the
garrison of the remaining fort joining liim as lie drew
on ; he passed by the investing posts in perfact silence,
talcii~gliis route along the skirts of the mountains to
avoicl the main roacl, and axrived in safcty at ChiLrikiir;
In Luglirndrii he abandoned the hostages whom he had
talcell from the ICohistBn chiefs, tvro boxes of treaswe
containing two thousand rnpees, about sixty stand of
ja~ails,all his office rccords, Mr. Rattray's, Dr. Graiit's,
ancl his o-vvn persolla1 property, and a numbcr of horses
belonging to himself, and the above-meutioned two
officers, and to some hprselvlen who llad not deserted;
for the greater part of his mountCrT escort had fled
in the beginning of the affray. The Hirhtis, and
seven or eight Pesh6\1larisJ were the only Afghhns
~vhoadhered to him ;the I<,ibulis had deserted to a man
immediately on the murder of Mr. Battray; they
had bcen much disgusted tlie ~rececling month, as
well as their comrades who proved unfaithful too,
by the audden reduction of 'a portion of I ~ i sescort;
which naturally led them to apprehend that their

Livelihoocl from the British service was of a precarious
nature.
On the morning of 5th November large bodies of the
enemy closecl in rouncl the Ch6rilc;il. barracks, and
abont 7 oJcloclcthey attaclced the outposts with a spirit
engendered by the success of the preccdirig evening.
Captain Codrington requested Major Pottinger to take
charge of what artillery he had, and to move a squadroil
in support of the skirmisl~ers, wliich he did. The
slrirnlishers were driven in, and, wliile rctreating, Major .
Pottinger was woundcd in the leg by a muslcct-shot.
Encouraged by this, and by the unfinished state of the
vorlrs round the barracks, in the eutrance of which
there was no gate, the enemy advancer1 with great determination to the attack, and clislodgcd the Gdrlcahs
from some mud huts outside, which were still occupied
by a part of the regimcnt. I n this affair Captain Codrington, an officer of whose merits it is difficult to spealc
too highly, fell mo~..tdly mounded. T l ~ emain post
was, howevcr, successf~~lly
defcndecl, and the enemy
driven back with considerable loss ; upon which Lieutenant I-Iaughton (who had now succeedecl to the command, the only remaining office^ being Mr. Rose, a
mere youth), made a sortie and drove the cnemy out
of the gardens occupied by them in the morning, maintaining his ground against their most despcrnte efforts
until after dark. Relief was then sent to the garrison
(consisthg of about fifty men) of Klloja MirJs fort,
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which it had been found expediel~tto occupy previously,
because it commalldcd the interior of the barracks on
the southern side.
From tbis time the unfortunate horses and cattle of
thc gar.l.rison vere obliged to enclwle the extremity of
thisst, there beillg no vatcr for them, and the slipply
for even the figl~ting-menscanty in the extreme, obtained only 'on1 a fern pools in the ditch of tbe ramp a ~ t ,wllicb hacl bcen formed by a seasonable fdl of
rain. II~wingthe 6th the enemy renewed their attaclr
in augmcntccl numbers, the lvhole population of the
country aPparcritly s~varmingto the scene of action.
Notmitlistnncling two successful sorties, all thc outyosts
mere clriven in hy darlr, ancl thenceforth the gal~ison
mas coufined to the barrack itself.
On thc 7th the enemy got possession of I<hoja Mir's
fort : the regimental m6nshi had been gained over, and
through him the native officer as iliduced to surrender.
l+om the towers of that fort, on the 8th) the enemy
offered terms, on tlie colldition that all the infidels
shoulil embrace Muhammadanism. Major Pottinger
replied that they had come to aicl a Mnhamnlaclan
sovel+cignin the recovery of his rights; that they consequently were within the pale of Islftm, and exempt
fsom coercion on the score of religion. Tlie enemy
rejoincd, that the king himself had ordered them to
attaclr the I<&fitfirs,ancl wished to know if Major Pottinges would yield on receiving an order. I-Ie refused to
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do so, except on the production of a written docnment.
All this time the garrison vas sorely galled from t h e
post of vantage in possession of the enemy.
On the 9thJ the enemy were enabled by the carelessness of the guard to blo~vup a part of the sonth-west
tower of the barracks; but, bcfore they could profit by
the breacll and the panic of the men, Mr. I-Iaughton
rallied the fugitives, and, leading them back, s e c ~ ~ r e d
the top of the parapct wall with a barricade of boards
and sand-bags.
On the loth, the officers bevrr their last pool of water,
and served out h a y a wineglass to each fighting-man.
On the l l t h , all could not share even in that miserable
proportion, and their sufferings from thirst wcre dreadful. During the night r7, sortie was madc, mcl some of
the followers~ljroughti n a little water fi701n a distant
place, the sight of which only served to aggravate t h e
distress of the majority ; still, however, the fortitude of
these brave and hardy soldiers remained unsl~alcen,
although apathy, the result of intense suffering, especially among I-Iindiis, began to b e n ~ ~ mtheir
b faclllties.
On the 12thJ after dark, Mr. Haughton ordered out
a party to cover the vater-carriers in an attempt t o
obtain a supply ; but the over-harassed Se JOYS, unable
to restrain themselves, dashed out of the ranks oil approaching the coveted element, instead of standing t o
their arms to repel the enemy, and, consequently, the
expedition failed in its object. Another sortie, consist-
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ing of two cornpanics under Ensign Rose, mns then
ordered out, one of which, liaving separated from the
other, dispersed in search of water ; that under Mr. Rose
llimself fcll on a post of the bcsiegcrs, every mall of
which they bayoneted ; but, being unaccountably strnck
with a panic, the men fled back to the bai,racks, leaving
MY.Rose almost alone, who was then obliged to return,
having accomnl~lishedhis object but partially. These
circumstances mere co~nmnnicntedby Mr. Hnugliton to
Major Pottinger (whose mouncl had disnblecl him from
active bodily co-operation in these last evc~lts),together
wit11 the stai-tling intelligence that the corps \rras dmost
wholly disorgaaized from the large nmount of lcillcd
and wonndcd, tlle hardsllips it had undergolle, thc
utter inefficiency of the native officers, who had no
sort of control over the solclicrs, the cxhanstion of thc
men from constant cluty, and the totnl want of water
and pl-ovisioas.
Relief from IC&bul, for which Major Pottinger had
written repeatedly, seemed now l~opcless,and an attempt
at protractecl defence of the post appeared likely to
cnswe tlle ctestruction of its l~ravedefcnclers. Alajor
Pottinger considel~edthat the only remnining chance
of saving any portion of tlie ~cgirnelltwas a retreat to
1CAl~ul;andJ although that was abuudantly pel.iiousJ
he entertained a hope that a fern of the most active
men who were not encnmbered with wives and children
might escape. Then mas felt most bitterly the impolicy

-

of tile encomqement ~vhichhad been helcl out to all
the recruits to bring their families with them, 011
what, even at the time of their being raised, was
lookcci 011 by tllc most able officers as likely t o provc
a c:t~n~aigi~
of several years. Mr. Haughton coincided
iu tlie Major's viems, ancl it was agiseed, to ensure
sccrecv, that the men sli0111cl not be informed of their
intentions u~itilpnrrtdecl for the march.
Tl~is~vretclieclstate of things continued until theafternoon of the 13t11, mllcnAfr. Haugliton cliscovered amongst
tllc Parijil~iartillerymen two who had deserted a few
clays Iwcviot~sly,ancl mlio appai-eatly had returned for
thc purpose of seducing t l i e i ~com~acles. H e immediately scizecl them ; but, while he mas in the act of
tlicir apprehension, thc jemad:ir of tlie artillery, himself
a Pniijii1,i Mussulmiin, snatched a smord from a bystander, arid cut domil that officer, repeating his blows
as lie lily on tllc ground. Before the astonished
Glirlcalls coulcl draw their knives or handle tlieb
muslcets, this miscreant, follomecl by all the artillerymcil aud the greater number of the Muhammadans
in the bnrmch, rushed out of tlie gate and escaped.
The tumult and confusion occasioned by this impressed Major Pottinger with the idea that the enemy
]lad rlriven the men from tbe walls; under this
impression he caused himself to be carried to the
maill gate, but on his arrival he found that Dr. Grant
had secured that point, and rallied the men. The
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native officers iinmediatcly gail~crcclroutid him, with
many of the Scpoys, to assert tlicir fidelity ; I ~ u tdemorrtlizatio~l liad cvidciitly progressed fearfully, as
m:~y be judged from tlie fitct tliat tlie ganison had
11lmldered tlie trcasurc and the quarters of tlic deceased
C:~ptain Cothington the iiivta~lt the Xajor llad left
them, alld tliat in the face of the ciictny's fire tlicy Iiad
plllletl dolm the officers' hoses, wllich liad 11eei1 piled
11p ns traverses to 1~1'0tcctthe doorw:~y,brolccu them
open, arid pillaged tllcm. Dr. Grant. tlieil niiiputatcd
Mr. Ilaugl~ton's right hand, and hastily dressed the
sovere wou~ids11rhic1ihe lind reccived mil liis lcft a r m
and on 11is necl;. I11 thc cvcniiig the doctor spiked
all the gulls with his omn htmds, and tht! g;lrrisoii
t l ~ e nleft t l ~ barraclrs
e
by the postenl gate. Tllc ndvullce
nns led by Mnjor Pottirlger (Alr. I-laugllton, who
accom1lniiied him, being una1)lc to do lilore t h a n sit
~nqsively OIL his liorse), Dr. Grnllt brouglit out tllc
miin body, and Ensigll IEose, wvitll tllc Qu:~rtormnstcr
Scrgea~it,coinmanded tlie real*.
Notwitlistanding the prcvions suKeriiigs of tllese
unfortunate men, it rnay be said that beye conimcnced
their red disasters. I n vain did Mnjor Pottiuger
attempt to lead his men to seizc a buildirig generally
occupied by the enemy after night-fi~ll, by the
possession of which tlie exit of the mail1 body from
the barYaclcs might be covered. 111 fact, it was with
rnIlch difficulty that he eventually auccecded in h d t ,

10

ing them at about half a mile from the barracks
until the main body and rear should close up. T h e
mcn were naturally occupied entirely with their
families, and such property as it had been impossible
t o prevent theb bringing away; and discipline, t h e
only source of hope under such cbcumstances, was at
an end.
After the junction of the main body and rear, Dr.
Grant suddenly disappeared, and was not afterwards
seen.
The regiment then proceeded dong the road to S i n j i t
Dara, where Major Pottinger ]mew that water could
be procured. On reaching the first stream t h e l a s t
remnant of control over this disorderly mob mas l o s t ;
much delay took place, and, in moving on, the advance
bccame suddenly separated from the main body. A f t e r
an anxious search Major Pottinger effected a rejunction.
At Sinjit Dara they quitted the road, to avoid alarming the villages and any outposts that might b e stationed there; and much time was lost in regaining the
track from the other side; at IstBlif the same manaeuvre was practised. Major Pottinger now found very
few indined to push on; exhaustion from the p a i n of
his wound precluded the possibility of his being of a n y
further use as a leader ; and he determined to push
on with Mr. Haughto~ltowards KLbul, although -6th
faint hope that the strength of either would p r o v e
adequate to the exertion. Having no guide, they g o t

147

T~TE ATTACK ON CMRIKAR.

from the barracks
uld close up, The
itircly with their
lad been impossible
arid discipline, the
cumstances, was at
)ody arid rear, Dr.
vas not afterwards
the road to Sinjit
v that water could
st stream the last
rly mob was lost;
rig on, the advance
main body. After
I'ccted a rejunction.
ad, to avoid almm;hat might be stat i n regaining the
if the same man;er now found ve~y
. from the pain of
f his being of any
:tcrmined to push
~ u l ,altllougl~.with
thcr would prove
.lo pide, they got

.

,

*

into many difficulties; and day was breaking by the
time tliey reached the range of mountains half way
between ChBrilrBr and Kribul. Men and horses mere
by this time incapable of further endurance : the latter,
it m ~ i s tbe remembered, liad bcen ten days without
water previously to star,rf.ing, and fire days without
food; tliey mere still upwaiads of twenty miles from
any place of safcty ; their sufferings from tlieh wounds,
fatiguc, hunger, and thirst, macle life a burden, and at
this time despair liad almost obtaiiied a victory-bul
God sustained them. 13y Mr. Hnughton's advice
they sought shclter in a very deep but dry ravine,
close to a small village, hoping tlint tlieir proximity
to dangcr might prove a , source of silfety; as it was
probable that tlie inhabitants, wlio by tliis time must
have been on the alert, would scarccly tliinlr of looking
for their prey closc to thch own cloors. The companions of Major Pottinger and Mr. Haughton werc
a Sepoy of the regiment, a mcnshi, and the regimcntd
haniail. I n the forenoon they were darmed by n
firing on the mountains above them; the cnuse of
this, as it appeared afterwards, was tliat a few of the
fugitive Gdrkalls had ascended the hills f o ~safety
(which, indeed, i t was Major Pottingcr's wish to do,
until he yielded to the arguments of his compaGon),
whither they were pursued and massacred by the
country people. The rcst of the day passed in traltllquillity; and again, under the friendly shroud of
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darkness, having previously calc~~latcdthcir exact
position, did this sorely-bcstcad little party resume
their dangerous routo. I t wa8 providential tlint Major
Pottingel* had, from his habits as a tr:wrllcr tllrough
u ~ ~ k n o w and
n
dificult regions, n c c ~ ~ ~ t o mliirnsclf
ed
to ascertain :md rcincmbcr tlic l~caringsof the niost
co~~spicuous
1aridrn:~rk~of tho conntrics 11c travcrsedJ
it mas thcrt:forc coml~nralivelycnsy for l i i n ~to lcntl t l ~ c
way over the stcnp anrl n~ggetlp c i ~ l 1)y
~ ~ ,wl~ich alone
tlicy might llopc to fi~lda s:rfc pntl~,-for tlict main
road, and cvcn tllc more ncccssible tri~clrsatn.oss tllc
tops of thc mountaius, were closcly bcsct, nncl w:~tclifircs glcamed in all dil.cctions. Indeed G11ul;inl-Muy:tn
ud-dir, a distinguisl~cdpartiza~iill t l ~ cS O I ' V ~ C ~of tlic
rebels, had been clcspatclictl from IC;il)ul, wit11 n 1n1m1)cr
of his most active followers, pnrposcly to intc:rr:cpt
and scizc tlic Major, of ~vlvlloscfligl~tiiltclligrncc l ~ a d
bccn carly rcceivcd, and :1ctll:111y 7vas :it t11:tt tinie
patrolling those very I~oightsover wllicll thc fi~gitivcs
pawed. But t l ~ eprotci!tiilg 11:lnd of I)roviiloi~cc:T V : ~
displayed not only i11 leading t l ~ c mun11:irmed tl~rongh
tlic midst of thcir oncmics, but in supplying tllcm
with mental Sortitudc and 1)odily strcngtli. Wcak aiid
exhausted, tlicir hardy i ~ ~ usually
id
sure-footed Tarkmhn
llorses could ficarccly strain 111) tlic almost irnpractioa1)le
~ i d cof the mountain, or plleserve t l ~ e i requilibrium in
t l ~ csharp, suddcn desccnts wliicli t l ~ c ycncountc!rcd,
for path thcrc was none. On onc occasio11 Mr
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Haughton, whose desperate wounds I have already
described, fell off, and, being unable to rise, declared
his determination of awaiting his fate w h e ~ ehe lay.
The Major refused to desert him, ,md both slept for
about one hour, when) m t w e being a little restored)
they pushed on until they descended into the plain
of Alifgt, which tliey crossed, avoiding the fort of that
name, and struggling up the remaining ridge that
separated them fkom the plain of Kribul, they entered
i t by the southern exid of the IC6bu.I lake. Intending
now to cross the cultivation, and to reach cantonments
by the back of the Shhh's garden, Major Pottinger
missed his roacl close to Qila-i-buland, and found
himself within the enemy's sentries ; but being unwilling to a l a ~ mthem by retracing his stcps, after
discoveilng his mistake, he led the wdy itwards Dih
AfghLn. Here they were challenged by various outposts, t o whom they answered after the fashion of Argh:'Ln
horsemen; but they were compelled, in order to
avoid suspicion, actually t o enter the city of Kkbibul,
their only hope now being i n the slumberous security
of the inhabitants at that hour (it being now about
3 A.M.), and in the protection of their ilfgllsin dress m d
equipments. The Gfitkah sepoy, who, strange to say)
had kept up with them on foot, had his outwarcl man
concealed by a l u g e posthin, or sheep-skin cloak. They
p r s u e d their way though the lanes and bfisiir of the
city, without any interruption, except the occasior~d

gruff challenge of a sleepy watchman, until they
gained the skirts of the city. There they mere like
t o have been stopped by a picket which lay between
them and thc cantonment. The disposition to a
relaxation of vigilance as the morning approaches,
which marlrs the AfghAn soldier, again befriended
them; they had nearly passed the post befo~ethey were
pursued. Desperation enabled them to urge their
nrearied l~orsesinto a pace, which barely gave them
the advantage over their encmies who were on foot;
and they escaped with a volley from the now aroused
picket, the little Ghlrah freshening his way i n the
most snrp1,ising manner, considering his p~evious
journey. A few hundred yards further brought them
Pcitliin the ramparts of our cantonment, where they
werc received by their brctlwen in arms as men risen
from the dead.

[The gallant Haughton still survives, as a MajorGeneral and "Companion of the Star of .India," i n the
Bengal Staff Corps, having fillcd with great credit
sevcral important posts.
Majoy Eldred Pottingel; C.B., the hero of I-IirM,
having been compelled by failing health to seek a
change of climate, was attacked by malignant fever at
Hong-kong, where he died, aged 32, on the 13th
November 1843, the anniversary of his retreat from
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Chkik4r. A monument was erected to his memory, in
the cathedral of Bombay, by public subscription, "in
token of the admiration and respect in which his
character as n, soldier and his conduct as a man are
held by his friends in the Presidency."]
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CHAPTER VIII.
CONTEWPLATED WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CANTONMENT AT^
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November 1 6 t h . - T ~ ~ imprcssion made on the enemy
by the action of the 13th was so far salutary, that
they did not venture to annoy us again for several
days. Advantage was taken of this respite to throw
magazine snpplies from time t o time into the BLl6
His&, a duty which was ably performed by Lieutenant
Walker, with a ris6lah of Irregular I-Iorsc under cover
of night." But even in this short interval of cornparative rest, such was the wretched construction o
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khe cantonment, that the mere ordinary routine of
garrison rlnty, and the necessity of closely mannirlg
o m long line of rampart both by day ancl night, was
a severe trial t o the hcaltli and patienoe of the troops ;
especially now that the winter began to slio~vsymptoms
of ~snusual severity. There seemed, indeed, every
probal~ilityof an early fall of snow, to which all loolred
forwarcl with dread, as the ha~biiiger of fresh difficulties and of augmented suffeiing.
These considerations, ancl tlie manifest superiority
of thc I3516 Hisrir as a, military position, led t o the ewly
discussion of thc exl~cdicncyof akandoning the cantonment arid consolidntiiig our forccs i11 tlie abovementioned stronghold. Tlie Erivoy himself was, from
the first, grcatlyin favour of this movc, until over-ruled
by the rnany objections urged against it by the milita~y
authorities ; to which, as will be seen by a letter f ~ o m
him presently quoted, he learnt by degrees to attach
some weight himself; but to tlie vcry last it mas a
measure that had many advocates, and I venture to
state my own firm belief that, had we at this time
moved into the BLlh HisAr, I<tibul might have been
still i n our possession. The chief objections urged
were, lst, the dificulty of conveying our sick and
wounded ;2ndly, the want of fire-wood ; 3rdly, the want
of forage for the cavalry; 4thly, the triumph that
our abandonment of cantonments would afford the
enemy; Sthly, the risk of defeat on the may +ither.

On thc other hand it was advanced, 1st) that, though
to carry the sick would be dificuZt, it still was not
impossi6le ; for so short a distance two, or even three,
men could be conveyed on each d a ; some might
manage to wallr, and the rest could be mounted on
the y;ibfis arid camels, on top of their loads; 2ndly,
although wood was scarce in the I3616 EIisiir, there was
enough for purposes of coolring, and for the want of
fires the troops would be amply compensated by the
comparative ease and comfort; they would cnjoy in other
respects; 3rdly, the horses must, i n the case of there
being no forage, have been shot; but the want of
cavalry would have been little felt in such a situ
ation; Liithly, as we should have destroyed all that was
valuable bcfbre leaving, the supposed triumph of the
enemy would have been very short-lived, and would
soon have given way to a feeling of disappointnlent at
the valueless natul-c of their acquisition, and of dismay
at the strength and security of our new position; Sthly,
the distance did not exceed two miles, and one-half
of that distance was protected by the guns of the Bait
' EIisk.
If we had occupied the Siy;ih Sang hills with
a strollg party, placing guns there to sweep the plain
on the calltonment side, the enemy could have done
little to impede our march, without risking a battle
with our whole force i n a fair field, to whiclr, they
were generally averse, but which would, perhaps, have
been the best mode for us of deciding the sti+uggle.
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To remove so large a force, clogged with so many
thousands of camp followers, without loss of some
kind, was, of com*se, next to impossil~le; but ought
w c h considerations to have interfered with a step
which would have been attended in the long run with
such great military and political advaiitages?. Our
troops, once collected in the BBB Hislr, could have
,

havc bcen ere long formed in oni, favour. Such were
thc chief arguments employcd on eitl~erside; but
Brigadier Sheltoa having firmly set his face against
tlie movement from the G~+st
moment of its proposition,
all serious idea of it m m gradually abandoned, though it
continued to tlie very last a subject of common d i Novembe?. 18th.-Accounts
were this day received
from Jall6l&bBd, that General Sale, having sallied
from the town, had 'repulsed the enemy mith consideral~leloss. At the beginning of the insurrection,
General Sale's brigade mas at Gaudkmalc ; and I have
already mentioned, that an order recalling it to KEIgbul
was imqediatcly despatched by the Envoy. General
. Sale, on receipt of it, summoned a council of war, by

l
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which it was unanimously agreed to be impracticable to
obey the order. The circumstances of llis march to
Jall616bGd are already well known to tlic public. lllle
hope of his return had tended ruuch to support uur
spiiits ; our disappointment was therefore great to learn
that a11 cxl~cctationof aid from that quarter was at ail
end. Our eyes were now turncd towards tlic Kanclalt6r
force as our last rcsourcc, though ail advance from that
quarter sccmcd scarcely practicable so late in thc ?car.
Mucll discussion took pl:~ce this evcrli~igregarding
the cxpedic:ncy of taking Mi~lllll~id
1<1rinYsfoi't. Tllcre
were many rcasons to urge in fl~vour of making the
attempt. I t was one of the cbicf resorts of the
rebels during the day, and they had cstablishcd a
battery of two guns under thc walls, from which t h y
constantly fired upon our foraging pa~tics, and upon
tlle south-cast bastion of cantonments. It was bout
nine hundred yarcls distant from our rampart, which was
too far for breaching with t l ~ e9-pounders, l ~ u n
t dry
canal, which ran towards i t in a zigzag direction,
afforded facilities for u, ~ c g u l a rapproach within three
hundred yards, of wliich advantage might 1i:rve beer1
talccn to enable the artillery to nlake a hrcach.
Secondly, this fort cornmandctl the road all tbc w:~y
up to the 3616 EIisiir and the posscssior~ of it would
at ouce have sccurcd to us sn c:tsy connn1111ic:~tion
wit11 tllat placc, and with t l ~ ccity. Thirdly, tlic
Envoy dccli~rcd liis opinion that ' the moral offcct
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derived. fiom its possession mould be more likely to
create a diversion i11 our favonr, than any otller blow
we could strike, aa the Afglihns llntl always attnclled
great i~nportallceto its occupation and 'had n superstitious opinion that whatcver party held possession
of it mere sure to bc ~ n a s t e ~ofs ICAbul. Tliese
consirlerntions had decided tlie General in favour of
malcillg the attempt this vcry night, by l~lowing
opcn the gate, and n storming party mas actually
married for the duty ; but sane sudden ol~jections
being raised, thc plan was given up, and llcver aftcrwards resumed by the military. I t was, liowcver, t11e
cause of no small astonisliineiit to the oIficers ill t l i ~
B:il;i IrIisAr, who, from tlleii* commandiug situation,
could obsei,vr. all that took place on 110th sides, that
Mahmdd TChhn's fort slioulcl llavc bccn suIferct1 to
remain in the hancls of tlie enemy, tllough at night
it was often garrisonecl by a mere handful of men.
This fort, nevertheless, gavc abundant occupation
to the ai*tiUeYy,who, when nothing elfie mas going on,
were frequently ernployed in disturbing the enemy
in that qnarter with one of the iron 9-pounders, and an
occasional shelling from the mort ar.
November 19th.-A letter was this day received by
the General from the Envoy to the following eft'ect :That, all hope of assistance fiom Jall;iliCMd being
over, it behoved us to take our future proceedings into
consideration. He himself conceived it our imperative
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duty to hold on as lollg as possil)lc in our prcucnt
position, and Ile tliougllt wc inight even fitrugglc
througll tllc wllolc winter by n1:ikili~illc & ~ ~ h O l l l ~ ? ~ l : l ~ k ~
and Christians live cliiclly up011 fl('sll, ~ t l ~ l [ l ~O ~U ri l l ~
supplies of
to fail; 115' which II1(':LIlH, 35 tll('
essentials of woo(l ;~ll(lw:L~c~'
H'CL'C! :~~lllll(l;lllt,
111:
considcrcd our ~~ositioil
~niglltl ~ rt~rltlorcltl
c
iulprc~gt1al)lt~.
A retreat ttownrtls d :ill;il:ihbd mould tc:r!~uriot r]rl\y wit11
disaster, l ~ u dislionour,
t
ant1 ougllt tiot tu 11o r:c111tc:111platetl until tlic rcry Inst cstrcltiity. Tri tight or tcbtl
days we slioul~lbe bcttcr aljlo to judge: 1vli~t1ic:rsl~cll
extremity slionld be rcsortcd to. Tu tli:11 coast:, n.(:
should have to sacrifice not oiily tho vul11:~111(~
prol)i.I*ty
of G o v c m ~ ~ ~ cbut
n t , liis mnjcsty Slilil~S11uj5, to N I I I ) ~ J I J L ' ~
whose autliority me wcrc cniployotl by 0ovt:nil~icrit ;
and cveu wcre we to make good our rctrc1ut; to J:~ll:ilAbfid, we should linve no sl~cltcrfor our troops, : L I I ( ~
our camp follo~vcrsmould :dl Ijc sacriiiced. I I e h;ul
frequently tliougl~tol ucgotiating, but Iherc u.:~110
party of suficiclit power arid iiiflucnae to protect 11s.
Another nltcniativc ~vouldto l ~ ctliro\v oursclvc~ ilito
the Bil6 I-Iis:ir ; but llc? feared that woulcl bc nho :L
disastrous rctrcnt, to effect wliiall lnudl ~ ~ r ~ p crrlust
rty
bc r~eccssxrily ancriIicci1, Our hr:airy gull8 ~ ~ i ~ l i t
be turned ngninst ne, nrld foot1 and fuol migllt I)c sr:lrtoc:,
for a fllrthcr srtp~)lyof \vIiioli wc 111igllt 1 1 ~clel,c!ntl(*llt
on sorties into tlic city, ill which, if 11ct\t.cn, wu ulllst
of course bc ruined. Ori thc wliolc, hc I V : ~ ~tlci:itlotljy
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of opinion that we should hold out; it mas still possible
that reinforcemei~ts might arrive from Kanddlrir, or
something might turn up in our favour; there weye
hopes, too, that on the setting in of winter the
enemy would disperse, R e had been long disposed
to recommend a blow being strucls to retrieve our
fortunes such as talriilg Mahmdd KhiLn's fort ; but he
had since reason to believe this would not answer.
I n eight or ten days, he concluded, it mould remain
for the militmy authorities t o cleterrnine whether
there was any chance of impltovmg our position, and
to decide whethcr it wonlcl be morc prudent to attempt
a retreat to Jall&l&bLcl,or to the Bd8 I-Iishr. If
provision sufficient for the winter could be procured,
on no account would hc leave the catitonmelzt."
November 22ncl.-The
village of Bem;ir6 (or " husbandless," from a beautiful virgin who mas buried
there) was situated about half a mile to the north of
cantonments, on the Rohistjn road, at the northeast extremity of a hill which bounded the plain to tlie
west. As it mas built on a slope, and within musketshot, t h e upper houses commanded a large portion of
t h e Mission Compound. Prom this village we for a
long time drew supplies, the Envoy largely bribing the
proprietor, t o which, however, the enemy in some
measure put a stop, by talring possession of it every
day. This morning, large bodies of Afg2l6n l~orseand
foot, having again issued from the city, proceeded to

,
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crown tlle summit of the above-mc~ltionedhill. I t
was determined, at the rccommendntion of the Envoy,
to send a party of our troops to foreslall tlic cncmy in
thc occupation of the villagc, and Major Sw:~ync,5th
Native Infantry, was appointed to t11:~t illltp, with n
detachment colnposcd as follows :-a Wing 6th N;ltivc
Infantry, two risillas Irrcgl~larIIorse, orlo riu;il:i 6th
bight Cavalry, and orlo Monntt~in Trnirl gull. 'I1llc
piwty had already rcaclled thc village, wl~cnit was
deemed proper to send after it a Horse Artillery
grin, whicli I was req~iestedby thc Gc~lcrnlto nccoinpany. Mqjor Swnyne, howcvcr, it would sccm, found
the village already occupied by a body of ICollistlinis,
and the entrance bloclred up in such a malnicr t1m.t
he considered it out of his power to force a paasage. On arriving at the place with the Horsc
Artillery gun, I found him in nn orcllaril on the
road-side, the trees of whicli partially protcctcd tlle
men from a very sharp fire, poured in :~mongst
them from the houses. TIlere being no sllclter for
the gun here, nor ariy rllotle of c n ~ ~ ~ l o g iitn g to
advantage; it was ordered to cross some field8 to
tlie right, and talrita up a position wllcre it co~lld
best fire upon the ' villngc, sad upon thc lleight~
above it, wllic11 were now crowded with thc encmyJs
infantry. I n ordcr to protcct the horacs, 1 drew up
tlic gun near the foyt of Zulfn ICll:ill, ullclcr tlle
wnlls of which tllcp had sl-icltcr; b11t for the gun
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itself no other position could be found than in the
open field, where it was exposed to the full fire of
the enemy posted in the village and behind the
neigl~bouring walls. The Mountain Train gun mas
also with me, and 110th did some execution among
the people on the summit of the hill, though to
little purpose.
Major Swayne, whose orders were to storm the
village, would noither go forward nor retire; but concealing his men under the cover of some low wall,
he all day long maintained a musketry fire on the
houses of BemArLJbut without satisfactory result. The
cavalry were disamn up in rear of the gun on the open
plaiu, as a conspicuous mark for the Kohistinig and
where, as there mas nothing for them to do, they accordingly did nothing. Thus we remained for five or six
hours, during which' time the artillery stood exposed
to tlie deliberate aim of the numerous marksmen w.ho
occupied tlie village and its immediate vicinity, whose
bullets continually sang in our ears, often striking the
gun, and pazing the ground on which we stood. Only
two gunners, llowever, out of six were wo,undedJbut
tlie cavalry in our rear had many casualties both
among men and horses.
Late in the evening, s party of Afgh6n horse moving
rouud from #behind Bembni, proceeded towards a fort
in our rear, whence a cross fire was opened npon us.
Brigadier Shelton now joined, bringing with him a

11

reinforcement fr'om the 5th Native Infantry, under
Colonel 0liver. Major Swayne, with two companies,
was then sent to reconnoitre the fort wlience the
fire proceeded, and the Horse Artillc1.y gun mas at
the same time moved round, so as to bear upon the
AfghAn cavalry, wlio hovered among the trees i n the
same quarter. While engaged in this operation, I
received a, bullet through thc left hand, whicli for the
present terminated my active services. Shortly after
this the troops were recalled into cantonments.
I t was worthy of note, that Muliammad Alrbar
K h h , seconcl son of the late Amir Dost Muliammad
Khan, arrived in K & b d this night from Bdmiiin.
This man was dcstined to exercise an evil influence over
our future fortunes. The crisis of our struggle was
already nigh at hand.

CHAPTER IX.
A

SECOND

EXPEDITION

TO

BEMARU. -MAJOR

TAKES A WRONG DIRECTION.-INCREASING
AND VIGILANCE OF THE ENEMY.-OUB
BACK WITH SEVERE LOSS.-TIIE

GUN.

-REINFORCEMENTS

SWAYNB

NUMBERS

DORCE D.EIVEN

ENEMY CARRY OFF A

UNFORTUNATELY COUNPEB-

MANDED.-OBSBRVATIONS.

'

November 23rd.-TIIIS day decided tllc fate of the
KSbul force. At a council held at the General's house
on the night of the 22nd it was determined, on the
special recommendation of the Envoy, that, in consequence of the inconvenience sustJncd by the enemy
so frequently taking possession of Bemirli, and interrupting our foraging parties, a force, undcr Brigadier Shelton, should on thc following morning take
the village by assault, and maintain tlle hill above it
against wlmtever number of the encmy might appear.
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Accordingly, at 2 A.M. the under-mentioned troops*
moved out of cantonments in perfcct silence by the
Kohistin gate, and slrirting the masjid immediately
oppositc, which was held by a company of Her
Majesty's 44tl1, toolr the direction of the gorge at
the further extremity of the Beinrirli hill, which they
ascended, dragging the gun to the top with great
dificulty, from the rugged ancl steep nature of the
side, which labour was greatly facilitated by the
exertions of two hundred commissariat sarwiins, who
had volunteered for tlie occasion. Tlle whole force
then moved to the lrnoll it the north-east extremity of the hill, which overhung the village of
Berngrii. The gun was placed in position commanding an inclosure in the village, which, from its fires,
was judged to be the principal bivouac of the enemy,
and a sharp fire of grape commenced, which evidently created great confusion, but it was presently
answered by a discharge of jazails; the enemy forsaking the open space, and covering themselves in
the houses and towers : to this we replied in the

* 1H. A. gun, under Sorgt. Mulhal.
5 00s. H. M. 44t11, u11der Capt. Leighton.
6 Cos. 5th N. I., under Liout.-Col. Oliver.
6 Cos. 37th N.I., undor Najor Eorshnw, H. M. 13th.
Gappars, 100 men, under Lieut. Lning.
1Gquodron 5th LL. Cnv., under CUIJ~.
Bott.
1 Do.
Irregular Itorso, u ~ ~ d Liout.
or
Walker.
100 men, Andorson's Eorse.

:xof
ldcs
)

1Y>

vitly
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intervals of the cannonade by discharges of rnu;Jlretry.
I t was snggested by Captain Bellew and others to
Brigadier Shelton to storm the village, while the
evident panic of the enemy lasted, undcs covcr of the
darkness, therc being no moon : to this the Brigadier
did not accede.
When the day brolce, parties of the enemy were
descried hurrying from the village, and malcing across
the plain towards the distarit fort, thcir fire having
previously slaclcenc(1 from the failure of thcir ammunition. At this time, certailily, not nbove forty men
remained in the village. A storming party, consisting
of two companies 37th Native Inft~ntry, and some
Europeans, undcr Majors Saaytyne and TZershaw, were
ordered to carry the village; but Major Swayne,
talcing a wrong direction, missed the principal entrance, which ~vas open, and arrived at a small
khirkhi, or wiclcet, which Tpas barricncled, aud which
he had no means of forcing, so that he was obliged to
cover himself and his men as well as he could fsom
the sure aim of the enemy's msrlcsmen, by whose fire
his party suffered considerably, himself being shot
through the neclr.
After remaining thus for about bnlf an hour, he was
recalled by the Brigadier, who observed large bodies
of armed men pouring out from tlie city towards
the scene of conflict. Mean~vhileI~ieutennntWalker
hail been directed to lead his Irregulm Horse down

on thewest side of thc hill, to cut off
into the
such fugitives from the village as lie might 11e able to
intercept, and to cover himsclffrom the fire of ialantry
under the walls of an old fbrt not far from tlic basc
of the hill. Brigadier Slielton, leaving tlirec companies
of the 37th Native Infantry in thc lrnoll abovc Ucmdrfi
as a reserve, undcr Major ICersliaw, moved baclc wit11
the troops and guns to the part of tlic hill which
overloolrecl Lhc gorge.
Shortly after tliis i t was suggested to raiso n snnga,
or stone breastworlr, for tlie protection of tllc troops
wholly exposed to tlic distant fire of tho cnemy's jnzails,
but this, proposition was not acted on. Im~nense
numbers of tho enemy, issuing from the city, had now
crowned the summits,pf tlie hill opposite tlle gorge,in all, probably tell tlionsand meu. Tlie plain oil tlie
west of tile two hills was swept by swarms of tlieir
cavalry, who evidently designcd to cut off the small
party of I r r e g ~ ~ l aI-Iorse
r
under Lieuteriant Walker;
while tlie failure of our attcmpt to storm tlic vi1l:lgc
had rendered it easy for tlle elielny to throw strong
reinforccmcnts into it, ancl to supply the ammunition of
which they liucl bcen in grc;~twant.
About 7 n.nr. tho firc from tlic eilemyJs hill was
so galling tliat tlic fcw slrirmishers scnt to tlie
brow of our liill could ~ritliclificulty rclain their posts.
As an instance of the bacliwarclriess wliicli now began
to develop itself nriiorig our rrierl, it must bc nlcn-
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tioned that Lieutcnant-Colonel Oliver endeavoured to
induce a party of his own regiment to follow him to
the brow of the hill, to keep down the sharp fire of a
numbcr of tlle enemy, who had ensconced themselves
i n a, small ravinc commanding the foremost square ;
riot a man would fullow him,-and
it was only after
t l ~ a tbrave oilicer had gone forwarci himself into the
thiclrcst of the fire, saying, " Although my men
dcscrt me, I myself mill do my duty," tliat about a
dozen wcrc shamed into performing theirs. The
remaindcr of tlic troops (the infantry formed into
two srluarcs, arid the cavt~lrybeing dramri up en rnasse
immcdiatcly in tlicir scar,) suffered severely without
being I L ~ I Cto: rct:~lintc, from the comp~ativelyshort .
range of t l ~ emusltct. Our ~ i u g kgun maintained as
hut a firc on tllc masses of the cnemy as possible,
doing grcst cxccution; but thc want of a scconcl gun
to tnkc up the firc -was sensibly felt, inasmuch as after
a sliort timetlie vcnt became too hot for the al.tillerymen
to scrve. Tliis state of' things contiuued until. betmeen
9 aud 10 o'clock, wllcri a large arty of the cnemy's
cavalry tlircatencd our right flanli, and, t o prevent
his tlcstruction, Lieute~iailt Wallrcr was rccdled.
This dernonstratiorl, howevcr, whs repulscd by a.
~vcll-cli~cctcd
di~ischzrgcof shrapnel1 from tlre Horse
Artillcry gun, by orlc of wllich a chief of consequence,
t~upposddto bc Abd-ulla,li Khhn, Achnlrene, was' mortdly woundcd.

By the recall of I~ieutenailtWallrer thc encmy wcre
enabled to surround our position nt all points, csccpt
that facing the cantonments ; our gun ammmiition
was almost expended, and tlie me11 mc'rc faint wit11
fatigue and thirst (no ~vatcrbcing pn)cunJ~le),while
tile number of ltillecl and ~ o u n c l c dmas smellccl cvcry
instant.
About this timc (11ctmcen 10 a11d 11 A . M . ) lnrgc!
bodies of tlic cnemy's infantry ndvnnccd :\cros.q tlie
plain from the Shhb B6gli to tlie cncl of tlic hill, to
cut off tllc supplies of ammunition coming froni cantollments, as also tlic dl~u'lis on wldcli mc enrlcnvoured to send off a few of thc wou~lclcd. Tlicsc,
howevcr, were checlted by a pality of o m troops i n
the masjid, opposite the I<oliisthn gate, ant1 by about
fifty jazailchis under the teinporary comnland of Captain Trevor, (Captain Macltenzie, thcir lcadei; having
been requested by Brigadier Sllelton to act
OI~C
of the staff for tlic day,) who lined some low walls niid
watercourses, as well as by frequent disc11:larges of
round shot and shrapnel1 from the cantorimciit gulls
under Lieutenant Warbuyton.
Previously to this, nnmbcrs of the most daring
Ghbzis had descended into the gorge, and, taliing
advantage of some liillocl~son the ascent towards our
position, had crept gradually up, rnai~~tainirig
a clcndly
fire on our sltimislicrs, wlio mcrc, utif~rtunntcl~,
wliolly
exposed; they became at lcngtli dislicarteiicd, arid grwc
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way. At this moment the Brigadier offered a reward
of one hundred rfipis to any man who should talce
a flag of the enemy wyich had been planted behind
a tumulus about thirty yards in front of the square,
and he fruitlessly endeavoured to indnce the rncn to
charge bayonets ; several of the officers at the same
time advanced to the front, and actually pelted the
enemy with stones. All attempts, however, to
encourage our men were in vain. The attacking party
were now emboldened to make a rush upon our gun;
our cav:tlry were ordercd to charge, but again in vain,
for the men would not follow their officers. The
panic spread, and our troops gavc way, except the
second sqnare, which had been formcd about two
hu~ldreclyards in the rear, and three companies under
Major Iiershaw at the other extremity of thc hill;
behind this second square the officers with great difficulty rallied the fugitives, leaving the gun in the
hands of the enemy, who lost no time in wallring off
with the limber and horses.
By this time the news of Abd-ullah Kh6n's wound
had spread among the ranks of the enemy, causing
great confusion, which extended to the GhBzis now
in possession of the gun. This, and the tolerably
firm attitude resumed by our troops, induced them
to content themselves with the limber and horses,
and retire. Their retreat gave fresh courage to our
disheartened soldiers, who again took possession of
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tlie gun, and advanced to the brow of the hill, where
were io~uld the bodies of Captain Maciritosli 2nd
Lieutenant Lning, as wcll as tllose of the soldiers
slain in the onsct, including two I-Iorse Aytillery mcn,
wlio, with a devotciliiess wortl~yof British soldicrs, had
perished while vainly endeavouring to dcfcnd their
charge. Some fs.csli gun-ammunition having now
arrivcd from can~l;onmcnts,carried by Lasc:~rs, :L fire
was again opcncd on tllc razllcs of t l ~ cerlen~y; but wc
were unablc to pusli tlic ndvniitagc gniilcrl by the
momentary disorder alluded to above, bcc:~use,in fact,
the cavalry would not act. I n the obucrvntions 011
this action, made hereafter, there will bc ftound some
palliation for the baclcwardness of thc cavalry on this
occasion, in spite of tlie gallant bearing of tlicir
leadem;. thc infantry were too few, and too mucli
worn out and disheartened, to bc able to ll~alica forwwd movemeut. Tlze conscquellce was, tlilut not only
clid lhe tvhole force of the enemy conlc on with
renewcd vigour and spirits, mni~itainirigat the same
time the fatal jazail fire wliicli liad alrcady so grievously tliirined our rlunlru, Lut frcsh nun ill err^ l~oured
out of tlie city, and from the surrounding vill:~gcs,
until the hill occupied by tllcm scarccly affordccl rooln
for them to stand.
This uncqunl conflict having lastcd until 11:rst noon,
dwing w l ~ i c lperiod
~
reinforccmcl~tsand an atlilitionnl
guu 11:d becn in vaiu ~olicitcdfro111 tllc cantonu~cllts,
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Brigadier Shelton sent Captain Mackenzie to request
Major Kershaw to mow up his rcserve (which could
scarcely so be callcd, having been the whole rlay hard
~resscdby large bodies of the eilcmy i n the village,
and by parties occupying ruins and broken ground
on tlle slfits of his position). he Major, fearing
that, if he abandoned the lrnoll on wliich he had been
stationed, our retreat to the cantonments (then becoming more and more imnperatively necessary) might be
cut off, made answer, that " he begged to suggest that
the Brigadier should fall back upor1 him." Before
this message could be delivered, the front ranks of the
advanced square, at the Brigadier's cxtremity of the
hill, had been literally mowed down;--most of the
artillerymen, who performed their duty in a manner
which is beyond praise, shmed the samc fate. The
rnanmuvre practised by the Ghii~is previously was
repeated by still greater numbers. Thc evident unsteadiness of our troops, and the imminent danger
to which the gnu was a second time exposed, induced
the Brigadier, after rcpeatcd suggestions from Sergeant
M~~lhall,
who comlnanded the battery, to order the
grin to Be limbered up-a
second limber having arrived
from cantonme.nts-and
to retire towards Major
Kershaw's position. Scarcely had this movement
been commenced, when a rush from the Ghdzis completely broke the square ;-all order was at m end :the entreaties and commands of the officers, endea-

vouring to rally the men, wcrc ilot cvcn listencd
to, aucl an utter rout cnsued ilo\vn the hill i n tlie
direction of cantonments, tllc erlcmy closely following,
whose cavalry, i n particular, matlc a fen~fiils l n ~ ~ g h t c r
among tlic unrcsisting fiigitives. Maj or I<crslia.rv's
party, ycrcciving this disaster, c1~tlc:~vourcdto cscayc;
but strong parties, issuing from the villagc, cut off
their retreat, and thus grcnt numbcrs of oar Scpoys
pcrisl~cd: tlie grcnndicr company, cspccinlly, 1v:is all
but anniliilxtecl. Tlic ~ninglcd tidc of figlit alld
pursuit secmcd, to those wlio manned tlic 1vn11s of
cantonmcnt, to be about to cntcr tllc gntc togctlicr ;
and, hy some fatality, tlie ammunition of the grcat
guns in battery within tlic canto~imcntsmas alniost
expendcd. A heavy fire, homcvcr, was opcncd from
the ShBh's 5th Infantry in tlic Mission Compouncl;
a fresh troop of tlie 5th Cavalry, under Lirutcn:mt
I-Iardyman, charged across tlie plaiii tolvnrds the
cnemy, joined by Lieutenant Walker, who had r:~llicrl
fifteen or twenty of llis own men; during mliicli gallant
effort this most promising ancl brnvc young ofIiccr
received a mortal wound. TIiesc opcratiouu, assistcd
by a sl~nrpdiscl~argcfrom thc jazailcliis untlcr Captain Trevor, contributed to chcclc tlic p~iruuit; 2nd it
was observcd at tlle time, ancl aftcrwnrds auccrt:~iried
to be correct, that a chief (Usrnhn I<han) vo11u1t:~rily
halted Iiis follo~vers, ~ ~ 1 1wcrc
0
among tlic Sorc~nost,
aiid led tlicm off; which niay bc rcclconcd, indced,
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the chief rcason why the mass of our people w11o on
that day went fort11 to battle were not destroyccl. Our
loss was tremendous ; the principal part of the wounded
having been left in the field, including LieutenantColonel Oliver, where tliey were miserably cut to
pieces. Oiir gun and second limber, whicli, while
endeavouring to gallop down thc hill, had orrertnrned
on rough ground, we had the mortification to behold
triumphant1y ca~riedoff by the encmy.
About half an hour previous to the Right of our
troops, a note had been -written to the Assistant Acljutaut-General by Captain Tronp, earnestly requesting
that the Mountain Train gun, wliich bail by that time
been repaired, miglit be sent out with the least possible
delay, and the first idea that suggested itself to that
officer after our defeat was, that by quickly bringing
this gun to bear upon the Horse Artillery gun, then
in the hands of the enemy, the latter miglit still be
saved. Be therefore galloped with speed to cantonrncnts, vhere fincling the MonntainTrain gun just ready
to start, he wns on the point of leading it out 6f the gate,
when his progress was interrupted by the Assistant
Adjutant-General, on the plea that it would now be
of no use. This is the more to be lamented, as from the
spot occupied by Captain Trevor's jazailchis, who, protected by alow wall, still kept up a slzarp and effectual
fire on the enemy, t l g range to the side of the hill
whence the AfghLns were endeavouring to carry off the

-

captured gun, about which they clustered in tliousands
was so short, that grape, even from a small calibre,
r l execution of their intciitions.
must liave ~ ~ e v e n t ethe
Had the company of Desh infantry wliich was drawn
up outside the gate, urider command of Licutcnant
Alexander, moved for~vardin coinpariy witli tllc mountain gun to tlic support of the above gallant llaiidful
of jazailchis, cxcellciit service miglit liavc been rendered. But it secmed as if we were undcr the ban of
I-Icaven.

-

I n this miserable and disastrous affair no less than
six great errors must present themselves, even to the
most ~~npractised
military eye, each of n~liiclicontributed in no slight degree to tlic defeat of our troops,
opposed as they were by overwliclining numbers.
1st. The first and perhaps most fatal mistalce of a11
was the taking out a single gun. Tlie Gencral Order
by tlie Marquess of I-Iastiugs, expressly Eoi,bidding less
than two guns to talte thc field, under any circumstarice.u
or on any pyctence whatever, wlien another is available,
must be well ltnowii at lcast to every officer wlio liav
served in India. Tllis positi&e prohibition was tlie
offspring of dearly-bought experience, and the action
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of Bernfir6 affords another convincing example of the
rislc to mhich a single gun is exposed when unsupported
by the fire of a second. I t was certainly the Brigadier's
intention to take the mountain gun also; but this had
unfortunately been disabled on the p~eviousday, and
it had been twice specially reported, both to the
Brigadier and to the General the foregoing night, by
Captain Troup, that it could not be got ready before
12 A.M. on the following day.
2nclly. Thc secbnd error is scarcely less evident
than the first. Had immediate advantage been taken
of the panic which o u ~unexpected cannonade created
among the possessors of the villagc, whose slaclc fire
afforded sufficient evidence of the actual fact that
they were not only contemptible in numbers, but s h o ~ t
of ammunition,-had,
I say, a stormiilg party been
led to the attack under cover of the clarltness,
which would liwe nullified the advantage they posst
sessed in- b e i ~ gundcr cover, the place r a ~ ~ inevitably have fallen into our hands, and thus would the
principal object of the sally have been gained, and a
good line of retreat secured for our troops in case of
necessity.
Srdly. The third error was so manifest as to be quite
unaccountable. A party of one hundred sappers had
accompanied "the force for the express purpose of
raising a sanga. The fittest place for such a work
would have been half-way along the ridge occupied by

us, where our troops would then have been wholly
protected from tlic fire of the jazails from the opposite
hill, whilc the enemy could not have advanced to the
attack without exposing themselves to the full effects
of our muslretry and grape. I t mould, in fact, have
infused into our troops a sense of sccllilrity from any
sudden charge of the cnemy's horse, and at the same
time have enabled our own pavalry to issue forth wit11
the assurmce of having in their rear a place of defence on which to fall back if hard pressed by the
enemy. I t has bccn scen that no such defence was
raised.
4tlily. All have heard of the British SQUARES at
Waterloo, which dcfied the repeated desperate onsets
of Napoleon's choicest cavalry. At Uema'rzi we
formed squares to resist the distant $re o j infintry,
thus presenting a solid mass against the aim of perhaps the best marksmen in the world, the said squares
being sccurely pcrched on the summit of a steep
and narrow ridge up wl~icll no cavalry could
charge with effect. A Peninsular General would co~isider this to be a novel fashion; yet Brigadier Slielton
had the beucfit of Peninsular experience i n his younger
days, and, it must be owned, was nevcr surpassed in
dauntless bravery.
6thly. Our cavalry, instead of being found upon
the plain, where tliey might have bccn nseful in 131.0tecting our line of commuriications with tlic canton-
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ments, and would have been able to advance readily
to m y point where their services might lzave been
required, were hemmed in between two infantry squares,
and exposed for several hours to a destrqctive fire from
the enemy's jazails, on ground where, .even under the
most favourable circumstances, they could not have
acted with cffect. This false and unsatisfactory position
of course discouraged the troopers; and, when the
infantry finally gave way, the two arms of the service
became mixed up in a may that greatly increased the
general confiision, and rendered it impossible for the
infantry to rally, even hacl they been so disposed. Tlie
trutlz is, that .the cavalry mere not allowed fair play,
and such a position must have disgusted and dispirited
any troops.
6tlily. Shortly after o w regaining possession of
the gun, one of the BrigaclierJs staff, Captain Mackenzie, feeling convinced that, from the temper of the
troops and from the impossibility of rectifying the false
.position in which the force was placed, not only was
success beyond hope, but that defeat in its most
disastrous shape was fast approaching, proposcd to the
Brigadier to endeavour to effect a retreat while it mas
yet in his power to do so with comparative impunity.
His reply was, "Oh, no! me will hold the hill some
time longer." At that time, even if the slaughter of
the soldiery, the loss of officers, the evident panic in
our ranks, and the worse than false natwe of our
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position, had not been sufficient to open all cyes as to
the impossibility even of partial success, (for the
real object of the expedition, viz.the possession of the
village of Bemk6, had been, as it mere, abandoned
from the very first,) the weakness and exhaustion of
both men and horses, who were not only worn out by
bodily fatiguc, but suffering grievously from extreme
thirst and the deljility attendant on long fasting, ought
to have banished dl idea of further delaying a movement
in which alonc lay the slightest chance of preserving
to their country lives, by the eventual sacrifice of which
not even the only solace to the soldier in the hour of
misfortune, the consciousness of unimpaired honour,
was likely to be gained.
[These criticisms gave rise to much discussion in the
English paperg. On behalf of Brigadier Shelton they
may be summed up as follows :1. It is admitted in the nasrative that the Brigadier
r r in vain solicited an additional gun " to be sent from
cantonmeuts, and ought not therefore to be held responsible on that score. Owing to the paucity of European
Artillery gunners only one of the Eorse Artillery
guns could he manne'd for field operations at one time,
as it was considered by the General esscntial to retain
a small reserve of European artillerymen for defensive
purposes within the long extent of ramparts. IIence
the Mountain Train gun was usudly substituted, but
chanced on this occasion to be out of repair.
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2. The Brigadier seems to have objected to risk a
night attack, 011 principle, and; cannot be held responsible for the failure of the storming party at daybreak,
which arose solcly from missing the proper entrance
to the village, which was open, and time mas thus
givcn to the enemy to pour forth from the city in
overwhelming numbers.
3. With regard to the omission to raise a c(sanga,"
or breastwork, for which purpose one hunched sappers
had been sent out with the force, it has becn dleged
that "t7~esenzen were too busily employed i n jighting to
be available .fir such a work."
4 and 5. It has becn asserted that what the author
has termed "Squares" mere not squares at all. ((The
enemy mere t ~ y i n gto tw11 our flardcs, and the Afghhn
l~orscmen mere pushing up hill, so t71e Jlunlcs were
thrown back to give a fiunking fiae"-the
odds against
ns being about 15,000 to 800 !
On the other llatid Lady Sale, who was an eye-witness
of the day's procecdings, describes what occul~edas
follows :"I had talcen up my post of obselvatioml, as usual,
on tlze top of the house, whence I had a fine view of
the field of action, aild whcre, by lrce~~ing
behind the
chilllncys, I escapcd the bullets that c o n t i ~ l ~ ~ d l y
whizzed past me. Brigadier Shelton having brought
f o r ~ ~ a rdiirmisbers
rl
to tlle brow of tlie hill, formed the
remainder of Elis infantry into two squares-the one
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about two hundred yards in rear of the otller, the intervening space being crammed with our cavalry, who,
from the nature of the ground, were exposed to the
full fire of the enemy without being able to act themselves."
"The number of thc enemy's footmen must have
been upwards of ten thousand (some say fifteen thousand), and the plain, on the north-west of the hills,
was swept by not less than three thousand or four thousand Afghiin cavalry. .
The figlit continued
till about 10 o'cloclc, by which time our lrilled and
wounded 11ecamc very numerous. I n spite of the
execution done by our shrapncll, the fire of thc enemy
told considerably more than ours [lid, from tlle superiority of their jazails and jingBs over our muskets.
. They also fought from behind sangas and
hillocks, whilst our men were perfectly exposed ; our
troops also labouring under the disaclvantage of being
drawn up in square, from an apprehension of an attack
from thc AfghLn cavalry."
'(The vent of the gun became too hot for the
artillerymen to servc it.
"At this time (half-past 9 A.M.) a, party of GhAziiis
ascended the brow of the hill.
I t is possible
that the Brigadier might not have seen their aclvailce;
but when they had nearly attained the summit, they
had an evident advantage over us, as their sllots
generally told in firing up at our men, whose persons
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were wholly exposed, mhilst only a fern of their heads
were visible to our troops, and the old fault of Jiring
too high most probably sent all our shots harmiessly
over their heads, for to hit them it was reqnisite to
fire on thc ground. When they fairly appeared above
ground, it was very cvident that our men werc not
inclined to meet them. Every field-glass was now
pointed to the hill with intense anxiety by us in cantonments, and we saw the officers urging their men to
advance on the enemy. Most conspicuous mere
Mackintosh, Laing, Troup, Mackenzie, and Layton;
who, to encourage the men, pclted the Gh&ziSs with
stones as they climbed the hill; and, to do the
fanaticsjustice, they returned the assault with the same
weapons. Nothing would do; our men would not
advance, though this party did not appear to be a
hundred and fifty in number. At length one of the
GhiLzibs rushecl forward, waving his sword over his head ;
a Sipsihi of the 37th darted forth and met him vith hie
bayonet ;but instead of a straight charge, he gave him a
kind of side stroke with it, and they both fell, and ~ o t h
rose again. Both were killed eventually, thc Ghkzi6
was shot by another man. I t was very like the scencs
depicted in the battles of the Crusaders. The enemy
rushed on-drove our men before them very U e a flock
of sheep, with a wolf at their heels. They captured
one gun. The artillerymen fought like heroes; two
were killed at the gun; Sergeant Mulhall received three

wounds ; poor Laing was shot whilst waving his sword
over the gun, and cheering the men. . . . Brigadier
Shelton says that when our men ran he orclered the
halt to be sounded ; at which the troops mechanically
arrested their flight, and fell into their plac6s I
"They ran till they gained the second square, which
had not brolren ; and the men finding a stand, turncd
about, gave a shout, and then the GhSLziRs were, in
their turn, panic-struclr, abandoned the p n , but macle
off with the limber and horses. On this we re-took
the gun, without resistance. . . . At this time I
was stancling on the ramparts, and hearcl the Envoy, i n
my presence, ask the General (Elphinstone) to pursue
the flying troops into the city, which he refused,
saying, ( i t was a wild scheme, and not feasible.' "
This account coincides exactly with the statements
made by those officers engaged in the action whom
I had opportunities of consulting. The reader can
therefore form his own judgment.
6. I t must be admitted, in Brigadier Shelton's favour,
that the odds were fearfully against him, although had
reinforcements been sent out to his aid at the critical
time the result might have been widely different, and
he would have been deservedly extolled as a hero.]

CHAPTER X.
OUR

PASSIVENESS.

- CONBERENCES

AND

WITH THB INBURGZNT CHIEFS.-LOSS
IHARIF'S

I

t

FORT.-TERMS

NBGOTIATIONB

O F MUHAMMAD

AGREED ON.

NovemBer 24th.--Ov~ troops had now lost all confidence ;and even such of the officers as had hitherto
indulged the hope of a favourablc turn in our affairs,
began at last reluctantly to entertain gloomy forebodings as to our future fate. Our f o ~ c eresembled
a ship in danger of wrecking among rocks and shoals,
for want of an able pilot to guide it safely through
them. Even now, at the eleventh hour, had the helm
of affairs been grasped by a hand competent to the
important task, we might perhaps have stee~cdclear
of destruction; but, in the absence of any such deliverer, it was but too evident that Heaven alone could
save us by some unforeseen interposition.

I have already mcntionecl thc new bridgc thrown
over the river by General Ell)hinstonc : this the enemy,
advancing up the bed of tlic river under cover of the
banlr, to-day began to dcrnolish. I must do Brigadier
Shelton the justice to say that he, secirig the vast
importance of the briclge in casc of a rctrcat (an alternative of which he never lost sight), had strongly wgecl
the erection of a field-morlr for its protection ; in fact
there wm a small uniinisllcd fort near at harid, mliicich one
night's work of' tlie snppers would hnvc rcnclerecl fit for
the purpose, and a small detachment tlirown into it
woulcl have perfectly commanded tlle bridgc. But
this simple 11rcc:~ution was neglected, and tlic rcsult
will be seen in the sequel.
Captain Conolly now m o t e ill from the U615 I'IisCLI;
strongly advising an immediate retreat thithcr, on mliicEi
movement several of the chief military and all tlie
political oofficers considered our only hope of lioldiilg
out through tlie winter to depcnd. But the old objections wcre still urged against the measure by Brigadier
Shelton a i d others ; and t h i Gencrd, ill a lcttcr this
day adchesscd to the Envoy, exprcssecl his opinion that
" the movemcnt, if not altogctlier impossil~le,mould
be attended with g ~ e a t difficulty, cncumbcrpd ns we
should bc with numcrous sick and ~voundctl. The
enemy would cloubtless opposc us wit11 thcir ~vholcforce,
and the grcater part of tlic troops would 11c rcrluired
to cover thc operatio~i,t l ~ u sleaving the can tolrn~cnts
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imperfectly defended ; that the men Ivere harassed,
dispirited, and greatly reduced in numbers ; and failure
mould be attendccl with certain destruction to the
whole force. To reillove the ammunition and stores
would be the m o h of several days, duwing mhiclz the
euemy mould hover around, and offer every obstacle
t o our operations. Oul. ~ m d c dwere increased,
whilst OUT mcans of conveying them vcre diminished.
Would the B d 8 I-Iisiu: hold the force mitli a l l the followers? Water was already saicl to be sclling there at a
high price." MJe had barely twenty days' s ~ ~ p p lofy
provisions in the cantonments ; and, eve11 supposing we
could find means to carry it 116th us, there was no
prospect of obtaining more in the 13616 I-Iis&r. A retreat
thence would bc morse than from om present position,
aftcr having abandoned our cattle; and tlie sick and
wounded must be left behind us." In tliese opinions
Brigadier Shelton entirely concurred. An appalling
list of objections, it must be confessed, but insufficient
to shake my bclief that a removal of the force into
the BhlQ I I i s b was not only practicable but necessary
for our safety and honour, while the rislrs attending it,
though formidable, mere only such as we ought, as
soldiers, to have unhesitatingly incurred. Shhh ShujB
had moreover declared himself impatient to receive us;
and, cven had thc dreaded ruin overwhelmed us in

* This report was entirely untrue.

the attempt, would it not have been a more manly
and honourable course, than the ingloiious treaty we
shortly afterwards entercd into with a treacherous band
of rebels, by which we deserted the sovereign whom
it was our duty to protcct to the last ~ ~ 0 1of3our blood?
Hacl we boldly sallied forth, preferring death to clishonour, would not the fate of our poor fellows have
been a 11undl.edfold happier than that they subsequently experienced, in their miscrablc retreat, inasmuch as they would have died in the consciousness of
having bravcly done tllcir duty? Never were troops
exposed to gcater hardsl~ipsand dangers; yet, sad to
say, never did soldiers shed their blood mlth leas beneficial result than during the investment of the British
lines at ICLibul.
But, to return to my narrative.
A letter to the address of the Envoy mas this day
received f ~ o mUsmBn I(hBne, BBralczi, a near relative
of the new Icing, and generally supposed to have a
favourable leaning towads us, wherein he took credit
to himself for having " checlred the ardour of his followers in their pursuit of our flying troops on the preceding day, when, by following up thcir success, the
loss of our caritonments and the destruction of our
force was inevitable ; but that it was not the wish of

* This cldof hnd slioll;oroc2 Oa11tai11Drumlnond in Ilia o m honso
sinco Lllo nrst day of ~ I I Qoutbrer~k.
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the chiefs to proceed to such dl-eadfd extremities, their
sole desire being that we should quietly evacuate the
country, leaving them to govern it according to their
own rules, and with a Iring of their omn choosing."
On the receipt of this friendly communication, the
Envoy requested the General to state his opiuion regarding the possibility, in a military point of view, of
retaining our position in the cantonments ; as, in case
of a negative reply, he might be able to enter into
negotiations vith the existing rulers of the country.
The General replied to the effect that "we had now
been in rt state of siege for three weeks; our provisions
were nearly expended, and our forage entirely consumed, without the prospect of procuring a fresh
supply; that our troops mere much reduced by
casualties, and the large number of sick and wounded
increased almost daily ; and that, considering the
difficulty of defending the extensive and ill-situated
cantonment, the near approach of minter, the fact of
OW communications being cut off, and that we had no
prospect of reinforcement, with the whole country in
arms against us ; he did not think it ~ossibleto retain
our present position in the country, and therefore
thought the Envoy ought to avail himyelf of the offer
to negotiate, which had been made him."
November 27th.-Nothing else of consequence took
place until this morning, when two deputies from
the assembled chiefs, having made their appearance at

.

the bridge, were ushered into cantonments by Captains
Lawrence and Trevor, the Envoy having a p c c d to
confer with them, on condition that nothing should be
proposed which it would be derogatory in him t o
consider. The iiitervie~vtook l~lace i n the oficersJ
guard-room at the eastern gate; thc exact particulars
did not transpire, but the demanrls made by the chiefs
mere sucli as it was impossible to comply with, and tlie
deputies toolr leave of tlie Envoy with the cxclainntiom
that " wc should meet again in battle ! " " W e shall
at d l cvents meet," replicd Sir William, " at thc day
of judgment." At niglit the Envoy rcccivcd a lctter
a
from the chiefs proposiilg terms of so disgraceful and
insulting a natureJ as seemcd at once to prccludc all
hope of terminating our difficulties by treaty. The
tenor 01them was as follows : 'cTl~atwe should deliver
up Sh&h SShujA and his whole family; lay down our
arms ; and make an uncoilditional surrender ; when
they might perhnps be induced to spare our livcs, and
allow us to leave thc country on condition of never
returning." The Envoy's rcply was such as well
became the representative of liis country's honour.
"1-Ie was astonished," 11c said, " at their dcpnrting
from tliat good faith for which lie had giver1 them
credit, by violntiiig thc co~iilitionv on ~vllichhc hat1
bceri lcd to cntcrtain proposals for u pacific arlsatigcmcnt; tliat tlic terms tlicy proposed mcre too dishonourable to bc eritcrtaincd for a moment ; ant1 that,
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if they persisted in them, he must again appeal to
arms, leaving the result to the God of battles."
Decemhr 1st.-No active renewal of hostilities took
place until to-day, when a desperate effort was made
by the enemy to gain possession of the BQA Hisk,
which they endeavoured to effect by a night attack, in
the first instance, on the BLrjS-i-likh, an isolated tower
forming an outwork to the fortress, ancl from its
elevated position commanding almost the entirc works.
This point was, however, strongly reinforced mithout
delay by Major Ewart, commanding the garrisou, anrl
notwithstantiig the determined spirit exhibitecl by the
enemy, who made repeated charges up the hill, thcy
were repulsed with considerable slaughter.
December 4th.-At an early h o u ~the enemy moved
out in forcc from the rcity, and, havillg crowned the
Bem6r6 hills, posted two guns in the go18ge, from
which they maintained a tolerably brisk fire for several
but
hours into the cantonments, effecting fo~%unately
little mischief; in the evening they, as usual, retired
t o their respective haunts. During the night a rush
was suddenly made by a party of Afgh&ns to the gate
of Muhammad Sharif's fort, gar1,isoned by our troops,
which they attempted, in imitation of our o m mcthod
at the taking of Ghazni, to blow open with powder
bags, but without success:
Decem6er 6th.-This day the enemy completed the '
destruction of our bridge over the river, which they

commeilced on the 24th ult., no precaution having
bcen tnlren to prevent the evil. Day after day me
quietly loolrcd on witliont an cffort to savc it, ordcrs
bcing in vain solicited by various ofIiccrs for preventive
measures to bc adoptcd. I n corisei~ucnce of thc
enclny 1i:~ving com~ncnccil~ l i i ~ i i ~one
i g of t l ~ ctomcrs
of Mul~i~tnmi~d
Sliarif's fort, tlic g:~r~*isoti
mas rei~~torccd,
nud Lieutenant Sturt succcedctl during tlic 11ig11t ill
dcstroyi~igtllc mine. Tliis, ho~vcvcr, conltl otily be
cffcctcil t ~ tt11c cxpciise of opcning a pnssngc u ~ i d c rtlic
walls, ml~icl~
it l~ccaincncccssary to 11n~ric:~tlc
; :u1(1
nltl~ouglltldu xncnsure of prcc:lution was cfficic~ltly
cxccntcd, such mas tllc nervous state of t l ~ cparty
composing thc garrison, that no reliance could bc
placctl on tlicir sta1)ility in cnsc of an nttaclr.
Dccentber 6th.-l%e garrison of Muhammad SharifJg
fort was relieved at an carly houi~lby one compaiiy of
I-Icr Majesty's 4-hth, untlcr Licutcn:~llt Grcy, and o l ~ c
company 37th Nativc Inhiltry, undcr Licntcnallt
IIawtrcy, an :~nlplysufiicicnt forcc for tlle dcfc~lccof
thc place against aiiy suildcn onsct ; but, ui~l~al)pily,
.
tlic fc:lrs of t l ~ cold garrivoti mcrc comm~inicaterlto tlic
ncw, and, owing to the rcpiscscntations of Licntcti:t~lt
I-Ia~vtrcy, t l ~ cdefences mcrc ~ ~ ~ i n u t ccsa~nil~cil
ly
l~y
Licutcnant Sturt, thc gi~l~rirjon
c i ~ g i ~ ~ eauil
c r , ljy liirrl
prot~omlccrlto 1)c con~plctc. Scarcely, ho~vcvcl.,11ntl
that oliiccr l.t!tnr~icd tc~a~ntontnciib,are ii~f'or~z~ation
wae convaycil t o the C1cncr:d that the dct:~cliu~cnt,

4

having been seized with a panic, had taken flight
oveil tlie walls, and abandoned thc fort t o the enemy.
I t would appear that a small party of jazailchis, having
crept up to thc undermined tomcr under cover of
the trees in the Sh6h Bfigh, had fircd upon the gailrison
through the barricaded breach which I have above
described, unfortunately wounding Lieutenant Grey,
upon whose departure for medical aid, the Europeans,
deprived of thei? officer, lost what little confidence
they had before possessed, and collecting their bedcling
under the walls, betrayed symptoms of an intention
to retreat. The enemy meanwhile, emboldened by
the slackened firc of the defenders, approached momentarily nearer to the malls, and, making a sudden
rush to the barricade, completed the panic of the
garrison, who now made their escape over the walls
in thc greatest consternation, deaf to the remonstrances of their gallant commander. The Sepoys,
who at first remained staunch, contaminated by the
, bad example set them, refirsed to rally; and Lieutenant
Hawtrey, finding himself deserted by all, was obliged
reluctantly to follow, being the last to leave the
fort.
The ehemy, 'though at first few in numbers, were
not slow to avail themselves of the advantage afforded
them, and their banner was soon planted in triumph
on the malls.
December 7th.-The European garison was this day

@
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withdravn from the baztir, and three colllpnnies of
the 37th Native Infantry substit~~tecl
in their room.
[This deplolsahle affair of Muhammt~cl Shal,{f's fort
mas made the subject of much censorious comment and
of mutual recrimination a t the time; and writing, as
'I did, before the excitement caused by tllese clisastrous
events hacl been calmed down, and when it seemed
inevitable that nothing less tvoultl satisfy tlle public
mind than a thorough sifting of facts, I felt in a
manner compelled, as a faithful narrator of events,
and i n the cause of truth. and justice, to lay bare
what then seemed a serious evil, regardless of unpleasant consequences. But now t h c case is altogether
diBerent, and I feel that I should not bc justified i n
reviving needlessly a n ungracious topic which had best

-

Moreover, while looking bnclc calmly, through a
long vista of years, o n thosc sad cvcrlts of my younger
days, and wit11 a more ripe militnry cspcric~icethan I
then could boast, I feel persuaclcd that tliei,c mas
a natural tendency among t h e actors in those trying
scenes (myself includecl) t o view what mere in reality
acciclental ancl exceptional errors or baclrslidings, on
the part of officers or men, through an exaggerated
r n e z ~ m . For, after all, there mas nothing veiy surprising i n the occupants of a small fortified outpost
being seizecl with a temporary panic on discovesing
that their enemies ontside mere secrctly undermilung

the walls, with the pyobable intent ,to blow up the
interior garrison at any moment ! Such incidents are
by no means so rare as might be supposed iu time
of war, even among the bravest troops in the world,
and when we consider the continuous hardships and
trials which these harassed and half-starved soldiers
had undergone during the previous seven wcelrs, we
ought not to marvel if their nervous systcm had
become temporarily unstrung. Let it the rather be
remembered, to their lasting credit, how these selfsame men fought their way, only a few days subsequently, under the personal leading of tl~eir brave
brigadier, during the fatal and ever-memorable retreat
from K:ibul, tlirougll a loug seiies of difficult mountain
passes, atid opposed on a11 sicles by a countless host of
fanatical AAfghAns, as he~eaflter recorded in these
pagcs ; and-let the voice of a worn-out opprobrium be
silenced for evennore I *]
Tlie alarming discovery having been made that
our supply of provisions had bcen materially overrated, and that not even a sufficiency for one day
remained in store, Captain I-Iay vas clespntched with n
convoy of ~nilitaiystores into the B51$ IIisk, wit11
orders to bring back the animals laden with grain.

* Tl~ougllRon~owlur~t
lrlto in tho day, I rojoico in tho op])orkuniby
nolv nflordorl IIIG of offori11g tlio abovo tributo of t h o roqjoct duo
alilco t o tho doad a1111 to tho living.

13

I-Ie started scvcral hours before dayl)rc:~lc, but, on
reaching the Siy5h Sang hill, a few straggling s21ots
being fii-ed upon his rcar, tEic rneii riding t l ~ c1:ldcn
ya'bds (A Fglitin ponics) mere panic - stricken, :~n(l,
hastily casting tlic loads to tllc gro~ulil, g:~llopccl for
safety to the I1,ont. Much privatc l)isopcrty was lost
at the same timc, for, not~vitlist;mdingall t11c ol~position that had bccn inatlc to tlic proposal of a rctrcnt
to the B:il:il. I-Iis:ir, tlic Goncr:~lin some dcgrcc dcfcrrcd
to tlie opiriions of tlioac who favourctl tlic movciilc?nt,by
adoptilig t l ~ chalf-mcasnro of scrlrliilg ill ii~:igaeiiic
snpplics from time to tiinc by driblets. Tliia led
many to supposc that tlle wllolc foiorcc would aooiicr
or latcr retrcrtt thither, and accordingly advantage
was talcen of cvery opportunity to send in a fcw
private neccssa~iesin atlvance. 011 this occasion tlia
attempt failed i n the manricr I have abovc rclatccl ; but
Captain EIay nevcrthcless accomplished tllc primary
object, of liis journey, by bringing back as rnucli
provisions as could 1)o collcctctl oil so sliort a noticc.
Dccembel- 8tl~.-Tlic Envoy, having aclt1ressi:ti a
public letter to thc Gcncral, requcstctl him to st:ti;e
" whether or not it mas his opiilioii that any furthcr
attempt to hold out against tlic crlcilly vrroulrl mcrcly
have the effect of sacrificing both His Majesty ShQi
ShujL and ourselves; :~ndmhctlicr, supposi~igtliis to
be so, the only i~lterxlntive lcft was rlot to ncgotiate
for our safe retrcat out of thc country, oti tlic rrlost

favoura1)le te1.m~ possible?" The General, in reply,
stated his conviction that " the present situation of
the troops was such, froln the want of provisions and
the impracticability o l procuring more, that no time
ought to be lost in entering into negotiations for a
safe rctreat from tlie country : That, as regarded the
troops at IIIandah.Lliir,and tlie rumours of their approach
to our assistance, he would 11esorry, in tlie al~se~lce
of
all autlientic infoi,mation, to risk tllc sacrifice of the
troops by waiting for tlicir arrival, wheil we were
ignorant cven of their having corn~nencedtheir mnrcll,
and were rcduccd to thrcc days' supply 01 provisions
for our Scpoys at lialf ratioils, and almost witllont any
foragc for our liorscs and catilc : Tliak our numnl~cr
of sick anil wouiided i11 hospital cscceclcd six lilindrcd,
and onr 1iie:uls for tllcir transport Tverc far from
adcquatc, owing to tlic tlcath by starvntioli of so
1na1~11y
of our camels, iiam which ca~iscalso we should
11e obligccl, at this inclclncnt season, to leave their
tents and bcddiiig beliincl, with such a marc11 belore
us : That, xq rcgnrded tlic king, he must be excuscd
from entering upon that point of the Envoy's lettcr,
and leave its consideration to his better Bnodcdge
and judgment; but he might be allo~vcdto sny that
it little 11ecalnc him, as commanding the 13ritisli troops
in Afgli;inistilii, to regard tlic ncccssity of liegotiation
in any otllcy light t1la11 ns concernccl tileir horlour
and welfare, Tor both of zvhicll lie shonl(111c answer-
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able, by a further stay here, after tlie suclden and
universal rebellion against I-Iiu Majesty's authority
which hacl talren place tliroughout his dominions :
That the whole of the grain and forage i n tlie vicinity
was exhausted, and the defcnce of tlic cxtc~lviveand
ill-selectecl cantonment would not admit of distant
expcditions to obtain supplies fyoin thc strongly
Eortiiicd dwellings of an ar~medand hostilc population ;
our present numbers being insufficient .€or its defcnce,
and obliging the whole of the troops to bc allnost
constantly uncler arms. I n conclusion, hc could only
repeat his opinion that the Envoy sl~oulillose no
time in entering into negotiations." This letter was
countersigned by Brigadiers Shelton and Anquctil,
and Colonel Chambers, who entirely concurrcd i n the
opinions i t expressed. Meanwhile starvation stared us in
the face, and it becnme necessary to adopt immediate
measures for obtaining a further supply of provisions.
A consultation was accordingly lield with this object a t
the GeneralJs house, and it mas determined that an
attack should be madc on tlie neiglibouring fort of
Khojn Ruwash at an early hour the followirig morning.
Decemher 9tl~-The morning dawned, but no signs
of preparation appcared for thc proposed enterprise;
no bridgc was laid down for the passage of the guns
and cavalry; no troops were in readi~lcss to marcli;
and it mas plain that either 'no orrlcrs had bcer~
given, or no attention had been paid to them, Thus,
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notwithstanding the importance of its object, the
expedition was suffered to die a natural death.
Upon this subject I shall only remark that Brigadier
Shelton commanded the garrison, and that with him
the necessary arrangements rested.
[The following explanation has since been giien in
an English paper :('The real fact $9, the Envoy found from his informant that there were plenty of provisions in the
village, (and in another, Khadabud, near it,) but it
was fully armed, and it was declared that the whole
armed force of the city would sally out to resist our
march to the place ; and hence the Envoy and General
decicled on the force not being sent. Was this the
Brigadier's f a d t ? "1
Intelligence having been this day received of a
decisive victory gained over the enemy by General
Sale at JallJlril,ibiicl, the Envoy conceived it might
have the effect of modifying the General's opinion
regarding the immediate necessity of negotiating
with the rebel chiefs, and addressed him a letter on
the subject. The General, however, declared in
reply, that, pleasing as the intelligence was, it coukl
not in the slightest degrce influence our position,
so as to affect the expediency of our treating; in
forming which opinion he was much influenced by
the joint representations that had been jnst made
to him by Captaius Boyd and Johnson, the respec-

tive heads of the Company's ancl ShilhJs commissariat,
wherein they declared thcir ~ l t t c rinability to procure
grain or forage within threc or four miles, and that,
although three days' supply of (it4 (ground wheat)
might still be procurable from the BQA I-IisAr, yet
every aclditional day's delay iiow cripplccl tllc c d t l e
more and more, and reridered our position more
perilous. Not~vithstnnding these :~pp:~z.cntlyconclusive argu~ncnts, thcrc existcd styorig grountls for
I~elievingthat tlie B61A Histir colztairicd n much larger
supply of provisions thau was generally sup~~oscd.
December 10th.-Another
convoy of military stores
was despatched to thc RB16 Hisbr this morni~igunder
command of Lieutenant Le Geyt, by whom a further
supply of u'tu' was brought back i n return.
December 11th.-The rebel chiefs having manifested
an inclination to treat, the Envoy, accorrlpnnied by
Captains Lawrence, Mackcnzie, and Trcvor, went
out to mect them on the plain towards SiyAliE1
Sang. Them werc present Muhammad Akbar IChAn,
Usmhn 1C116nJ Mullanlmnd K h h Nail) Amir (cornmonly called Naib Amir), 13tirakzis;-Mulinnlnlad Sll(L1~
IChBn, Hnmza ICl~bzl,ICli~tdaIChtin, Ghn1zis;-Jay-:it
Ulal IChim, Pupa1zi;-IChAn Shnri~iRhGn, ICnxill~fidi;and seveyal o t h e ~ sof inferior notc, 1)ut all hcails of
tribes. After tllc e ~ ~ l l a t l gofc ~;1~Ltt:lti01lH,
s i r William
addrcsscd thc nssernblcd ICllAns, alluding to past timcs,
during wliicli rclutions of perl'cct cordi:llity :uld fl4icuc1',
I
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ship had existed between them and the Znglish.
He greatly lamented that feelings of so pleasant
and mutually bcneficial a nature should have been
thus rudely interrupted; but professed himself wholly
ignorant of the causes of such interruption. He proceeded to state that sentiments of good will towards
the AfghiLn nation hacl principally induced the British
Government to lend their aid, in restoring to the
seat of his ancestors a king, who, notwithstanding
his misfortunes, oiiginating in causes to which he
mould not then allude, hacl ever reigned in the hearts
of the mass of his people; that the restoration of their
monarch had apparently given the utmost satisfaction
to all classes throughout his dominions. If, however,
that satisfaction had passed away, and given place
to emotions of a wholly contrary nature (and he
supposed that the assembled Sirdks and K h h s
might be considered the mouth-piece of the peoplc),
it no longer became the British Government to persist in a course so displeasing to those chiefly interested in the result. On this account he was willing
to enter into negotiations, for the smoothing over of
present difficulties, and for the adopting of such
measures as were likely to be the most conducive
towards the re-establishment of that mutud friendship
between the British and Afgl16n Governments, the maintenance of which, he felt assured, must be earnestly
deaired by both parties. To all these propositions
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Muhammad Akhar Kh%n and Usmdn IChAn, as the
principal personages present, expressed, with the hearty
concurrence of the inferior chiefs, their entire assent,
adding many expressions of their personal esteem
for the Envoy himself, and their gratitude for the
way in which the exiled Amir had bccn used. The
Envoy then requested permission to read to them
a paper containing a general slcetch of the proposcd
treaty. This being agrecd to, the articles of the
tiaeatywere read and discussed. Their genaral purport
was to the effect-That thc British should cvacuate
AfghdnistLn, including Kandah&r, Ghaeni, ICSbul,
JallBhbrid, and all tlie other statiolls n1)solutcly
within the limits of the country so called;--that
tllcy
should be permitted to return not only uiimolestcd
to India, but that supplies of every description sliould
be afforded them in their road thither, ccrtnin
men of consequence accompanying them as liostagcs;
-that the Amir Dost Muhammad IChLn, his family,
and every Afgl16n now in exile for political offences,
should be allomed to retuTn to tlicir country ;-that
ShiLh Shuj6 and his lamily should be allowed thc
option of remaining at KLbul or proceeding wit11 tlle
British troops to Ludihna, in either case rccciving
from thc A f g h h Government a pension of one lalc11
of nipis per annum;-that means of tra11spoi.t for
the conveyance of our baggage, stores, kc., includiug that required by thc royal family, in case
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of their adopting the latter alternative, should be
Iurnished by the existing Afghjn Government;-that
an amnesty should be granted to all those who had
made themselves obnoxious on account of their
attachment to Sh&hShujB and his allies, the British;
-that
all prisoners should be released;-that
no
British force should be ever again sent into Afghhnistjn, unless called for by the Afghfin Government,
between whom and the British nation perpetual friendship should be established on the sure foundation of
mutual good offices.
To all these terms the chiefs co~diallyagreed, with
the exception of Muhammad Akbar, who cavilled at
several, especially that of the amnesty, but was overruled by his coadjutors. He positively refused to
permit the garrison to be supplied with provisions
until it had quitted cantonments, which movement
he clamorously demanded should take place the
following morning. His violence caused some confusion; but the more temperate of his party having
interfered, it was finallym'agrcedthat our evacuation
of the cantonments should t a l e place in three daysthat provisions should be supplied-and that to all
the above-mentioned articles of this new treaty a
formal assent in writing should be sent, with all
the usual forms of a restored peace. The chiefs, on
returning to the city, took with them Captain Revor
as a hostage for the sincerity of the Envoy. During
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the whole of this interview, which took place not
far f ~ o athe bottom of ihe Siytih Sang hills, great
anxiety was felt in the cantonments from the apparent
danger to which the Envoy was exposed,-he being
accompanied only by a fcw troopers of the Bodyguard,-and hom the circumstance of large bodies
of the enemy's horse and foot bcing sccn to pass
towards the scene of conference from the city, their
leaders evidently with much diibculty restraining
their advance beyond a certain point. Sir William,
however, although not unaware of the ljerfitlious
nature of those he had to deal with, nor insen~ibleto
the risk he ran, (a shot, in fact, from the fanatic
multitude, having whistled over the heads of the
gentlemen in attendance on him, as thcy advanced
towards the rcndeevous,) wisely imagined that a display of confidence was the best modc of begetting
good faith. I t is, however, pretty certain that the
tumultuary movements of the AfghiLn troops, whose
presence was in direct violation of the stipulations
under which the conference was held, wcre not without
their cause, it having been the eaixcst desire of
Muhammad Akbar to seize upon the Envoy's person
at that very meeting, from which step he was with
difficulty restrained by the other Ichiins. But no sense
of personal danger could have deterred a Inan of
Sir William's truly chivalrous and undaurltcd chnractcr
from the performance of any duty, private or public.
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Woulcl that he had becn more alive to the apprecommon men ! We might
hensions which infl~~eaced
not then have to mourn over the untimely fate of
one whose memory must be ever cherished in
the hearts of all mho h e w and were capable of
appreciating him, notwithstanding the disilstrous termination of his political career, as that of a good,
and, in many essential points, a great man.

204

THn KABUL INScRREOTION OF

1841-42.

CHAPTER XI.
PREPARATIONS F O R EVACUATING.-NORE
MORE

DELAYS. -MORE

CONFERENCES.-

DIWICULTIIS.

-LIUIIAMNATJ

AKHAR'S PLOT AGAINST THE INV0Y.-HIS

TrIURDER.

December 12tA.-IT is undeniable that Sir William
Macnaghten was forced into this treaty with men
whose power lie clespisecl, and wliose trexcl~erywas
proverbial, against his own judgment, by the prcssing
reprcscntations of our militmy heatls. I t is no less
true that, whatever inay have bccn his political remissness or want of forcsiglit before tlic rebellion
brolce out, he liarl, througliout tlie perils that afterwards besct us, displaj~ed a truly Iji,itisll spirit of
unflinching fortitude and intlefatignl~le energy, cnlculated, under . more auspicious lcaclcrs, to have
stimulated tlie zeal and v,zlo~u~of the troops, anil
to have cliecretl them under the trials and liartl~l~ips
they were callcd on to endure ; :ultl I can safely add,
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without fear of contradiction, that scarcely an enterp ~ i s ewas undertaken throughout the siege but at the
suggestion, and even the entreaties, of thc Znvoy, he
volunteering to take on himself the entire responsibility. Justice demands this tribute to the memory
of one, whose acts, as they will assuredly undergo the
severe scrutiny of his countqmen, it therefore becomes
the duty of every eye-witness, who bears testimony
on the subject, not only to shield from misrepresentation, but, where they are deserving of it, to hold
up to public admiration. I am led to write this
solely by my public knowledge of the man. If 1
could bring myself, on matters of such vital importance, to follow the dictates of mere private feeling,
my bias would be altogether on the side of my late
lamented militmy chief, and for whose infirmities
every allowance ought, i n common justice, to be
made. With a mind and talents of no orciuary
stamp, and a hitherto unsullied fame, he copnitted
the f a t d error of transporting himself suddenly from
a state of prolonged luxurious reposc, at nu advanced
age, to undertake the fatigues and cares inseparable from high military command, in a foreign,
uncongenial climate; he thus not only ruined his
already shattered health, but (which to a soldier was
a far worse calamity) grievously damaged that high
reputation which his early services had secured for
him.

The terms of the new treaty were immediately
made known to ShLh ShujL, by which that unfortunate m o n a d found himself once more doomed to
an old age of exile and degradation. The first step
towards its fulfilment was the withdrawal of our
troops from the BB16 EIissr, which was to have taken
place this very day, but was postponed for a short time
longer to admit of the necessary preparations being
made. A deputation of chiefs had an interview i n
the close of the day, who were the bearers of a most
unexpected proposition, to the effect that Shhbh ShujiL
should continue Icing, on condition of intermarrying
his daughters with the leading Afghlin chiefs, and
abandoning the offensive practice of keeping the
chief nobles of his lringdom waiting for hours at
his gate in expectation of audience. The Afghgns
hate cwemony, which Shhbh Sliuj& carried at all times
to an absurd extent, hence much of his unpopularity.
This. arrangement was not intended to annul thosc
parts of the treaty which related to o w immediate
evacuation of the country, for the fulfilment of which
some married families were demanded as hostages.
December 13th.-Such was the inveterate pride of
the king, that he yielded a most reluctant consent
to the above-mentioned proposals, notwithstanding
that the only alternative was thc instant resignation
of his kingdom. Little confidence was, however,
placed by the Envoy in the sincerity of the chiefs,
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whose hatred of the Dhiini ruler was notorious. As
o w retreat was now fully decided on, and o w wellstocked i~iagazinewas shortly to fall a prey to our
enemies, the General ordered that some ammunition
should be distributed to certain of the camp-followers ;
and commanding officers were directed to indent for
new arms and accoutrements, in exchange for such
as were old and damaged. The reins of discipline
had, howevel-, by this time become so terribly relaxed,
and so little attention was paid to superior orders
by either officers or men, that many of the officers
i n command of companies rested content with sending
their men to the magazine, to help themselves at will,
the stores l~cingunfortlmately, in the absence of any
finished building for their reception, ar3ranged under
the trees of an orchard, in charge of a sinall guard.
The consequeuce was, as might have been expected,
a scene of conFusion and plunder, which was rendered,
worse by a iwsh of camp-followers, who, imaginbg
that a licence hnd been given for every one to take
whatever he pleased, flocked in hundreds to the spot,
and terribly increased the tumult ; insomuch that
the authol~ityof several officers, who, observing what
was going on, exerted themselves to restore order,
was for aevcrd minutes set at naught.. At last,
however, the place was cleared of the intruders, and
the g r e a t e ~portion of the atolen articles was recovered
the same evening.
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At 2 P.M. the troops in the BAIL I-Tislir, consisting
of the 54th Native Infantry, haE of Captaiu Nicholl's
troop of Horse Artillery, and a dctachmcnt of the
Mountain Train, with two howitzers, under Lieutenant
Green, commenced their evacuation of that fortress.
They were also encumbered with an iron 9-pounder
gun, and a 24-pounder brass howitzer, drawn by
bullocks, whicli it was the Gcllerill's wish should Lave
been left bchind, but his order to tllnt cffect llad by
some accidcnt missed its destination. As tllc utmost
scarcity of provisions prevailed in cantonmcntu, Captain ICirby, the commissariat officcl; h:~d zealously
exerted hirnseLE. to collect a supply of about one
thousand six hundred mauncls of whcat nit1 flour
to carry thither. Much delay, howevcr, occurred i n
packing and loading; and, the bcst part of t l ~ cday
being nearly spent ere above onc-tliirtl of that (luantity
was ready, Major Ewart deemed it advisable t o illove
off Tvithout lurther loss of time. I-Ic fonlid Muhammad Alrbar Khan in waiting with a smnll 11ody of
followers outside the gate, for the purpose of cscorting
him to cantonments; md, as the evening dscw nigh, a
dense crowd of armcd AfghLns had bceu obsertved to
collect on the Siylih Sang hill, along t l ~ cbase of
which our troops must pass, giving rive to suspicions
of some meditated treachery. Wllilc tlie rcnr-guard,
with the Mountain Train gun and rb poiti011 of the
baggage, was leaving the gate, some of Mullammad
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Akbar's followers, pushing quietly past them, endeavoured to effect an entrance into the fort; but on
their being recognized by the Iring's guard, the gates
were immediately shut, and a rouncl or two of grape
fired upon the intruders, with so indiscriminate an
aim as to endanger the lives of Captain Conolly and
several of the Sepoys, of whom some weye severely
wouncled. It call scarcely be doubted that Muhammad
Alrbar's intention was to havc seized the gate with a
few of his men, until a rush of the Afghrins from
the hill should have enabled him t o carry the body
oE the place by storm. The vigilmce of the garrison
having cleEeated this plan, the wily chief, imagining
that ihe gates mould again be opened to re-admit
ouT troops, informed Major Xwart that, owing to
tlie lateness of the honr and the threatening attitude
assumed by the crowrl on thc hill, it would be necessary to postpone his mwch until the following
morning. I n consequcncc of this sudden, ill-timed
announcement, Major Ewmt applied to tlic king for
tlie immediate readmission of his troops for shelter
during tlie night ; but tlie monarch, whose suspicions
of foul play on the part of Muhammad Alcbar were
now fillly n~valrened,positively refused to accede to
the request. Tlie prospect of passing the night in the
low ma~,sliy ground undcr the walls, without tents,
bedding, fire-mood, or food for officers or men, was
suificicntly cllecrless ; while tlle fcar of treachery on
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the part of Muhammacl Alcbar, and tlie dangerous
vicinity of an armed m~tltitude, ~vhose match-fires
already
on the adjacent hills, tender1 but
little to relieve the discomforts of sucli n sitnntion.
The cold mas intensely bitter, nncl pcrhaps so rrliacral~le
a night had nevcr beforc bccu spcnt hy Indian troops.
December 14th.-At
an early hour tliiv morning,
Muhammad Akbar having dcclarod Ids readiness to
proceerl, the troops comlncnced tl~eiru1;1ivcIi. 'J'lie advance-guarrl was sl~fferedto proccctl ~uiniolestctl;but
tlie rear-guard, on rcacliii~g the base of tllc SiyAh
Sang hill, was iired upon by t l ~ ccncmy, ~vliocrow~icd
the ridge; and the iron 9-pountlcr being i i ~ r:L fcw
moments accidentally separated from tllc colum~iin
crossing a water-cut, azi instantaneous rush mas nlacle
u11on it by a number of Afglulns, and a poor sick
European artilleYjrman, ~ ~ 1 1 0for w:t,nt of n more
suital~le conveyance had been lashcd to tllc gun,
was unmercifully butchered. The aplwol~ch of the
rear-guard, and a round or two of grnpc from the
Mountain Train howitzer, drove oiT the ass:lilant.u ; nud
they were restrained from offcring ally ac1ilitio~i:~l
annoyance by the exertions of Mullammad lilcbar
himself, who, galloping i n amongst them with a fcw
followers, threatened to cut down any rvho darcd to
be guilty 01 further opposition to the progrcss of tllc
detachment, which accordingly reached carltonnicnts
safe at about 9 A.M.
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DecemBer 16th.-ShBh Shujh having, for reasons best
lrnown to himself, withdrawn his consellt to the
arrangement which was to .have continued him in the
possession of his rights, the treaty resumed its original
form; but the chiefs positively refused to snpply
provisions or forage, m t i l we should further assure
them of our sincerity by giving up every fort in the
immediate vicinity of cantonments. Forage had for
many days been so scarce, that the horses and cattle
were kept alivc by pwing off the bark of trees, and by
eating their own dung over and over again, which
was regularly collected and spread before them. The
camp-followers mere destitute of other food than the
flesh of animals which expired daily from starvation
and cold. The daily consumptioll of kt2by the fightingmen mas about one hundred ancl Uty maunds, and not
above two daysJ supply remained in store. By giving
up the forts in question, aJl of which commanded the
caatonment, we should place ourselves entirely 'at the
mercy of the enemy, who could at any time render our
position untenable. But our leaclers now seemed to
consider that wc had no other chance left than to concede to the clembds of the chiefs, however unreasonable ; and our troops were accordingly withibrawn from
the Rilribishi, Magazine, and ZulfikirJs forts, and from
the Masjid opposite the western gate, all of which were
forthwith occupied by the Mghhns, who, on their part,
sent in Nassar-ullah K h h , a brother of Naw4b
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ZamBn Ichfin, as a hostage, and n supply of allout one
lluntlred and fifty nialmila of At5 for tllc troops.
Thcy likewisc promiscd us two tl~ousnnil canicls and
fo~u.hundred ydl~dsfor t l ~ cniarcll to Ja11:il :il);id.
Dece?r~ber1 8th.-Tlic delay of thc clliors ill furnishing
the necessary carringc, and t l ~ cSl1ril~'s ililutoritiess in
deciding on liis luturc coursc, colllllcllctl na fi'om
day to day to 11ostl)oiic our i1cp:~rturc. hlcnilrvliilc tlic
increasing scvcrity of tllc winter rc~itlr!rc!tlc:v~ry hour's
procmstiiiatioii of tlic ntlrlost co~isccluc!nc:e; and this
morning our situation mas rcntlcrctl liiorc ilcspcrate
tlinn cvcr by a 1lc:~vy
of snorv, wllicli covcrctl t l ~ c
ground to the deptli of five inclics, :uld licvcr n f t c i ~
wards disappcarcd. Thus a iicw eiicnly c~itci.erl on
thc scenc, whicli wc mcrc ilcstiiletl to filitl c:vcn rnore
formidable than an nriny of rcl~cls.
December 19th.-Thc -E~ivoywrote nrl ordcr for the
evacuation of Ghazni, nnd it mas arrnllgotl t1i;~ttlie
27th Nntivc Infantry, ivllic!ll g~rriaonctlthe l)lacc,
should marc11 tlirougll tlic Zurmnt valley, ant1 pursuc
tlie route of Dcril Iahma51 ICl1;ill. '1'11~29nd was fixed
for our departure.
Decemder 2Ot?~.-Thc Xnvoy had an intc:rvicw with
the chiefs, nrlio now dcmandcil that n portion of
our guns and ammunition should bc ininicrli:itcly
given up. Tlicy also rcilnirctl 13rig:iilicr Sliolton na
a liostngc. It mas proposcd by Liclltclialit Sturt to
tlie Gcncrnl to 11rcak ofF the treaty, arid ~liarclifortll-

with to Jall&l&11Bd,devoting all the means of transport
wc possessed to the service of the sick, and the conveyance of such puldic stores as were absolutely
necessary. But neither the General nor his immediate
advisers could bring themselves to adopt a course
which would have saved thc nationd honour, at the
risk of sacrificing our whole force.
I t has been truly said that a council of war never
fights. A door of hope had, until this day, still
remained open to us in the approach of Colonel
Mnclaren's force to our assistance from ICandahLr;
we now heard with despair of its retreat &om TLzi,
in consequence of the snow.
Dece~n-lzlrer.
2lsf.-The Envoy mct Usllllin IChdn ancl
Muhammad Alrbar IChrin on t l ~ eplain, when four
hostages were fixecl upon, two of whom (Captains
Conolly and Airey) were at once given over. Brigadier
Shelton, having expressed a decidecl objection to undertalcc the duty, was not insisted upon. In the evening
Captains Trevor and Drummond were permittecl to
return to cantonments, the lattcr officer having been
concealed in the city since the 2nd of November.
Decenzber 22nd.-I was ordered to conduct an officer
of NawBb Zamkn ICh6n over the magazine, that he
might make choice of such stores as wonlcl be most
acceptable to the chiefs. I rccommcnded a lmge
pile of 8-inch shells to his notice, wliich I knew
would be of no use to thc chiefs, as the mortars

were with Captain Abbott's battery at JdlBBbAd.
He eagerly seizcd the bait, and departed in great
glee, with his prize laden on some old ammunitionwaggons.
The Envoy at the same time sent his carriage as
present to Mullammad Alrbar IChAn. That same
night the last-named chic! spread the net, into which
Sir William Macnaghteii was, on the following day,
so miserably lurcd to his destruction. Captain Slrinner, at this time living under Mnharnmad AlrbarJs
protection, was made the bearer of proposds to the
Envoy, of so advantageous a nature, as to prove, in
his forlorn circumstmces, irresistibly tempting.
Amin-ullah KhAn, the most influential of the rcbels,
was to be seized on the folloving day, and delivered
up to us as a prisoner. Muhammad IChiLn's fort was
to be immediately occupied by one of our regiments,
and the 13616 I-Iish by another. ShAh SliujB was to
continue Iring; Muhammad Altbar was to become
his wazir, and our troops were to remain in their
present position until the following spring. That il
scheme like this, bearing impracticability on its very
face, should have for a moment deceived a man of
Sir William's usual intelligence and penetration, is
indeed an extraordinary instance of infatuation, that
can only be accounted for on the principle that a
drowning man will catch at a straw. Our fortunes
were now at their lowcst ebb; thc cliiefs werc appa-
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rently delaying o w departure until the snow slould
have formed an impassable barrier to the removal of
our troops, who, even in the absence of an enemy,
would but too probably perish from cold and famine.
A treaty formed mith men famed for falsehood and
treachery, and who had already shorn an utter disregard of some of its most important stipulations,
could be regarded as little better than so much waste
paper; added t o which conside~ations, Sir William
felt that his own fame was deeply involved in the
issue of that policy,* of which he had from the very
first been the prime advocate and upholder, and that
with it he must stand or fall. The specious project
of Muhammad Akbar offered a solution to the difficulties that beset his path, at which he grasped mith
an eagerness engendered by despair. The strength
of the rebels had hitherto lain in their unanimity;
the proposed stroke of, policy would at once dissolve
~
~
the ~confederacy,
and open a road by which to retrieve
our ruined fortunes. On either hand there was
danger; anrl, miserable as Sir William's life had
been for the past six weeks, he mas willing to stcake
his d l on the issue of a plan which seemed to offer
a faint hope of recovering the ground we had lost.
I n a fatal hour he signed his name to a paper con.
senting to the arrangement. His doom was sealed.

.
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The whole was a schcme got up by thc chicfs, to test
his sincerity.
December 23rd.-At about noon Sir William Macnaghten, attended by Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and
Mackenzie, left the mission-house to attend a conference with Muhammacl. Alrbar KhSn on thc plain
towards SiyBh Sang. Previously to this hc had requested the General that two ~egimcntsand two guns
might be in readiness for sccret scrvice, and that, as
the intcrview would be of' a critical ~iature,thc garrison
might bc 1ccpt.well on the alert, and the walls strorigly
manned. I n leaving the cantoamcnts, Sir Wi1li:~m
expressed his disappointment at thc paucity of nlcu
on the ramparts, ancl the apparent incrtrless of tlle
garrison at such a critical moment, saying, " I-Iowevcr,
it is all of a piece with the military arrangemerits
throughout the siege." On liis lcaving the gatc only
sixteen troopcys of the Body-guard mcre in attend:u~ce,
but the renidndcr shortly alter wards joined, under
Lieutenant L e Geyt.
Sir William now for the first time exl~laincdto tlie
officers who accompanied him the ohjccts of the
present conference, and Captain Lawrcnce was warned
to be in readiness l;o gallop to thc Bdlri Hisbr, t o
prepare the king for thc approach 01 a rcgimcnt.
Apprehensions being exprcsscrl of the clangcr to
wliicli the selleme miglll; cxposc him, in casc of
treachery on the part of Mullammad Al~bar,he rc-

plied, Dangerous it is ; but if it succeeds, it is
worth all risks: the rebels have not; fulfillccl cvcn
one article of the treaty, and I liavc no confidence
in them; ancl if by it we can only snvc our honoilr,
all mill be well. At any rate, I would ratlicr su~ffcr
a hundred deaths than live the last six ~vcclts ovcll
again."
Meanwhile crowcls of armccl Afglihs wc1.e observcd
hoverillg near tlie cantonment anrl about Muhammad
ICh6n's fort, causing misgivings in tlie millds of all
but the Euvoy himself, whose confidcncc 1,cnlnincd
unshalten. On ai.l.iving rical, tlie bridgc, tllcy wcre
met by Muhammad Altl~ar IC11ki1, Mullnrnrunrl SliA11
IGin, Dost Muhammad I<ll&n, I<lmd:~ 13dcsli IC112it1,
Azild IChLil, and other chief's, a~norlgstmliolil was the
brother of Amin-ldlall K115i11, wliosc ~ ) ~ C S C L ~ might
CC
have beeii suficient to convilicc Sir Williarn t h d hc
hacl been dupcd.
The usual civilities 11:~ving pnssecl, tlic Errvoy p1.esented Alrbnr Khhn with a valuablc Arab horsc, wliich
had only that morning been yurcll:~scclTor three thousand r ~ p i s . Thc whole party then sat do~vrlncnr sorllc
rising ground, wliich pa~ltially coriccnlcrl tlic~n froni
cantonments.
Captain La~vrencc having calletl attention to the
nunlbcr of inferior followers aromld tlicni, wit11 tb
view to tlrcir being ordc~*ecl
to a dist;:n~cc,Muhnn~mnd
Akbar exclaimed, "No, they nrc all in t l ~ asccrct; "

II

l1

11
11

I

'

1
j

I

t

1

I

I

1

1

;I

4 ;
ti

I'

which words had scarcely been uttercrl, when Sir
William and his three companions found tlicmselves
suddenly grasped firmly by the hands I'rotn bcliind,
whilst their swords and pistols were ruclely snatched
away by the chiefs and thcir followers. The three
officers were immediately pullcd forcibly along and
compelled to mount on lzorscbaclr, cacli llchind a
Ghalzi chid, escorted by a nnrnbcr of armcil retainers,
who with difficulty repellecl tlic cft'orts of n crowd of
fanatic GhRzis, who, on seeing tlic aiTr;~y,Lad rushed
to the spot, calling aloud for the blood of tlie hated
infidels, aiming at them clespcrate blows with their
long lmives and other weapons, and only clcterred
from fil'ing by tlie fear of Billing a chief. 'Phc mlfortunate Envoy was last secn struggling violently
with Muhammad Akbal; " consternation m d liorror
depicted on his countenance."
On their nearing Muhammad I<hBri)s fort, renewed
attempts were macle to assassinate the time captive
officers by the crowd there assembled. Captain Trevor,
who was seated behind Dost Muhammad I<h:in, unhappily fell to the ground, and was instantly slain.
Captains Lawcnce ancl Maclrenzie reaclicd thc fort in
safety, but the latter mas much bruised in various parts
of his body, ancl both were greatly exhausted from the
excitement they liad undergone.
At thc entrance 01 the fort, n furious cut was aimed
at Cal~tdri Maclrcnzie's hcarl by a ruflinn 11amed
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JiI~illahM~imin,which was warded off by Muhammad
Sh6h Ichhn, that chief receiving the blow on his own
shoulder. Being talien into a small room, they found
themselves still in continual jeopardy from repeated
assaults of the Ghhzis without, who were with the
greatest difficulty restrained from shooting them
through the window, where the hand of some recent
Emopean victim (aftemards ascertained to be that
of the Envoy himself) was insultingly held up to
their view. Throughout this trying scene they received repeated assurances of protection from the
Ghalzi chiefs; but Amin-ullah KhBn coming in gave
vent to a torrent of angry abuse, and even threatened
to blow them from a gun. It is deserving of notice,
that, amidst the congratulations which on all sides met
the ear of Muhammad ShLh II(h&n on the events of
the day, the solitary voice of an aged Mull& was
raised in condemnation of the deed, which h e solemnly
pronounced to be "foul" and calculated to cast a lasting
disgrace on the religion of Muhammad. At midnight
they were rcmoved to the house of Muhammad Alrbay
Ichin. As they passed through the streets of K&bul,
notwithstanding the excitement that had prevailed
throughout the day, it resembled a city of the dead;
nor (lid they meet a single soul.
By Alrbslr I-Chgn thcy were received courteously,
and were now informed for the first time by Captain
Skinner of the murder of the Envoy and Captain
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Trevor. That Sir William Macnaghten met his
cleath at the hands of Muhammad Alcbar himself
therc can be no reasonable doubt. That chief had
pledged himself to his coacljutors to scize the Envoy
that day, and bring him into the city, when the chiefs
hoped to have been able t o dictate their own terms,
retaining him as a hostage for their fidfilment. Finding
it impossible, from thc stre~iuousresistance Sir William
offerecl, to carry him off alive, and yet determined
not to disappoint the public expectation dtogethcqinfluenced also by his tiger passions, and the remembrance of his father's wrongs,-Muhamm~d Alcbar
drew a pistol, the Envoy's own gift a few hours before,
and shot him through the body, which mas immediately hacked to pieces by the fei-ocioas GhLds, by
vhom the dismembered trunk mas afterwards carried
to the city, and publicly exposecl in the Chiir Chauk,
or plincipal m a t . The head was taken to the house
of NawLb Zam&n Khiin, where i t was triumphantly
exliibited to Captain Conolly.
Such was the cruel fate of Sir William Macnaghten,
the accomplished scholar, the distinguished politician,
and the representative of Great Britain at the court of
ShAh ShujB-ul-Mullt
I t cannot but be acceptable to my renders, if I here
present entire the interesting and important letters of
Captains Macltenzic and Lamrence on this melancholy
subject.
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You ask for a minute account of the circumstances
attending the assassination of the late Sir Willia~nMacnaghten, and my own cletention and imprisonment on
that occasion. You may remenlber that, for many days
previous to the f a t d 23rd December, the poor Envoy had
becn subjected to more mew and tear, both of bocly and
mind, than it was possible for the inost iron frau~eand
the strongest intellect to bear without deeply feeling its
effects. He had fulfilled all tlle preliminwy conditions of
the treaty which had been proposed between the British
and the Afghkn insurgents, mhereas the KhAns had in no
one particular adhered to their engagements. Bad faith
was evident in all their proceedings, aiid our condition
was a desperate one ; more especially as Sir Willi1~1uhad
ascertained, by bitter experience, that no hope remaiucd
in the energies and resources of our military lcaders,
who had formally protested that they could do nothing
more. Beset by this disgraceful imbecility on the one
hand, and by systematic treacheiy on the other, tho unfortunete Envoy was driven to his wits' end, and, as will
be seen, forgot, in a fatal mornent, the wholeso~~le
rule
mhich he had theretofore laid down for himself, of refusing to hold co~n~nullication
with individuals of thc rebel
party, eepecially withhim who was notorious, even alnongst
his villanous countrymen, for ferocity and t ~ e a c h e ~ y ,
to wit, Muhammad &bar KhCn. Late in the evening
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of the 22nd December, Captain James Skinncr, who, aftcr
having been concealed iu K a u l during the greatcr part
of the sicgc, had laLterly been the gucst of Muhammad
Akbar, arrived in cantonments, accoulpanied by M~thanlmad Sacliq Khin, a first cousin of Muh:lmmacl Akl~nr,nilcl
by Sirmk K h h , the Arhini inerchaut who in the bcginning of the campaign had furnishccl thc ariny mitli
camels, and who had bccn much in thc conhdunce of
Sir A. Burnes, being in fact onc of our stmincliest
friends. Thc two latter rcmainecl in a different :lpa,rLilzent, while Slrinner dined with tho Envoy. During dinnor,
Slcinncr jestingly remL~rked
that lle felt ~ L Sif li~deliwith
coinbustibles, being charged with a ilzessage froin Muh:tmmad Akbar to the Euvoy of most portentous naturc.
Even then I remmkod that the Envoy's eyc glanced
ertgerly towards Skinner with an expression of hope.
In fact, he was like a drowning man catching at, straws.
Skinner, however, referred him to his Afghirn conllmnions,
and aftcr dinner the four retirecl into a, room by themselves. My knowledge of what there took place is gaincil
from poor Skiuner's own relation, as given during my
subsequent captivity with him in Akbar's house. Muhammad Sadiq discloscd Muhammad Akbar's proposition
to the Envoy, which was, that the follomng day Sir
William should meet him (Muhammad Akbar) ancl n few
of his iinmediate friends, viz. the chiofs of thc Eastern
Ghalzis, outside the cantonments, when a final agrcernc?id
should be madc, so as to bo fully understoocl by 110th
partics ; that Sir William should have L: considcrabl~?
bocly of troops in readiness, which, on a given signal, wuro
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to join with those of Muhammad Akbw ancl the Ghalzis,
assault ancl take MahmGcl B L n ' s fort, and secure the
person of Ainin-ullah. At this stage of the proposition
Muhammad Sadiq signified thrtt, for ti certain suln of
money, the head of Ainin-ullah should be presented to
the Envoy; but froin this Sir William shrunk with
abhorrence, declaring that it mas neither his custom nor
that of his country to give a price for blood. Muhammad
Sadiq then went on to say, that, after having subdued
the rest of the Khcins, the English should be peimittcd to
remain in the country eight months longer, so as to save
(veil, or credit), but that they mere then to
their pu~da7~
evacuate Afghinistin, as if of their own accord; that
Shbh Shujh was to continue Iring of the countiy, and
that Muhainmad Akbar was to be his wazir. As a
further reward for his (Muhammad Akbar's) assistance,
the British Government were to pay hhn thirty lacs of
iupees, and lour lacs 01 rupeea per annum cluring his
life ! To this extraorilinaxy and mjld proposid, Sir
William gave car with an eagerness which nothing can
account for but the supposition, confirmed by many
other circumstances, that his strong mind had beell
harassed, until it had, in some degree, lost its equipoise ;
and he not only assented fully to these terms, but
actually gave a Persian paper to that effect, written in
his o m hand, declaring as his luotives that it mas not
only an excellent opportunity to caily into effect the
real wishes of Government, which were to evacuate the
country with as much credit to ourselves as possible,
but that i t would give England time to enter into a,

treaty with Russia, defining the bounds beyond which
neither were to pass in Central Asia. So endcd this
fatal conference, the nature and result of which, contrary
to his usual custom, Sir Wdfiam communicated to none
of those who, on all former occasions, were fully in Ilia
codidence, viz. Trevor, Lawrence, and myself. It seemed
as if he feared that we might insist on the impracticability
of the plan, which he must have studiously concealed
from himself. All the following morning Ilis manner
was distractecl and hulmied in a way that none of us had
ever before witnessed. It seems t h t Mullammad Akbar
had demandcd a favouritc Arab horse, belonging to
Captain Grant, Assistant Adjutant-Gcncral of the force.
To avoid the necessity of parling with the animal,
Captain Grant had fixed his price at the exorbitant
sum of five thousand rupees; unwilling to give so large a
price, but determined to gratify the SirdLr, Sir William
sent me to Captain Grant to prevail upon him to take a
smaller sum, but with orders that if he were peremptory,
the five thousand rupees should be given. I obtained the
horse for three thousancl rupces, and Sir William appeared much pleased with the prospect of gratifying
Muhammad Akbar by the preseut.
After breakfast, Trevor, Lawrence, and myself were
summoned to attend the Envoy during his conference
with Muhammad Alrkar Khdn. I found him alone, when,
for the first time, he disclosed to me the nature of the
transaction he was engaged in. I immediately warned
him that i t was a plot against him. He replied hastily,
" A plot ! let me alone for that, trust me for that ! " and

I consequently offered no further remonstrance.
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Sir
William then arranged vith General Elphinstone that
the 54th Regiment, under Major Ewart, should be held in
readiness for iillmediate service. The Shhh's 6th, ancl
two guns, were also warned. It is a cuiious circunistance,
and betrays the unhappy vacillation of poor Elphiustone,
that, after Sir William hacl actually cpitted the cantonment in full expectation that everything had been
arrangecl according to his desirc, he (the General) addressed a letter to him, which never reached him,remonstrating on the danger of the proposed attack, and strongly
objecting to the eniployment of the two above regiments.
About 1 2 o'clock Sir William, Trevor, Lamreace, ancl
myself set forth on o w ill-omenecl expedition. As me
approached tho Siyhh Sang gate, S h Willialll obsei~ed
with much vexation that the troops mere not iu readiness,
protesting at the s m c time, however, that, desperate as
the proposed attempt was, it mas better that it should be
made, and that a thousancl deaths were preferable to the
life he had lately led.
After pnssing the gate, he remembered thc horsc
which he had intended as a preaent for Afiar, and sent
me back for it. When I rejoined hill1 I found that the
small number of the bocly-guard who had accompanied
him, hacl been ordered to halt, and tlial he, Trcvor, ancl
Lameace, had aballced in the direction of Mahmiid
Kh&nls fort, being some five hundred or six hundred
yards horn the eastern rampart, and werc there avaiting
the approach of Muhammad A k b x and his party, mllo
now made their appearance. Close by were some Ellocks,

15

on the further side of mhich from the cantonment a
carbet was spread where the snow lay least thick, and
there the Khins and Sir William sat down to hold theis
conference. Men talk of presentiment ; I suppose i t was
something
- of the lirtd which came over me, for I could
scarcely prevail upon myself to quit my horse. I did SO,
hornever, and mas invitecl to sit clown among the Sirdirs.
After the usual salutations Muhaininad Alrbar cornmencecl business, by asking t h e Envoy if he was perfectly ready to carry into effect the proposition of the
prececling night ? The Envoy replied, " Why not ? "
my attention was thcn called off by an old Afghin
acquaintance of mine, fornlerly chief of the R&bulpolice,
by name Ghu1;im Muyan-ud-din. I rose fsom my recumbent posture, and stood apart with him conversing.
I afterwards remembered that my friend betyayed much
anxiety as to where my pistols were, amd why I dicl not
cnrry thenr on my person. I ansmcrcd that although I
more my smorcl for form, i t was not necessary at a,
fiienclly conference to be wmed cup-a-pie. His discourse
was also lull of extravagant compliments, I suppose for
the purpose of lulling me to sleep. A t length my
attention was called 01f from what he was saying, by
observing thbt a llulnber of men, a m e d to the teeth,
had gradually approached to the scene of conference,
and were clrawing round in a sort of circle. This Lawrence and myself pointed out to some of the chief men,
who affected a t first t o drive them off mith whips ; but
~ u . h ~ aAlibar
d
obsorved that it w ~ of
s no consequencc, as they were in the secret. I again resumed

conversation n i t l ~Gl~uliuiilfripil-ud-din, mhcn s\i&denly
I. heard Xulia~niuadAkl)ar call ont, " nigir ! Rigir ! "
(seize ! seize !), atid trirnilig round, I s:uv liiiu ~ c i s ptlie
Envoy's left hmd with all cxprcssion ill l i i ~f:icc of the
1uost di&bolic~lferocity. I thinli it was Snltl'tn Jdn who
laid hold of the Envoy's riglit h:~nrl. 'flipy clraggr.d lli111
in a stooping posturo dowil tliu l~illuclc,tlie only words I'
heard poor Sir Willii~muttcr baing " Az I)r~r:iiXhudh ! "
(for God's st~lcc!) I saw his fncc lion.crr:r, and it was
full of horror and astcsnisliu~icnt. I did llot scbe what
becaiue of Trevor, but T~nmrcucew:is d~nggeillnst me hy
severd Afghims, who111 I H ~ Wwrmt his TV-VI!:L~~OI~S
froill
him. Up to this ~noinentI m;~sso c:ngrosst'il ill ohscrvirig
wlvllat mas tnlring pl~~ce,
that I actually mas not amarr
that my own right ariu mas innaterecl, that iny url~ano
friend held L pistol to my teiiil~lc.,aiid tlii~tI NnY s t ~ r rounded by a circle of Ghhxis with dram1 sworils a i ~ d
coclcecl jaeails, Resistance mas in ,vnin, so listening to
the exliortations of Gh11li~laMuynu-lid-din, which wore
enforced by thc whistling of divers hnllcts 0vt.r illy hencl,
I hurried tllrough the snow with luiiil to the placc wllerc
his horse wrLs standing, being despoil~dt . 1 ~ ro?lte of my
s:~bre,and ~ i n ~ r oescapiug
~ ~ l y Jivers attempts rimdo on illy
life. As I mounted bohind lily chptor, now lily onorgetic
defender, the crowd increased around us, tlie cries of
" Kill tlie Xi~fii*" became more vohcmcuit, i~lid,although me
hurried on at a fast canter, it was with tlic utmost difficulty Ghulilm Muyan-ud-din, although assisted by one
or two friends or followers, could mal'd off and avoid
the sword cuts aimed a t me, the rascals being afrrtid to
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fire lest they should kill my conductor. Indeed he was
obliged to wheel his horse round once, encl taking off
his turban (the last :~ppeala Mussolmrin can make), to
implore thelll for God's sake to respect the life of his
friend. A t last, ascencling a slippery bank, the horse
fell. &Iy cap had been snatched off, and I now received
il h c a ~ blow
~ - on the head from a bludgeon, which fortunately did not quite deprivc me of my senses. 1had
sufficic~ltsense left to shoot ahead of the fallen horse,
where lily 11~0tcctorwith another man joined me, and
clasping nle in their arms, hurricd mc towards the wall
of Muhamiilad Khlin's fort. How I reached the spot
where M~thninmadAkbar was receiving the gratulat'1011s
of the multitude, I know not, but I remember a fanatic
rushing on me and twisting his h n d i n my c o l h until
I becaulc exhausted from suffocation. I must do Muh m ~ i ~ iAkber
d
the justice to say, that, finding the
GhiLzi~ bent on iny slaughter, even after I had reached
his stinup, h0 drew his sword and laid about him right
mimfully, for my conductor and Mirza Bahb-ud-din I Q L A ~
were obliged to press me up against the wall, covering
]lie with their own bodies, and protesting that no blow
should m c h me, but through their persons.
Pride, however, overcame Muhalnmad Akbar's sense
of courtesy, when he thought I was safe, for he then
turned round to me, and repeatedly said in a, tone of
triumphtlnt deri~ion, ' l Shum$ mulk-i-nd me-gired !
(You'll seize my country, will you !) He then rode off,
and I was hurried towerds the gate of the fort. Here
new dangers ameited me, for MuDL M h i n , fresh from
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the slaughter of poor Trevor, who mas Billcd riding close
behind me,-Sultbn Jiln having the credit of h:lving
given him the first sallre cut,--stood
hcre with hi8
lollowers, whom he exhorted to slay me, setiing them
the example by cutting fiercely at me himself. Fortuuately
n, gun stood between us, but still he mould have effected
his purpose, hed not Muha~nrnadSh:ili Khim at that
instant, with sonle followers, come to m y assi~tanco.
These drew their swords in n1y defence, tho chief liirnself
throwing his arril round my neck, and rcceivir~gon his
shoulder a cut aimed by MulW Mi~lllin : ~ tmy head.
During the bustle I pushed forlvard into the fort, and
wis immediately taken to a sort of dungeon, wheru I
found Lawrenee safe, but somcwhat exhaumteil by his
hideous ride and the violellee he had sustnincd, although
unwounded.' Here the Ghalzi chiefs, Mnhi~~llmadSbLh
Khi~n,and his brother Dost Muha~nnzadKll!~n, prcsently
joined us, and endeavoured to cheer up our flagging
spirits, assuring us that tho Envoy and Trevor \yere uot
dead, but on the contrary quite well. They stayed with
us during the afternoon, their presence being ~bsolutcly
neces sary for our protection. Many attenipts were ~nade
b y t h e fanatics to force the door, to ncco~iiplivh our
destruction. Others spit at us and abused us though a
smdl window, through which one lellom lcvcllccl e blunderbuss at us, which was struck up by our keepers and
himself thrust back. At last Amin-ullah made his appearance,
threatened us with instant death. Some of h i a
people most officionslyadvanced to make good his word,

until pushecl back by the Ghalzi chiefs, who renlonstrated
with this iniquitous old monster, their nlastel; whom they
~ e r s u a d e dto relieve us from his hateful presence. During
the afternoon a human hand was held up in nlockery to
us at the endow. We said that it had belonged t o an
t was
European, but were not aware at the time t h ~ it
~ c t u a l l ythe hand of the poor Envoy. Of all the Muhalarnadans assemblecl in the room discussing the events of
the day, one only, an old Mu116, opedy and fearlessly
condemned the acts of his brethren, declaring that the
treachery mas ahominable, ancl a disgrace to IsliLm. At
night they brought us food, and gave us each a postin to
sleep on. At m i b i g h t me were awalrenecl to go to the
house of Muhammad Akbar in the city. Muhammad Shhh
Khlm then, with the lueauness common to all hfghhns of
rank, robbed Lawrence of his match, while his brother did
me a similar favour. I had been plunclered of my rings
and every thing else, previously, by the under-strappers.
Reaching Muhammad Akbar's abode, we were shown
into the roolu where he lay in bed. He received u s ~ 6 t h
great outward show of courtesy, assuring us of the welfare
of the Envoy and Trevor, but there was a constraint in
his manner for which I could not account. We were
shortly taken to another apartment, where we found
Skiuner, who had returned, being on parole, early in the
morning. Doubt and gloom marked our meeting, and the
latter mas fearfully deepened by the intelligence which we
now receivecl from our fellow-captive of the base murder
of Sir William and Trevor. He informed us that the
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head of thc forlncr had been cn~riodabout the city in
night. Thc
triumph, We of course spcnt a ~lliscral~le
next clay mc mere taken uuder a strong guard to the house
of Za~nLnKltBn, mhore a, council of the Kh:ins was being
held. Hero me foulid Captains Couolly and Aircy, mllo
had some clays l)reviously beell sent to tlic Nawhb's house
as hostage for tho l ~ e ~ f o r n ~ a nofc ecertain parts of tho
trei~tywhich was to have been e u t ~ r e dinto, A violent
discussion took plmcc, in mhich 3Iuhammacl AIil~arbore
the most prominent part. Wc were veheuleutly :~ccnscd
of treachery, am1 everything that mas l~acl,I L I ~told
~
that
the mllole of tlie ty:~nsactions of the niglit previou.~had
bccn n, tricli of Mu1larnnr:d Akbnr, ;nid Aiuin-ulldl, to
~scertainthe Envoy's sincerity, They decln.red t l u ~ tlley
t
mould now g~iuitus 110 terius, ti'ave 011 the BUP~EILC~PP
of
the wliolc of thc marrieil fainilics ns liostagcs, all the gulls,
n m n n i t i o n , and trensure. At this tinie Coiiolly told 1110
tllat 011 the prccerling day the Envoy's head had beon
paraclecl about i n thc court-yarcl ; that his and Trevor's
bodies hncl been himg up in Lhe public LiLsLr, or clnzlk ;
and that it was with the greateat difficulty that the old
NawLb, Zamrin K h h , had savecl hiill bnd b r e y from
being ~nurdereclby a body of fanatics, who hnd : ~ t t e u ~ ~ ) t e d
to rush h t o tho room where they were. Also that previous to the arrival of Lawrence, Skinner, and myt;clf,
Muhan~madAl~barhad Leen relating the eveuts of the
preceding day to tho Jb.ga, or council, and that he had
ungumcledly avowed haying, mllilc endeavouling to force
the Envoy either to inount on horseback or to move more

quickly, struck him, and that, seeing Collolly's eye fastelled
upon him with an expression of illtense indignation, be
hail altered the phrase and said, '' I mean 1 pushed him."
After an immense deal of gabble, n proposal for a renewal
of t h e treaty, not, however, demanding all the guns, mas
determined to he sent to the cantonments, ancl Skinner,
Lawrence,and myself, wore marched back toAllhar's house,
enduring en ?.oute a11 manner of threats &ndinsaltls. Here
we were closely collfincd ill an inner apartment, which was
indeecl. necessary for our safety. That evening we received
a visit from Muhammacl Akbar, Sx11iBb JBn, and several
other Afghhns. Muhamlnad Akbar exhibitecl his doublebanellccl pistols to us, which he had worn the previous
day, requestiug us to put their locks to rights, something
being amiss: Two of dhe b w ~ e Z had
s b e m recently discharged,
which he ende~vourecl,in a most confuse& way, to account
for by saying that he bad been charged by a hnvilclbr of
the escort, ancl had fired both barrels at him. Now, dl
t h e escort had run away without even attemptiug to
charge, the oilly man who advanced to the rescue ha;ving
been a Hind6 JemaclAr of Chapritsis, who was instantly
cut t o pi.eces by the assembled Ghhzis. This defence he
made without any accusation on our part, betmying the'
anxiety .hf a liar to be believed. On the 26th, Captain
Lawrence mas taken to the house of Amin-ullah, whence
h e d i d not return t o us. Captain Skinuer and myself
remainecl in Akbar's house until the 30th. During this
time we were civilly treated, and conversed with numbers
of Afghitn gentleinen who came to visit us. Some of them
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asserted that the Eiivoy hacl boon murdered by the unruly
soldiery. Others could not deny that Akbai. himself vas
the assassin. For tmo or three days we hnd a fellowwho had bee11 deceived
piisoner ' i n poor SirwAr
throughout the whole matter, ancl out of whom they mere
then endeavouring to screw money. He of course was amre
fi.om his countrymen that, not only hed Akbar conlmitted
the murder, but that he protested to ithe Ghhzis that he
gloried in the cleed. On onc occasion a m h s h i of Major
named Mohan
Pottinger, who had escaped from Ch:l~rikiLi*,
Bir, came direct from the prcsence of Muhxnmed Akbm
to visit us. He told us that Muhammad Akbw had begun
to see the impolicy of having murilered the Envoy, mhich
fact he had just avowecl to him, shedcfag many tenre
either of pretended remorse, or of
vexation, nt having
committed himself. On seve~ttl occasions Muha1111nail
Akbar personally, and by deputy, besought Xlrinner ancl
nlyself to give him attvice as to how he wes to extricate
himself from the dilemma in which he was plwed, more
than once encleavouring to excuse himself for not hwing
effectually protected the Envoy, by saying that Sir millimn
had drawn a sword-stick upon him. It seems that mennwhile the renewed negotiatioiis with Major Pottinger, who
had assumed the Envoy's place in cantonmel~ts,had becn
brought to a head, for, on the night of the 30th, Akbar
f umished me with an AfghiLn dress (Skinner already wore
one) ancl sent us both back to cantonments. Several
Afghirns, with whorh I fell in d t e i ~ a r d s protested
,
to me
that they hnd seen Muhammad Akbar shoot the Envoy
with his own hand; amongst then1 Mirza Bah!r-uld-dill

str

lKh&n,who, being an old acquabtance, always retained a
sneaking Knclness for the English.
I am, my dear Eyre, yours very truly,
C. MAOKENZIE.
Kibul, 29t7~July, 1842.
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Letter addressed by CAPTAING. ST. P. LAWRENCE,
late
Nilitary Secretary to the Envoy, to MAJORPOTTINGIBE,
C.B., lcde in c7~aryeof the Kcibul Mission.
SIR,

INcompliance with yow request, I have the honour
to cletail the particulars of my capture, mcl of the death
of my ever-to-be-lamented chief.
On the morning of the 23rd December, at 11 A.M., I
received a note from the late Sir W. H. Macsaghten,
warning me to attend, with Captains Trevor and Mackenzie, an interview he was about to have with Sirdhr
Muhammad Akbar =tin.
Accorciingly, with the abovenamed officers, at about 12, I accompanied Sir William,
having previously heard him tell Major-General Elphinstone to have two regiments of infantry and two guns
reecly for secret sewice. In passing through cantonments,
on my observing that there were more Afghkns in cantoiiments than usual, or than I cleemed safe, the Envoy
directed one of his Afghtin attendants to proceed and
cause them d l to leave, at the same time remarking how

w
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h
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strange it mas that, although the General was fully acquainted with the then very critical state of affairs, no
preparations appeared to have been made, adding, " However, it is all of a piece with the military arrangements
throughout thc siege." H e then said, "There is not
enough of the escort with us," to which I replied, that he
hnd only ordered eight or ten, but that I had brought
sixteen, and that I would send for the remainder, which I
accordingly did, asking Lientenant Le Geyt to bring
them, and to tell Brigaclier Shelton, who had expressed a
wish to attend the next interview, that he might accompany thcrn. On passing the gate, we observed some
hundreds of armed Afghhns within a, few yards of it, on
which I callccl to the ofiicer on duty to get the reserve
under arms, and brought outside to disperse them; and to
send to the General to ham the wi-rison on the alert.
Townrcl~lWahmi~dKhin's fort were a number of armed
Afghi~ns,but wc observed none nearer.
The Envoy now told us that hc, 011the night previons,
had received a proposal fro111 SirdAr Muhammail Akbar
K h h to which he had agreed, and that he had every
reason to hope it would bring our prescnt difficnlties to
an early and happy termination ; that Muhammad Akbar
KhAn was to give up Naib Amin-ullah JKhAn as a prisoner
to us, for which 1)urposc a rcgimenf was to proceed to
Ma;h~iiildKhAn's fort, aud another ~011)swas to occupy
the BhlL HisAr. Sir William then wained me to be reacly
t o gallop t o the king with the intelligence of the approach
of tho regiment, r~iid to acquaint hiln with Akbar's proposal. On one of us remarking that the scheme seemed
'
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a dangerous one, ancl aslrillg if he did not ap1)rehend any
treachery, he replied: " Dangerous i t is, but, if i t succeecls, i t is mortll all rislrs ; the rebels havc not fulfilled
even one article of the treaty, aucl I have no confidence i n
them, and if by it me can only save our honour, all will
be well ; at any rato, I mould rather suffer a h u h r e d
deaths than live t1ie"last six weelrs over again." W e
proceedecl to near the usual spot, and met Sirdhr Muham~lzad Alrbar ICh611, who was i~ccoml~:~nieil
by soveral
Glialzi chiefs, Muhammad ShLh K h h , Dost M~lliainll~ad
Khirn, Ehuclil Babsh Ehirn, AzLd KhLn, kc. After t h e
usud salutations, thc Elivoy l~rescnteda vnhiablc home
which Akbar had nslrccl for, and which hacl becn that
moriiing p~achasedfrom Captain Gmnt for thrcc thous;~lid
rupees. The Sirclh :~clrnowledged tlie attention, alld oxp~essedhis thnnlrs for a haudsome brace of doulblebarl'relled pistols which the Envoy had purchnsed from
me, and sent to him, with his caryiage nnd pair of liors(?s,
the day before.
The party dismounted, and horse-cloths were spread on
a small hilloclr which partially concealecl us from cantonments, and which was chosen, they said, as being free
from snow. The Envoy threw himself on the l~anlrwith
M ~ h m m a dU b a r and Ca1~t:~insTrevor and M:wkcnzie
beside him; I stoocl bohind Sir Williaiii till, pressed by
Dost Muhainmad Kliiln, I knelt on one Imee, having Grst
callecl the Envoy's attention to the nmnber of Afghirns
arouncl US, saying that if tlio s~lbjectof the coilfcrcilce
was of t h t ~ tsecret naL~u.uI l~eliovcilit to l ~ c they
,
had
better be rcmovcd. Ho spoke to W u L ~ ~ ~ l i i lAltbar,
ad
who

replied, " No, they are all in the secret." Hardly had he
so said, when I found lny arms locked, my pistols m d
sword mrellched fro111 my belt, and myself forcibly raised
from the ground and pushed along, Muhammad Shith
IChh, who held me, calling out, " Come along, if yo11
value your life." I turned, and saw the Envoy lying, his
head where his heels had been, and his hands locked in
Muhammad Akbar's, consternation and horror depicted in
his countenance. Seeing I could do nothing, I let illyself
be pulled on by Muhalumad Shhh IChkn. Some shots
were fircrl, r~ndI was hurried to his horse, on which he
jnmped, telling me to get up behind, which I did, and we
l)rowwlcd, escortcd by several arnled men who kept off a
crowd of Ghkzis, who sprang up on every side shouting
fur ino t o be givcn up for them to slay, cutting at me with
their swordu and knives, a i d polxing me in the ribs with
their Eg11ns: they w r e afraid to fire, lest they should
injure their chief. The horsemen kept them pretty well
off, but not snificicntly so to prevent my l~eingmuch
bruisod. I n this manner we hurried towards Mnhnmmad
Khbn's fort, near which me met soilzc hundreds of horsenien who were 1ii:eping off the Ghbzis, who here mere ill
greater ~iunllrcrs,:illcl more voeifer01~sformy blood. We,
homcver, reached the fort in safety, and I was pushed
illto i~ 8111;~llroom, Muh~mmadShlih Khi~nreturning to
tlio gate of tlie fort ; ~ n dbringing in Captain Maclrenzie,
wlloso horsct hncl thero Ii~llen. This he (lid, receiving a
cut t11rongh his llirnclia (Scother coat) OIL his arm, which
JV:LS ainlcil at t1i:~toiIicc:r, who w:ls ushered into the room
jvith 1 1 1 ~much
~
cxhansted ;~nclbruised from bloms on his
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head ancl body. We sat clown with some solcliixs who
were put over us with a view to protect us fro111 tho mob,
who now surrounded the house, and who till dnrli contiliucd execrating and spitting at us, calling on t h e nlrhnto
give us up to be slaughtered.
One produced a hand (European) wllicli Z ~ P C : L ~ " to
have been i.ecently cut off; anotlicr prcmi1tt"d :L l~l~iildcrbuss, ancl was about to fire it, when it was Irllo(!Iit~ditfiidc
by ono of our guarcl. Several ol thc Sircliirs o:~mcin
during the day, and told us to be assured that; 110 h:~i~nl
should befall us ; that the Envoy and Tr~voi*
vt!r\: R : L ~ ( :ill
the city (a falsehood, as will bc :~fterw~rcls
~ r c a ) . N:~il]
Amin-ullah Ichiln and his soils came also. The fornl~.r,in
great wratll, said thht we either sliould be, or c l c s c r ~ dto
be, blown away from a gun. Mnhamlmd Shhh KhArl and
Dost Mnhammad K h h begged he would not so talk, and
took him out of the room. Townsds night food waH given
to us, and postins to sleep on : our watches, rings, nxld
silk handkerchiefs were taken fronl u s ; but in a11 other
respects me were ulnmolested. The lollowers of Illu11:~inmad Shhh Khhn repeateclly congratulated him 011 the
events of the day, with one exception, viz. :In 01~1Mullil,
who louclly exclaimed that " thc nauic of the faithful W:LY
tarnishedJ and that in future no belief could be placccl in
them; that the deed was foul and coulld never be of ailvantage to the authors." At midnight ~ v cmere t,nlten
throng11 tho city to the house of Muhammad A k l ~ r Xliiln,
~r
who received us cou~.teously,1:~ineilting the ncourrcbIica~
of the day : here we found Captain Slriniicr, alltl fol*t11e
first time heard the dreadful and nstoullding intolligcnco

of the murder of the Envoy and Captain Trevor, and ihat
our lamented chief's head had been paraded through the
city in triumph, and his trunk, after being dragged
through the streets, stuck up in the Chilr Chauk, the lllost
conspicuous part of the t o m . Captain Skinner told us,
that the report was, that on Muhammad Akbar ITh6nYs
telling Sir William to accompany him, he refused, resisted, and pushed the SbcliLr from him; that in consequence he was immediately shot and his body cut to pieces
by the GhLzis ; that Captain Trevor had been conveyed
behind Dosi Muhammad Khhn as far as Muhammad
EhLn's fort, mhera he was cut down, but that his body
was not mangled, though carried in triumph through the
city. On the following morning (24th) we (Captain
Slrilmer, Maclrenzie, and self) were tnken to Nawib ZamiLn
Khilu's house, cscorted by SultiLn JBn and other chiefs, to
protect us from the GhLzis; there we met Captains
Conolly and Airey (hostages) and all the rcbel SiraLrs
assembled in council. The Envoy's death was lamented,
but his conducl,severely censured, and it was said that now
no faith could be placed in our words. A new treaty,
homcver, was discnqsed, and sent to the General and Major
Pottinger, and towards evening we returned as me came
to Muhammad Akbar's, where I remained a prisoner, but
well and courteously treated till the morning of the 26th,
when I was sent to Naib h i n - u l l a h Khhn. On reaching
his house I was ushered into his private apartment. The
Naib received me kindly, showecl me the Envoy's oyiginal
letter in reply to Muhammad Akbar's proposition, touching his being made ShAh ShujL's Wazir, receiving a lalrh

-I

of rupees on giving the Naib a prisoner to us, thirty laklis
on the final settlement of the insurrection, k c . To this
the Naib aclded that the Envoy had told &hihnlnixiad
Akbar's cou~sinthat a, lakh of rupees mould be givcn for
his (bin-ullah KhAn's) h e d . I pron~ptlyrcl)licil, " 'lL1is
false," that Sir William had never done so, t1i:~L it; was
utterly foreign ancl repugnant to his naturo, ;LI~CZto D13l'if;isli
usage. The Naib expressed himself in strong tor~iis
against the Envoy, contrasting his own fni.r nntl opcn conduct with that of Sir William. He tuld 1110 tlmt G~1ici,i~l
Elphinstone ancl Major Pottinger 11:~d beggucl 1 liiiglit IN:
released, as my presence was necessary to cnal)lo thc!m t;o
prepare bills on India, which it had Loen an.i~ngc:cltllc!
Sirdhs were to get. After some delay, conscqnont oil llly
asking for Captain Mackenzie to 11e rcleased with nlc, :~nd
Muhammad Akbar78 stoutly refusing the relcnse of citlicr
of us, I was sent into cantonments on the nlorniug o% th,!
29th, escorted by the Naib's eldest son and a strong 1):~rt~y
of horse and foot, being disguised as an AfghAn fur lily
peater protection. I must; here record that nothuig coulil
exceed the Naib's kindness ancl attention to rlic wllile
under his roof.
I have, Ac. &c.,
(Signed)
G. ST. P. LAWEBNCE,
Military Secrdary,
Latc Envoy and Miiiistcr.
Cam-p Ziid6.7t,
Ten wiles sout7t of Tizilz.
10t7~May, 1842.

CHAPTER XII.
SUSPENSE I N UANTONNBNT.

O F WAR. - TBRMS
-POSTPONBMINT O F

- COUNCIL

ACCEPTED. -- HOSTAQES

GIVEN.

DIPARTUIEE.

1.30~what were om troops about all this time ? Were
no steps trtlren to rescue the Bnvoy and his friends from
their perilous position ? Where was the body-guard
which followed them from cantonments ? These questions will naturally occur to all who read the foregoing
pages, and I wish it were in my power to render
satisfactory answers.
The Native body-guard had only got a few hundred
yards from the gate in their progress to the scene of
conference, when they suddenly faced about and came
galloping baclr, several shots being fired at them in
their retreat. Lieutenant Le Geyt, in passing through
thc gate, exclaimed that the Envoy had been carried off,
rind it mas understood that, finding his men would not
nrlvance to the rescue, he came back for assistance.
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Intense was the anxiety and wretched the suspense
felt by all during the rest of the day. A xiumber of
AfghAns, wlio were trafficlcillg in cantonineilts at the
time of the conference, on hearing the report of firearms in that direction, endeavoured to escape, but were
detained by tlie oiHcer at tlic gate. N O ccrtain tidings
regarding the Eiivoy could be obtained : many confidently affirmcd that he mas alivc and unharmed in
Mullarnmad's fort; but Lieutci~ni~tWarrcn stoutly
maintained that Ize had Icept his eye upon Sir William
from the moment of his leaving tlie gate, and had distinctly seen him fall to the ground, and the Afg11:ins
hacking at his body. The agony of his poor wife during
this dread intervd of suspense may bc imagined.
December 24th.-The fntc of tlie E~ivoyand his tluec
companions remained a mystery, until the arrival of a
note from Captain Conolly notifying his death and that
of Cafitain 'fievor, aiid the safety of Captains La~vrence
and Maclcenzie.
Thc tvo latter officers hat1 heen that morning escorted
to a conference of chiefs at the llouse of Namhb Zam6ii
IChdn, where tlic late EnvoyJs conduct was sevcrely
commented on ; but Ids decltli mas neve~thelesslcm~ented.
The treaty was again discussed; and, after a few alterations and additions llad bcen made, it was sent to
General Elphinstone, wit11 an explanation of the breacli
of faith ~vhicllhad cost the Elivoy his life.
General Elphinstone now requested Major Pottinger

to assume the office of political agent and adviser, which,
thougli still suffering greatly fTom his wound, and incapacitated from active bodily exertion, that gallant
officer's strict sense of public duty forbade him to decliiie, although he plainly perceived our affairs to be so
irretrievably ruined as to 1.enc1er the clistillction anything but enviable, or lilrely to improve his hardly-earned
fame.
The adilitional clauses in the treaty now proljosed for
our renelvcd acceptance were-1st. That me shoulcl
leave behind all our guns excepting six. 2nd. That
we should immediately give up all our treasures. 3rd.
Tliat the hostages should be all exchanged for married
men, wit11 tlieir wives and families. The difficulties of
Major Pottinger's position will be ~eadilyperceived
wllen it is borne in mind that he had before him the
most coiiclusive evidence of thc late Envoy's ill-qdvisecl
intrigue with Muhammad A l r l ~ aKhin,
~
in direet violation of that very treaty rvhicli was uow once more
tendered for consideration.
Dccclnber 25t?~.--A more cheerless Christmas-day
perliaps never darned upon British soldiers in a strange
land; and the few whom the force of habit urged to
exchange the customary greetings of the season, did so
mitli countenances and in tones indicative of anything
but merriment. At night thcre mas an alarm, and the
d r ~ r u mbeat to arms, but nothing occurred of any consequence.
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Becemher 26th.-Letters were received from Captain
Mackeson, political agent at Peshiiwal; announcing the
march of strong reinforcements from India. A n offer
was made by Mullammad Usivtin IChBn to cscort us all
safe to Peshii~varfor five lnlrlis of rupees ; and shol.tly
after this tlic Nail, Amir nrrivcd, wit11 a vcrbal agreement to certain ameudinents wliicll had becn proposed
in the trcaty bp Major Pottinger. I-Ic wns accompanied by a I<;ishmir merchant and several Hindti
sharofs, for the purpose of negotiating bills to the
amount of fourteen lalchs of rupces, payable to the
scveral chiefs on the promise of the lntc Envoy.
Major Pottinger bcing altogetlier averse from tllc
payment of this money, and indeed strongly opposed to
any treaty binding tlle Indian Government to (L course
of policy whicli it might find inconvenient to adopt, a
council-of-mar mas convened by the General, consisting
of himself, Brigadiers Sliclton and Anquetil, Coloncl
Chambers, Captain Bellcm, Assistant Qual'termasterGeneral, and Captain Grant, Assistant AdjutantGeneral. I n tlie presence of this council, Major
Pottingcr declased his convictioil that no confidence
could be placed in ariy treaty formed wit11 the Afglihn
chiefs; that, under such circumstai~ces, to bind the
hands of Covcrnment, by promising to evacuate tlie
country, and to rcstore tlic dcposcd Amir, and to mastc
inorcover so nlncll public money, merely to save our
own lives a~idproperty, woulrl be inconsistcrit wit11 tllc

duty we omecl our country and the Government we
servcd ; and that the oiily honourable course would be
either to hold out to the last at I<&bul, or to force our
immediate retreat to JallBbb6d.
This, however, the officers colnposing the council, one
and all, declared to be impracticable, owing to the
want of provisions, the surrender of the surrounding
forts, and the inshperable difficulties of the road at
the present scason ; tliey therelore dcemed it preferable
to pay any sum of money ratller than sacrifice the
wholc lorce in a hopeless proloi~gation of hostilities.
I t was accordingly determined, nem. con., that Major
Pottinger should at once renew the negotiations which
had been commcnced by Sir William Macnaghten,
and that the sums promiscd to the chiefs by that
f ~ ~ n c t i o n aprevious
~y
to his m~irdershould be paid.
M%jor Pottinger's objectio~isbeing tlius over-ruled,
thc tendered treaty was forthwith accepted, and a requisition was made for the release of Captain Lawrence,
whose presencc mas necessary to 1)~ep;tl.ethe bills on
India. lpour married hostages, with their wives and
children, being required by the chiefs, a circular was
sent round, to ascertain if that numbcr would volunteer to remain, a salary of two thousand rdpis per
month being guaranteed to each as an inducement.
Such, hornever, was the liorror entertained of ATghAn
treachery since thc late tragical occurrence, that some
officers wcnt sofar as to say they would sooner shoot their

wives at once, than commit them to the chargc of meii
vho had proved themselves clevoid of comnion honour
and humanity. Therc wcrc, in Eact, but onc or two
~vhoconsented to stay, if the General coilsirlcreil that
by so doing they would bcnefit tlie public scrvice.
[Tlie folloving arc thc replics, as given by Lady
Sale :Lieutenant Eyre said, if it zoas to beproiluctivc o j
p e a t good he would stay u ~ i t his
l ~ zoqe and child. Tlie
others all refusecl to rislr the safety of thcil. Snmilics.
Captain Anderson said lie mould rathcr pnt a pistol to
llis wife's llead and shoot her; aucl Sturt, that his
.
vife and mother shoulcl only be talren at thc point of
the bayonet : for himself, he was ready to perform any
duty imposed upon him."
Tlie simple fact is, that on the question being put
officially, Lieutenant Eyre replied that lic was ready
to do whatever tlie General might tllinlr most conducive
to the public good under the circumstances."]
December 27th.-The chicfv mcrc irlformccl that it was
contrary to tlie usages of war to givc LIP ladies as
hostages, and tliat tlie Gcneral could not conseiit to an
nsr~ngemcnt which would branil liim with perpetual
disgrace in his own countiy.
December 29th.-Tlie Nail, Amir came in horn tlie
city with Captain L:uvrcnce and the sliarofs, ~vlicn
the bills were prepared wil;llout fartlier rlclay. Captains Drnmmoncl, Walsh, Warbm.ton, and Wel~h,
((
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having beell acccpted as hostages, wcre sent to join
Captains Conolly and Airey at 'thc house of Nawhh
Zamlin KliAn. A portion of the siclr and rno~uldccl,
anlongst wlionl was Licutcnallt I-Iaugllton of the Gdrlrnh
regiment, wcrc lilrc~vise coriveycd to the city, and
placc(1 uridcr tlic protcctioii of the chieh. Three of
the SlililiJs g~uls, with tlie greater portiori oP our
trcasnre, wcre ninclc over cluring the day, much to
the cvident disgust of tlic soliliery.
December 30th.-Tlie
rernr~inder of the sick went
into the city, Lieuteriant Ev:ms,
MnjestyJs 44th
Foot, bcing ~)lacc(li11 cr)mmanil; Dr. Ct~mpbell,5111th
Natvc 1nfa1,ntl-y, svitll Dl*. Be~rniclr,of the Mission,
ill mcrlical ch:~rgc of tlic ~v1,vllole. Two mom 01 tlie
ShQl's giills wcrc giveu up. I t snolvcd h a l ~ l the
mllolc day, A crowtl of armed C11:llzis and Gh5zis
took up L: tllrc:~tcning position close to the castcrn
gate, ancl cveu attempted to force :m entr:incc into
ca~ltonrncnt~.Mucll allnoynnce was daily expcrienccd
from these pcoplc, who wcrc in thc linbit of plunde~ing
tllc peeccnblc clc:Jcl*s, mllo flocltccl i n f'i*orn the city
vith grain :md for:igc, the monlcnt thcy issuccl from
tllc c;ultoiimciits ;tlicy even committed I'rcqilcnt r~ssaults
on OUT Scpoyn, and orrlcrs to fire on them on such
occasioris 1~11crercpc:~tetlly solicited in vain, althougli
it TVRH WCII know11 that tllc chief's tllcniselves aclvised
us to do yo, :~nd tllc Gcner:~l 11:~d given Brigadier
Shclton positive ir~structiorlsto that cflect, wlienever
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circumstances might render it advisable. The consequence mas that our soldiers were daily constminecl
to enclul-e the most insulting arid contemptuous t:tunts
and treatment, from iello~vswhom n single charge of
bayonets mould have scattered lilx clin8, hut nrlio
were emboldened by the appncnt tainc~lcss of om.
troops, vliicli tliey doubtless attributed to tllc rn:nlL of'
common pluclr
tllnri to t11c rcstr:~iiitsof discilrlinc.
Captains Maclrcrlzie and Slrillilcr ol~taincil tlicir rclease this evcning, tlic latter ofGcer liaviilg, fiiiicc tlic
outbreak of the 1.cbellior1, passecl tlirongli sorilc curious
ndvcnturcs in tlic disguise of an Afgliliil fc1n:~le.
January 5th.-Affairs
contiiluccl ill tlle saine 1.111settled statc llntil this datc. The cliicfs post1)oiiccl our
departure from day to day on divers prctcxts. I t had
been agreed that Naw&b J n b h ICliAu. sl~ouldescort
us to JallLlilBblid with d ~ o u ttwo tliousand followers,
who were to be entcrtnined for that purpose.
I t is sul~posedthat, up to tlie very last, tile majority
of chiefs doubted the reality of our intcntiori to dcpnrt :
and many, fcarEul of the civil cliscorcls for wliicli our
retreat woulcl be thc signal, would liave gladly cIetairic(1
us at Kdbul. Attcmpts wcrc matlc, contilrually by
Alrbar IChhn to wean tlie Hirid6st;inis fro111 tlicir
allegiaace, 2nd to induce tlicm to desert, Nulncrous
cautions mcyc receivcil from v:trious well-mislicrs, to
place 110 corifidcricc i11 tllc profcssiori~or tlic cliicftr,
mho 11:lil smorri togctlicr to accornplial.1 our cntirc.
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destruction. Sh:*tli SllujG liin~sclfsent nlort.: tll;kll olle
solemn mnming, rind, fi~idiiigme vcrct llclit 011 t:lliillg
our own course, used liia utnlost cilde:tvo~rrsto l)t.rs~l;tc\e
Lady Macnaglitcii to talie advatitage of liis protcc:tio~i
i n the Bhlilli Hisfir. R c also nppc:~lcd to l'lrig;i~lier
Anquetil, who commandetl tllc Shill's force, " if it were
me11 to forsake him iu the lionr of ncctl, :uid to dcl)rivc
him of tlie aid of tliat force, mllicll i
t had hitherto 1)ren
taught to consider as his own ? '' 1111 w : ~ ,liowc~\-er,
unavailing. 'I'he Gcnei*al aiid his counctil-of-wur 11:td
determined that go .wc rmlst, anrl go ~ v cac!corrliiiglp did.
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I n tlle foregoing cliaptcrs I linvc offorrd w11:it 1
honestly believe t o bc a faithful 11:nr:ltion of t l ~ cctis~iial
train of events 1vhic11preceded tllc cvacu:ltioi~of li;il)ul,
a n d the abandonment of ShRh Sllujfi, I)y t l ~ c'13ritisli
army. In taking a retrospcctivc view of tliosa unprecedented occurrences, it is cvidcnt tlint our rcvcrscs
may be mainly attributed to n lack of ordin:iry f01,csight and pelletration on tlie part of the cllicf iriilitary
and civil autliorities, on their first etitcri~~g
on t l ~ c
occupation of this eountry ; n comitry wllosc innimlcrable fortified stro~igholdsand dificult mountain passes,
h the hands of s proud and marlilie popl~lntion,licvcr
really subdued nor reconciled to our rule, though 1111able to oppose the march of a discipliilcd army tllrough
their.land, ought to have induced a Inore tlian colllrnotl
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degree of vigilance and circumspection i n making
ar
adequate provision against any such p o p ~ ~ l outbreak
as might haye been mticipatecl, arlil clid actu a11-v occur.
But, instead of applying his undeniable talents to the
completion of that co~lquestwhich gaincd liiin an i l l ~ ~ s trious title anrl a widc renown, Lord ICcanc contcntcd
lzimself with the superficial success which attciided liis
prog~ess tlirough a country hitherto ui~trnvcrsecl by
an European aymy since tlie classic days of Alcxarnder
the Grcat ; he hurriecl off, wit11 too gi-cat e a p c i ~ r ~ ~tos s
enjoy tlle apl~lause which awnitecl liim in England,
and left to lzis successors tlie far inore arcluo~istask
of securing in their grasp tllc unwicldy prize of ~vhicli
'
Ize had obtained the nornilid possession.
On his return to Irlclia, Lord Iccane took wit11 hirri
a large portion of the Bengal force with ~vliichhc
had arrived at IcBbul; tlie wl~oleof the Boml~aytroops
made a simulta~ieoushomeward movement; and the
army> with which hc had entered Afgllknistrin, was
thus reduced to a misc~ahlcmoiety, bcforc any steps
bad been talren to guard against suilprisc by the
erection of a strongholil on the approvccl princil~lcsof
modern warfare, or tlic establiulimcnt of a line of
military posts to lreep open our comrnunic:~tions with
India, on which c o ~ n t r yt l ~ earmy must iiccessnrily for
a long time have bee11 cntircly dcpcndcnt for tlie munitions of war. lYic diatancc filom ICBhul to Firozpur,
our nearest Indian fitation, is al>out six l~ui~clrcd
miles.

i
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Between KAbul and Peshicwar occU the stupendous
aud dangerous dcfilcs of Khnrd-ICBbul, Tizin, Paridaral,
Jagdallak, and Khaibar, thronghout whose whole extent
food and forage are proc~u.ableonly at loug intervals
and even then mith mnch difficulty.
From PeshAwar to Rrozpur is the PanjAb, or country
of the Sikhs, traversed by five great rivers, and occupied by a powerful nation, on mllose pacific professions
no reliance could be placcd. Along this extended line
of communication Lord ICeane established but one
small solitary post? in the fort of Ali Masjid, in the
heart of the Khaibar pass. EIe left behincl him, in
fact, an army whose isolated position and reduced
strength offered the strongcst possible temptation to a
proud and restless race to rally their sc~ttercdtribes
in one grand effort to regain thcir lost independence.
I n Lorcl KeaneJs successors may be secn the same
dispositioil to be too easily satisfied 114th the outma~d
semblance of tranquillity. Another brigade was ere
long withclramn from a force already insufficiellt for any
great emergency ;' nor was their position for holding in
subjection a vanquished pcople much iinproved by their
establishment in an ill-situated and ill-constructed
cantonment, mith their commissariat stores separated
from their lines of defence. To the latter-mentioned
error may be mainly attributed the evacuation of 1Ctih.l
and the destruction of the army; for there can be no
doubt that, notwithstarding all the difficulties of our
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position, had tlle cantonmelits been wcll supplied \pit11
~rovisions,the troops co~llcl have c:isily licld out uritil
the arrival of reiiiforccrncnts from India. Tlic real
cause of our dcreat Tvas, beyoncl all qncstion, ,f(~nliIle.
W e mere not drbcn, but stavz>ed,* out of 1liLl)uil; and
evcry al1om:mce ought i n comn~onjustice to l)c madc
for men who, fi.0111 thc vcry colllmciiccmcnt of tlic
conflict, saw tlic coinl,iiiccl liorrors of starvatioii ni~cla1
rigorouu minter frowning in tlicir fncc,--no succonrs
within rcacl1,-tlicir rctrent cut off,-a11d all tlicir sanguinary cflorts eitllcr altogcthcr fi'uitless, or at bcst
ilcfcrriiig for n few sllort clays tllc ruin wllicli 011 cvcry
side thrcatcncd to overwhelm tlicm.
In connection with tllia subjcct, I may be cxcusccl
for quoting, in conclusion, t11e powerful reasoning of a
recent ~vritcrin tllc " Bombay Times :""When a soldier finds that liis every movenicrit is
directed by a mastcr mind; tllnt, wlien hc is apparc~itly
tlnust into the grcatcst cln~iger,lie finds, in truth, llis
grcatcst security; that his march to cngagc an appnrently superior force is not a ~vild sacrifice, but thc

*

Tlio Envoy, in n, roporL t o tho Gororninont of Indio, writton
just aftorwards, but ~~11iclr
dicl not ro:icll Intlin ill d11o ColirRo, stntuu,
plmagrnph 12, tliora is " noL 0110 L ~ I L Y ' H 1?riwiui011sloft; " rind, 1wmg r n p l ~17, " iVo had boon iigliting forty i l n y ~n g n i ~ l ~VbO I ~~11110rior
mimbors, nnllor grcnt disnclvnnttr~os; ill n clny or two TVO munt l~r~vo
porisllod from hungor, t o H I L ~notl~ingof tho ndvnncod Bentroll of Lhu
yonr, anrl tho oxtromo cold, from which our Nativo trooljs woro
t l l l f f ~ l i l lH~O V O ~ O ~ ~ . "
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result of a well-calculated plan; when he Icnows that,
however appearances may be, he is sure to come o g
with honour, for his brethren i n arms are already in
progress to assist him, and mill not fail to be fortllcoming at the liour appointed; when he sees that there
is a watchful eye over him, providing for all his wants,
assisting him to overcoine a11 his difficulties, and e11abling him to reap the fruit of all his successes; wheu
he finds that even retreat is but a preparation for victory, and, as if guided by Providence, all his movements,
though to him incomprehensible, are sure to 'provc
steps to some great end;-when the soldier finds this,
he rises and lies down in security, and there is no
rlauger which he will not brave. But when, in everything they undertake, they find the reverse of the
picture I have drawn; when they are marched, as they
imagine, to glory, but find it is G ~ toY slaughter; when
even victory brings no fruit, and retreat they discover
to be flight ; when the support they hope for comes not,
and they find their labours to be without end or purpose; when the provisions they loolr for daily are
issued to them no more, and tliey see all their ,efforts
paralysed ; the stoutest heart will fail, the bravest sink;
for the soldier lrnows that, clo what he mill, his efforts
can only end in ruin and dishonour."
[An intercepted letter from one of the I G b d chiefs
to a fiiend at KandahBr throws some light on the losses

sustained by tlie Afg1161is up to t h c time of the Envoy's
murder. I-Ic writes as follolvs :c c A11d-nld~I<liiln and his two soris are dcncl; also
Tbz N1~1inmm:~tl1<11611, tlic SOIL of Alnil: JT111i:~mmntl
IChB1. Greut wcaebors o j the c J ~ i ( f of
s the Klibulis and
I<azilbdsJ~i,~
J~avebeen killed ~ I Lthe various actionsJ ~ 7 r t l
above tzoo thousand ~ n e n7~c1vebeen killed and w a ~ ~ d ~ l
g[ tfie Mz~sst~lmcins."]

?=

CHAPTER XIII.
T H E RETREAT O F THE ARMY, AND ITS ANNIIIILATION.

January 6th.-AT last the fatal morning dawned, which
was to witness the departure of the ICtibul force from
the cantonments, in which it had sustained a twomonths' siege, to encounter the miseries of a winter
marc11 through a country of perhaps unparalleled difficulty, where every mountain defile, if obstinately defended by a determined enemy, must inevitably prove
the grave of hundreds.
Dreary indeed was tlie scene, over which, with
drooping spbits and dismal forebodings, we had to bend
our unwilling steps. Decp snow covered every inch of
mountain and plain with one unspotted sheet of dazzling
white, and so intensely bitter was the cold, as to penetrate and defy the defences of the warmest clothi~g.
No signs of the promised escort appeared : but at an

'

cnrly hour tlic prepnratioils commenced for our march.
A cut mas rnnde tllrougli the eaatcrll rampart, to ope11
a11 adc1ition:~lpassage for tlze troops and baggageJ a
sutficiont n ~ ~ ~ n of
b cgmi-mnggons
r
slid platform planlcs
wcrc t:~lccn(low11to tllc river for the formation of a
tcrn1)ornry bridge, aud cvcry nvnilnblc cnmcl and y6116
(thc ~vholcamounting to two thouuai~d)mas ladeli with
militnry xtu~os, col~~~nissnrint
supplies, and sucli small
prol~o~tiou
of c:~11111-ccl~1il)agas
mns indispcusably nccessary to ~licltcrtllc troops in a climate of extrnordirlnry
rigour.
Tlic strength of the whole force at this time mas, so
far ns call ilow bc ascertainedJ very ne:wly as follows :-

5.11 1

1I

'I . d

o

37th
do.
6 1tll
do.
O t l ~t;hi~11'~
Infitt~try
Rnppwil ctod N i n c r s
Fihall'e (lo.
IInlS tho Molmtnin Trnin
-

-

-

o

-

-

7

- . - - - -

-

1

- 600

-

-

050
600 .2,840.
20

-240

-

Total

6 IIor~oArt i l t o y

600

30-

-

4,600 fighting-mon.

~ I I ~ B .

8 Mountain Train do.

Besides tlie abovc, the camp-followers amounted, a t
a very rrnot1er:~tecomputation, to about twelve thousrtrld
men, bc~iclcsworncn nlld children, These proved from

-
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the very first mile a serious clog upon our movements,
and were, indeed, the main cause of our subsequent
misfortunes. I t is to be devoutly hoped that every
future commancier-iu-chief of the Indian army will
adopt decisive measures to prevent a force employed
on field service from being ever again afflicted with such
p curse.
Tlie order of march mas as follows :-

-

H.M.'s 44th Foot - Suppers and Minera
- - Ii-rog. Horse, 1squad.
8 Mountain Train guns - Tho escort, with tho laclios The invalids and sick - 2 lIorse Artille~yguns - Anclerson's Irreg. Horse
37th Native Infantry, with troosuro
5th Native Infantry, with baggage
54th Nativo Infantry
- 6thShab'sInfontry
5th Light Cavalry 4 Horse htillei,y guns ,

-

-

- . - -

-

-

-

--7[ The advance, under
- Brigadier Anquetil.
-

1

-

-

Main colu~m,uuder
Brigadier Sholton.

--

-

Roar-guard, under
Colonel Chambers.

All being ready at 9 A.M., the advance commenced
moving out. A t this time not a single Afgh6n was to
be seen in any direction, and the peaceable aspect of
affairs gave rise t o strong hopes that the chiefs intcnded
to remain true to their engagements.
A t 10 A.M. a message was brought from NawAb
Jabfir KhAn, requesting us to defer our departure
another day, as his escort was not yet ready t o accompany us. By this time, however, the greater part of
the force was in motion, and a cromd of Afghins, who
had issued from the village of Bem6rd, impatient for

17

plunder, had forced their way into tlie nortlleril cantonment, or Mission Colnpouncl (wliicll, owing to some
mistake, llad beell evacuated too soon by tlie Shiih's
6th Infantry), and lvcre busily engaged i n the work
of pillagc ancl d ~ s i ~ u c t i o n Tlle
.
aclvailce was clclaycd
for U ~ I W ~ Tof~ Snn horn at tllc rivcr, liaving fouiicl tlie
tempo1,ary bridge incomplctc ; ancl i t was noon ere the
.rvliolc llad crossecl ova; lcnviiig a clcnr road for the
main columii to follow.
The order of ninrcli in wliicli tlie troops stnitcd
mas, however, soon lost, and the camp-follotvers mitli
tlie public and privatc baggngc, oiicc out of cniitonrnents,
conld not be p~evcntcclfrom i~iiringtlieinselves np with
the troops, to the uttcr confusioii of the wliole column.
The main body, with its long train of laden camcls,
co~itinuedto pour out of tlic gate until the evening, by
which time tliousands of .Afgli6iis, tlie majority of whom
..rrreilcfanatical Ghiieis, tlirotigecl the wliole area of cantlie air .rvitli their e x ~ ~ l t i ncries,
g
atid
tonments, rci~dit~g
committing every kind of atrocity. The rear-guard,
being unable to restrain them, was obliged to provide
for its own safcty by t:lking up a positio~loutside, on
tlie plain; where a grcat quantity of thc 11:lggng-e had
11ecn brouglit to a stand-still at tlie canal ((mithin one
liuiiclred aiid fifty y,~rcls of tlic p t e ) , ~vliosc slil~pery
sides rlfforded no safe footing for tllc beasts of Lurclen.
T l ~ ebridge'aci~osstlic rivcr, being by this time imprncticable, occ:~sioilcd:~dclitionnldclay.
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The Afghlins, who had hitherto been too busily engaged in tlie morlr of plunder and destruction to take
much notice of the troops, ilo~vbcgan to line the ramparts, and annoy them with a mischievous fire of
jazails, undcr wllich many fell ; and i t became necessary, for tlie preservation of those who remained,
to spilre and abandon two of the IIorse Artillery
guns.
Niglit had no\v closcd aro~uid; b ~ the
t Gldzis, having
firetl thc residency ancl dmost every other b~ildingin
thc cantonment, tlie conflagration illuminated the surrounding cowltry for sevcrcll miles, presenting a spectaclc of fea~fuls~~blimity.I n tlle mad fervour of tlieir
religious zeal, tlicsc ignorant fanatics even set fire to
tlic gun-cnltriages hclongilig to tlic various pieces of
orclnaiice, whicli wc liad lcft in position round the
~ v o ~ kof
s , wliosc use tlie Afglilin chiefs Ivcre thus luclrily
ilclxivcd. The g c u e r ~ lhad
l been oftcn urged to destroy
tliesc guns, rather than suffer tliern to fall into the
enemy's hantls, b11t h c coi~sicleredthat it would have
hccn a hreach of tlie treaty to do so. Bcfore the rearguard commenced its inarch, Lieutenant I-Iardyman of
tlie 5th Light Cavalry, with fifty rank and file, meyc
s.tretclied lifelcss on tllc snow. Much baggage was
nl~andoncda t starting, and much was pl~~ildered
on tllc
ronil. Scorca of morn-out Scpoys and camp-followers
lined the way, having sat do~vnin desprtir to perish ill
tlie snow. I t mas 2 A.M, crc the rear-guard reached

17
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camp at Bdgrbm, a distalice of only fivc miles. I-Icrc
all was confusion. Tlie tciits liatl bccli pitcliccl without
the slig1;lltest regard to yegularity, tliosc 01 r1iKci1crlt
regilncnts being liuddlcil t o g c t l i ~in~ one intricate m:lss,
'mixer1 up with bnggagc, carlip-followers, <::~~iicls,
and
horses, in R way ~vliicli1)cgg:~rur1cscril)tioli. 'J'lii: llit~~sy
canvas of tile snldicrs' tcnts was l ~ u :Lt l)oor pvotoatioii
from tlic cold, wliicli townrds iiiorniiig bc!c:~ruc: rticrc!
and morc iiiteiisc; aiid t1luus:uiils of poor mrctolictl
creatures wcrc obliged to lic clown oil tlia 1):~rosnow,
without eitlicy sliclter, firc, or food. Scvcrnl rlictcl
during tlic night ; ainoligst ~vliolnmas all l(:urol)o:rii
conductor of orilllance.
About t~vcntyjazailcliis, ~vliostill hcld f:ritllfully by
Captain Maclcenzie, suffered lcss than tlic rcst, owing
to tlicir systematic moilc of proceeding. Tliair first
step on reaching the grouild wiis to c1c:rr a sni:~Ilsp:tcth
from tllc snow, mllcre tllcy tlicii Inid t l i c ~ n ~ o l v110wv11
~s
in a. circle, closely packcd togctlicr, with tllcir feet
meeting hi tlic ccutre ; all tlic wrrnii clotliing tlicy
could muster among tliem ljcing sprcxd cclua~llyover
tlle mhole. By tllcsc simple nicails snfficiciit n11irn:~l
warmth was g:.cner:ltcd to prescrvc tTlc~nfrom boirlg
frost-bitten ; arid Capt:iili M:lclrc~lzic:, who himsclf
sliared tlicir lioniely bccl, dcclnrcd that 11c lind felt
scuccly any inco~iveiiieuccfrom t l ~ ocold. I t was cliffcrcnt with our Scpoys aiid camp-followers, ~vlio,h a v i ~ ~ g
had no fonncr crpcrierice of sue11 liarildiips, wcrc
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ignorant how they might hest provide against tliem,
and the proportion of those who escaped, witho~ltsuffering in some degrce from frost-bites, was very small.
Yct this was but the beginning of sorrows !
Junuary 7th.-At 8 A.M. the force movecl off in the
reverse orclcr of yesterday-if that could be called order
ml~iclicoiisistcd of a mingled mob of soldiers, campfollomcrs, arid baggage-cattle, preserving not cven the
f:intcst seinblancc of that reg~llarityand cliscipline on
ml~icliclepcncled OLW only cllance of escape from the
clangers which thrcatencd us. Even at this early stage
of thc retrcat scarcely oiic-half of the Sepoys mere lit
for duty ; hullrlreds had, from sheer inability to keep
thcir ranks, joillcd tlie uon-combatants, and thus incrcnsed the confusion. 11s for tlic Shil?s 6th Infantry,
i t m;u ~io~vlicrc
to be fomid ; oiily a fc~vstraggling files
were pcrccptible llcrc and there; and it was generally
believed that tElc majority of the rcgimeiit had absconded
during tlic iiiglit to IC6bul.
At starting, largc clorls of hardciicd snow adhercd so
firmly tu the lioofs of OUT horses, that a cliisel and
liarnnicr mould lime hcen recl~iisiteto dislodge them.
Thc vcry air mc brcatllcd froze ill its passagc out of the
inoutll :uid nostrils, formiiig a coating of sniall icicles
on our moustnclics and beards.
T l ~ e;~dvancoljrocccded onward mitliout molestation,
tliongli nurncrous small bodics of Afgli6n liorse and
foot were obsei*vcd hanging ahout our flar~lcs, and

moving in a parallel direction with ourselves. These
were at first supposed to form a part of,"our escort, but
the mistalre was soon discovered by their attacltirlg the
rear-guard, commanded by Brigadier Anclnetil, consisting of Hcr Majesty's 44tl1, Lieutenant Green's Mountah1
I'rain guns, and a sq~~aclron
of Inegulay I-Iorsc. h'lncl~
baggage fell into the cnemy's hands, 1~110,though in
some degree lrept in chcclr by the glins, cshil~iteda,
bold front, and maintained a harassing fiipc oil our
troops, whose movemeilts wcre terribly cripplcd by tllc
disorderly multitude that thronged the 19o:id in front.
The latter being for several minutcs byougllt to a
stand-still by a deep water-cut wliicll iiitcysccted thc
road, the Mountain Train guns endeavowcd to pass clear
of thcm by ma11ing a short detour, in doing which they
got separated from the infantry, ancl-one hnl~peniugat
this unluelry moment to ul~sct-the enemy seized the
opportunity to rush for~varcland capturc them, before
Iler Majesty's 44th, who saw too late their awltward
predicament, could render cffcctual assistance.
A gallant example was, howevel; shown by Lieutenant
Green and his few artillerymen, 1)-110 lnacle a suclderi
charge upon the foe, and spilred thc guns, but, not being
supported, they were obliged a sccond time to abandon
them. Lieutenant Wllite, the Adjutant of Hcr Majesty's 44th, reccived a sevcre wound through the face on
this occasion.
Brigaclier Anquetil now sent to {lie front for win-
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forcements, mhicli, however, it was found impracticable
to furnish, from the crowded state of tlie road. The
Afgliiin liorsc shortly after this charger1 into tlie very
~iiiclstof tlic columrl of baggage, and carriecl ofl large
quantitics of plunder, creating the greatest collfusioil
and dismay. Numbers fell from wounds, arid still
greater numbers from inerc bodily wealmess produced
by cold, fasting, and fatigue. I t was found necessary
to spike aricl al~anclontwo more I-Por~leArtillery gmis,
~vhich the horses were fo~incl perfectly incapable of
t21-agging any furtller through tllc decp snow.
011 the arrival of the advance at Kta-i-lrh;'iIlr, the
Gcncrnl, having been iilforlncd tllnt tlle rcar was hi
tlai~gcr of bcing entirely cut off, ordered a halt, and
sent back all tllc troops that conlcl bc spared, togctlier
wit11 tllc t ~ v oremcli~ling gulls, to clrive off the enemy,
~vlioliar1 now assembled in grcat numbers in tlie rear,
and were proceecling to crown some heights on tlie
riglit coinmniicling the road. This was, however, prevcntccl by our troops under Brigadier Slielton, wlio tooli
possession of the nearer hciglits, anrl lrept the enemy in
c*liecli for ul~wards of ail houi-. 011 tliis occasion,
Lieutenant Slia~v,of the 54th Native Infantry, was
~vomidcdscve~clyin tlie thigh. Mean~vl~ile
Captail1
Slrinricr had fallen in with s follower of Muhammacl
~ l k b a 1<11;;11,
r
filom ~vliomliaviilg leal-nerl that tlle cliief
mas cncnrrlpcd ricar at hand, h e accompanied tllc man
to his masker's prescncc. M~thammad all,^ now in-

formed Captain Slrinner that hc llad been sent by thc
chiefs to escort us to Jalliil&b6d, and declared that we
had becn attaclrcd in coilscquencc of having marclled
contrary to their wishcs. IIe insistcd on our halting
at Bdta-i-lrhA1r till thc following morniug, i n ~vllicll
case he would providc food, forage, and fire-woorI for
the troops; but lie said that be should cspcct sis
hostages to insure our not marching bcyond Tiziri hefore tidings should bc reccivcd of Qcncral Sale's cvacuation of Jalliil&biid,for .cvhicl~an ordcr liad bcen alrcady
despatched to that officcr, in compliaricc wit11 tlic
stipnlatioiis of thc trcaty.
.These terms having becn agreed to, thc firing ccascd
for the present, and thc force came to a halt on somc
high ground near thc cntrance of thc 1Chuz.d-IChbul
pass, having in two days accoinplished a distancc of
only tcn milcs from I(ilbu1.
Here, again, tlie conf~~sion
soon hecamc indescribablc.
Suffice it to say that an immcnve multitude of from
fourteen thousand to sistecn thonsancl mcn, wit11
several hundred cavalry horses and baggagc cattle,
were closely jammcd together in one monstrous, nnmanageable mass. Night agairl closcd over us, .cvith
its attendant train of horrors,- starvation, cold, cxhaustion, death; and of a11 deaths I call imagine 110110
more agonising than that wliere a nipping frost
tortures every sensitive limb, mltil the teriacious spirit
itself sinlrs ~ n d e thc
r cxtreme of l~urnari~ufi'cring.
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.Tusi.ciuv?/ hl/~.-At
an early hour the treacherous
11lglikrl.r again commancctl to molest us with tlieir lire,
nnil scvc:rnl li~~iidrcds
liaviilg i~sscmblctlin liostilc array
to the sontli of tlia c:imp, the troops mcrc drawn I ~ I
ill expectation of : ~ n attack. M a j o ~Tliain, putting
Eliniself : ~ ttllc llcnil 01' tlir: 4 bth Foot, and cxliortilig
n ~ c uto follow Iiiin, let1 tllcin boldly on to tlie
attack; hut tlii: oriciny (lid rlot tliinli proper to await
tlic? fiIio(:k of' I):~YOILC~S,:ind c.ifccted a hasty retreat.
T l i this l~llsiilcssIIer Mr~jcsty's4.l'tli Foot behavc?d wit11
:I, resolutiou :~11dg:ill:~litrymortliy ol Britisli soldiers.
Ca~'ltiiiiSliixii\(~r:lgai~l~ v e i ~tot conim~lili~ate
wit11
hIu11:~~nmatl
Altllar Iilllin, ~vlioilcmandcd tliat Major
Yottingor i u d Captailis L:~rvrencc aiiil &Iaclieiizic
sliould i~xirnctli:~tclybe madc ovcr to hiin, wliieli was
aecortlii~gly donr, xitl liostilitics :igain ccnsed; the
Sirilhi*l)romisi~igto sr:itd furward some ilifiueiitial mcu
to cle:~r tlicl pass fiom tlla C~halzie, .ir~hooccupicd it,
:uld merc lying in ~rvnitfor our al>proacli. Once more
tllc l i ~ i n giuass of nlcli arld animals mas in motion.
At tlle cntr:uice of thc parjs an attcmpt was made to
scl)ar:~tt: tlie troops f ~ o mthe lion-combatants, wliicli
mas but partially sncccusful, and created c~nsidcr:ible
duli~y. Tlie rapid cffccts of two nightsJ exposure to the
frost in ilisorganiziiig tlic force call hardly be conceived.
I t had so nippet1 tllc llnilds aud fcet of cven thc
rjtrorlgcst men, a8 to completely prostrate tlieir powers
and iuciq~ncitatethcm for service; eveu the cavalry,
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wlin sufl'crccl lcss tlia~itlle rcst, mcrc ol~ligcdto be
liftcd ou tlicir horscs. I n fact only a fc~vhundred
schrvict::rl~lcfightii~g-mmirwnained.
Tlic idcn of tlircading tlie stupendous pass before
us, in tlic fncc of an nrmcd tribe of blood-thirsty
I)nrl~clrinns,wit11 such n dense irregular multitude, was
liligl~bl'ul, ancl the spcctnclc tllel~ presented by that
~vztving so:^ of :uiiiiiated beiiigs, tlic majority of ~vliom
:L f i : ~ilcctir~gliours wo~lidtrai~sibl~~n
illto a line of
lif(:loss ~:~rc:issest o guidc tlie fuuture traveller on his
WILY, ( ' i ~ i iiicv~i,11e forgnttc~lby tllosc ~vliomitncsscd
it.#: -Mrc Iiad so of1e11 bcci~deceived by AfghLn pro-

" W11cutilo nvoiigin~~ ~ r nnudor
ly
Goncr:ll Pollook wns in prOgrCSE
lo K b u l in tllo Sol~lciul~or
follo\~ii~g,
T~ioutonant Greenwood, of

Ilcr h f n j r h l y ' ~3181 ILogiii~cnt,writos :I' 0
1
1 0lll~rinjitilo 1il1l11~1l-Ii~bi11
pas8 \YO wort all fltrucli ~vit11the
u t n ~ i ~ hri!ilonial~n~c~~t.
l
Tho otl~or1i:issorc aim as notl~iilgin corn~~nrisoil
~villlIllis nlnlohl iniprcgnnblo dclilo. Tlio dond of Gonorol
E l l ~ l ~ i n ~ t omsniy
u o ' ~ ltiy iri 11cnpu; in ~olnoplaces tlioy eecmod to bo
niomc!tl down in ~v11oloIiattalions. Altl~ougl~
oiglit nlo~~tlis
had
olnp~cll,tl~c?p
llritl bcon l~rrecrvodin tllo mow, and their ghastly
flrce~hco~r~ctl
to call opo~i118 for rovongo."
IInjr~rSlnitl~,of IIor &l:~josty'u9tli Foot, llius dosoribos tho same
ACOIlO :-

t

i
I

"Next morniny: wo nlnrchcd tllrough tho Ul~urd-Kibulpass t o
xVnsfull of tho niost painful
Bfida-i-kliirk. Tho wcc~lcwo wit~~oaeotl
i~~tcroclt.l i t this fat:~1 pol iiat lea8 tl~irrlthree thousand incliriduols
of tlio I<dl)nl nrr~ly~ o r omnurtaorod by tho Afgliilns. Nino English
ladios, mitlr o i ~ l ~ t o e or
l i tncnty yo~inji ohildron, witnossod tho
friglltful u~~cotr~clo,
~und~hnrerlits dnngors. Tlioro in a grandour
ill tho Rcmcry of this pnfls wllicli soolnorl to accord mith tho hideous
rlsl~octof tlio ronil tilong mllicll \YO t~*avollod,~ t r o ~ v ofor
d two miles
liko n charnol lron~owit11 nlcnldoring ukoloton~. What feeling was
oxcitod in our troopn by ~ a c hoLjoc&~
nlay readily be concoivod."

.

fessione, tliat little or no corlfidcncc uraR placcd in the
tlie dretltlcd pass in no \.cry stnlguinc: tcnlpcr of nliutl.
This truly i'onniclnblc clcfilo is t111o11t i i ~ ctllilcv froln
cncl t o cncl, ntitl is a l t ~ till 011 citll~19I I ~ L Iby
I ( ~;L lint
of lofty Ilills, l~otwce~l
~ v l ~ o xprccipitoux
c
~irlestllc: sun
tllc ccnt1.c daullcil a ~nomlC;liutorraiit, ~vlloscinq~etuoos
conrse t l ~ oCrust in vain ;~ttc:it~ptccl
to rurrc:st, tliougli i t
~tucccctlodi r k l i r ~ i r ~thc
g cdgcv will1 tlticalr, layers of icc,
ovcr wllicl~ tllc finow Lly cousolidi~tetl it1 s1ippc:ry
masscs, :~fl'oi)l'~liiig110 veyy onsy footing for onr j:rtlcd
animals. Tllis strcaitl me l ~ t ~ ct ol crow I L I I ~recross
.

-I

Tho Ilov. J. N. Allon, U l ~ a ~ ~ l at iol ltho army uildor Gonoral Nott,
writes on tho 14lh October 1 B l Y :"Mural~ccl n t 6 A.M. thrclngll tho ICll~irtl-Kirlr111-u ~tuy~ontl(~un
I t i~ ~ l o s e ( 1i n Iry l r i l l ~~ ~ uororlln~lgiug
d
IIILBA.
rockn, ml~icl~,
if
tlofondotl, wonltl 110 oxccodingly ( I I L ~ ~ ~ ~ Onllllf~st
L . O I I Hirrlpi)~nihlo
,
to
c r o ~ v n ant1
,
rL CILIIRO of i ~ l l i ~ l c r lltlqs
s ~ C V ~ ~ It(r
I 1110 IIIOHL ititl.olri111lr1i1
wcll-orgr~l~izocl
fol.co with fcivo~rrirl~lr!
t\entlic~. [ t will alrsily Lo
cunccivc!tl, thorcforc, wlu~Li t I I ~ I I S L IIILVO
lrt>[:rl ( 1 1 1110 tro1111~
u~~tlor
Gonorril I ~ l l ~ l l i ~ ~ t~~tt~~ ~v i ~liql~il.it.i~I,
!e~, l ,
rl~i(lI ~ ~ R I J P ~ : L
illI ~tho
~%CI~,
n i o n t l ~of ,It~nlt:~~.y
; tl~cl~ I * I ) I I I ~tlucy
II
i r ~H I ~ ~ I Virl~d
,
c~rlrosotlto tho
ilro of crol~rlyof Afgllin~a.
" Thcj L ~ I I ~ ~ I L I Ito
C O t h o 1111s~
~o111i1IISLVO f0r1110rlIL fi~lontik~jcctfor
Salvator I ~ J H '.l~'11(!. gol.go 100k0(l ~ l ~ ~~r~kO,o l t l IyL, I I ~t l ~ r o r ~ t ( \ ~ ~ i r ~ ~ .
'1'110 C ~ I ~ ~ ~nnrl
K C ,itr~~tltxtic
'~
r13olrg towcare11I I I I I I O H ~1 1 0 r ~ 1 0 1 ~ d i o ~C J~I ~l u r l ~
llotll H ~ I ~ O HlrliLllJ'
,
01' t,tllllll tlllit0 H(1, to 1111 ~?111J~I11011HI10ir;hk. TI10
forcgrtr~l~ltl
ISIIH
occnl)iotl 11ytho n k ~ l i l l o ~of~ ut11(!i l l - f ~ ~ L~L o, ( I~O ~lH ~
t ~ n d\rtil,ll 1110 Itbrginr I'ornis of c s i ~ l n ccult1
l ~ IIOI'HOH.
All a~+o,~rld
1
1 1 o ~ .h " v1~110yof LIMJ H I I I L ~ ~ of
W iIc~11111" i t IIILH illtleod ;
rrmd ovaryorru rolt norisiLly ruliuvod \YIIUII \VU O I I I O P K O ~ frorn it."
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wards, the defile gradually narrowed, and t h e Ghalzis
were observed hastening t o crow11 the heights ill
considerable forcc. A hot fire mns openecl on tho
advance, wit11 wlioln tvei9e several liidies, wlio, seeing
their only clinricc mas to kcel) t~iemselves in rapid
motion, gnllopccl fortvmcl a t the head of all, rtuiniug
the gauritlet of the enemy's bullets, wliicli ~vhizzeil in
hundreds abont thcir cws, mltil they wc1.0 fairly o u t of
the pass. Providci~t;i,zllytlie whole csc:~ped, ~ v i t h the
exception of Lady Sale, wllo rcccivcd n slight w o u n d
in tlic arm.* I t ougllt, however, to bc meutionecl, that
several of Mullammad Ak11a~'s cliief adherents, wllo
11ad pycceclcd tllc ndvn~icc,escrterl tlicniselves s t r e n u ously t o l<ccl)ilowii tllc fire; hut rlotliiilg could r e s t r a i l ,
tlle Glialzi~,mllo sccilicrl fully tlctcrmiueil tlint noboaY
sliould iiltcrferc to ilisnppoiiit tlicm of' their p r e y .
Orlward lnoved tlic cro~vclirito tlie tliiclrcst of the f i l ~ ~ ,
nnd fcnrfiil tvas tlic slaughter that ensued. iln universal panic sl)cedily prcvniled, a i d tliousnnds, seelci~lgrefilgc in fliglit, hnrricd ior\vnrcl to the front, &andotling bnggage, arms, nmmmiition, womcn, and
cliilill.ca, rcgarcllcus for tlie moment of e v e r y t h i n g
hut thcir ow11 livcu.
Tlie rear-guarcl, consisting of I-Ier Majesty's 44th
# Tho ~ l i t h o r ' eliLtlo boy (now LL Mojor of Artillory in Bollgal),
who wnn ~ t n y q i o t lo n tho lmck ti[ n, fuitl~fulAfg1~Ln ~orvant,had o,
vory nurrow OMC(IIIO, u ~ ~ i lto
l g t110 a~linlalfulli~igu ~ i dthrowing t h e m
off iu. tho ~iiicltlloof Ll~o11nfls.
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and L$tli Native Infantry, suITercd severely; and at
last, finding that delay was oilly dcstruction, they followed the general eekamplc, ant1 made the best of tlieir
way to the Iront. Another I-Iorse Artillery gun was
abandonccl, and thc whole of its urtillcryrncii slain.
Captain Anderson's cldest girl,* nncl Captain Boyd's
youiigest boy, fell into tlie liancls of tlic Afglilil~s.
It is supposcd that three i,housantl souls pcibishcd in thc
pass, amongst whom wci-e Captain Puton, AssistautQuartermaster-Gcllernl; ancl Licutcriallt St. Geovge,
37th Native Infantry; Majors Gvi&tl~s, 37th Native
Infantl-y, ancl Scott, liter Majesty's 44,tli; Captains Botl,
5th Cavdry, and T r o y, Brigadier-Major Slfilh's force.
Dr. Cuvrlew and Licutcnant Xturt, ciilgincei,~, wcrc
wounded, the latter mortally. This fine you~igofficer
had nearly cleared tlie defile when he ~eceivedhis wound,
'ancl would have becn left on tllc grouiirl to bc liaclcccl
to pieces by the G1i:izis who i'ollomcrl in the rear to
coml~letetlie work of slaughter, bnt for tlic gelierous
intrepidity of Lieutenant Meiri of IIer Majesty's 13th
Light Infantry, who, 011 learning what liar1 befallen him,
went back to his succour, and stoocl by llim for several
minutes, at tlie i~nmirientrisk of his own life, vainly entreating aid from tlie passers by. I-Ie was at lerigtli
joined by Sergeant Dean of tlic sap per^, witli vlioac

*

6110 ma8 rocovororl o n tho lot11 of &f&yfollowing, 11nving I,OQII
mcnnwhilo mout 1;indly truntocl in tho fttn~ilyof NnwiLb Bimirn
IChdn &at; Kdbul.
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assistauce he dragged his friencl on a q~tiltthrough the
remainder of the pass, when he succeeded in mounting
him on a miserable pony, ancl coilductcd him in safety
to camp, where the unfortunnte ofTicer lingerecl till the
following morniag, ancl was the only inwi of tlie whole
force ~vlioreceived Cliristian bu~ial. Lieutenant Mein
mas liimself at this very time suflcriug. from a dangerous
October,
wouncl in the liead, received iiz the previo~~s
and his lieroic ilisrcgard of self, ancl ficlelity to liis friend
in thc llonr of ilnnger, are well deserving of a record ill
thc annals of Bviti~jlivnlour nncl virtue.;{:
On tlie force reacliing IClit1l.d-IC6b~11,snow began to
rail, and coiitinucd till morning. Only four small
tents mcre saved, of \vhicli one belongcd to thc General :
two mere dcvotcd to the lnilics and cllildren, nud one
\vas givcn up to tllc tiiclr ; but all irumciise numllcr of
poor ~vouudcdwretclics wnndcrecl about tlic camp dcstitute of sheltcr, aud llerishcd duririg tlie night.
Groniis of iliisery and distrcss assaileil tlic car from all
quarters. 'VVe had ascelided to a still colder climate
than nre liad leCt bchincl, and were without tents, fuel,
or food : tlic s n o 1 ~was
~ tlie only bed for all, nncl of innny,
crc morl~ing,it provcd tElc zoindin,q-sheet. I t is olily marrellout.1that :my ~lioulilhnvc survived tlint fearS111 night !
Jr~x7larySt?&.-Anotlicr moriii~igda~vncd,nnralrening

*

Tlio nbnvo l ~ a s ~ n f 'ivnR
o r ~ ~ l o t l)y
a ~ lSir Robert I'rol, tlloll Plriliio
Minislor of Engl:iild, in tho 1 1 0 ~ ~
of0 Comn~one. LionLcna~~i,,
nonv
Colonol, Moin still ~ u r v i v oon
~ tho activo lint.

tliousands to increased misery ; and many a wretched
survivor cast loolrs of envy at his comracles who lay
stretched beside him in the quiet sleep of death.
Dayliglit was the signal for a renewal of that confusion wliich attended every movcmeiit of tlie force.
The General had intended us to marc11 at 10 A.hI., but
a, large portion of the troops, with nearly all the
camp-followers, moved off without orders at 8 a . ~ . ,
and had advanced about a inilc from the camp, when
they were recalled by tlie Gcneral, in consequence of
a comrnullication from Mulinmmad Alrbar I<h&ii, who
promiscd to use every endeavour to furnish us with
supplies, but strongly recommended us to halt until he
could make some proper arrangemellts for escorting us
down safely. Therc can be no doubt that the geiierd
feeling in camp was adverse to a halt, tl~ere being
scarcely eveti a native soldier who dicl not plainly pcrceivc that our only chalice of cscape consistcd in
moving on as fast as possible. This additional rlelny,
therefore, and prolongation of their sufferings in tlle
snow, of wliicli one marc march mould have carried
them clear, made a very ulifavourablc iml~rcssioil011
tlic minds oC the native solrliery, who now for the first
time began verj genei..ally to entcrtaiu thc idea of deserting; nor is it at all astonislling that these symptoms
should have first developed themselves amo~igstthe
ShrihJs native cavalry, who were, for tlie most part,
exceedingly young soldieys, ancl foresaw full well tlie
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fatal result of all these uscless and pcrnicious delays.
The love of life is strong in every brcast.
Tliese men had hitherto behaved remarkably well,
notwithstanding the numerous efforts that liad been
made to detach them from their duty; and, if their
fealty at last gave place to the instinct of self-preservation, be it remembered in their favour, that it was not
until the position of the force, of which they formed a
part, had become altogether desperate beyond the reach
of cure.
Towards noon Captain Slcinner arrived in camp with
a proposition from Muharnmacl Alcbar ICldn that all
the widowed ladies and mwu.ried families, whose destitute
situation ill camp rendered them objects of universal
pity and sympathy, sliould at once bc made over to
his protcction, to preservc thein horn further hardships
and dangers ; i n this case he promiserl to escort them
down safely, lreeping them one dayJs march in rear of
the army. Tlie General, though not himself disposed
to placc inucli confidence in Muharnmacl Alrbar's friendly
professions, mas strongly recommended by Captain
Slcinner to trust him on the present occasion, as he
felt assured that such a mark of confidence would
be attended with happy results to the wllolc force.
Anxious at all events to save the ladies and children
from fwthcr suffering, tlie General gave his consent
to the ai~angcment, and told Captain Slcinncr to prepare all the married officers and ladies to depart imme-

18

diately with a party of Afghgn horse, who were in
w a i t i ~ gto receive them. His intention also was that
all the wounded officers in camp should have had the
option of availing themsdves of the same opportunity to
seek Muhammad AkbarJs protection; but the others
were hurried off by the AfghBns before this had become
generally known, and o d y two were in time to join
them.*
Up to this time scarcely one of the ladies had
mated a meal since leaving KiLbul. Some had infants
a few days old at the breast, and were unable to stand
without assistance. Others were so far advanced in
pregnancy, that, under ordinary circumstances, a walls
across a drawing-room would have been an exertion;
yet these helpless women, with theh young families,
: had already been obliged to rough it on the baclss of
camels, and on the tops of the baggage yfib6s : those
who had a horse to l-icle, or were capable of sitting on
one, were considered fortunate indeed. Most had been
without shelter since quitting the cantonment-their
~lervantshad nearly all deserted or been killed-and,
'with the excel3tion of Lady Macnaghten and Mrs.
Trevor, they hacl lost all their baggage, having nothing
I

*

Cnptdn Troup, Brigadier-Major, Bhbh'~forco, and Lieutenaiit
Mein, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, who went as Lady Snle's
protector.
LieuLenants Wdlap and Eyre were likewise suffering from severe
and painful wounds received in notion at Khbnl, which totally
disabled them from active service.
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in the world left but the clothes on their backs; those,
in the case of some of the invalids, consisted of nightdresses in which they had started from IC6,bul in their
litters. Under such circumstances a few more hours
woulcl probably have secn some of them stiffening
corses. The oEer of Muhammad Albar was consequently their only chance of preservation. The husbands, better clothed and hardy, would have infinitely
preferred taking their chance with the troops; but
where is tlie man who would prefer his own safety,
when he thought he could by his presence assist and
console those near and clear to him 1
It is not therefore woncle~fulihat, from persons so
circumstmced, the General's proposal should have met
with little opposition, althougll it was a matter of
serious doubt whether tlic whole were not rushing into
the very jaws of death, by placing themselves at thc
mercy of a man who had so lately imbrued his hande
in the blood of a British Envoy, wl~omlie had lurecl to
clestruetion by similw professions oE peace and goodwill.
But whatever may have beell the secret intent of
Akbas's heart, he was at this time our professed friend
and ally, having u~ldertalcen to escort the wl~oleforce
t o JallilAbfid, in safety. Whatever suspicions, therefore, have becil cntcrtained of his hypociisy, it was not
in tlie character of an enern9 that he gained possession
of the married families ; on the contrary, he stood

18
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pledged for their safe escort to Jall6lBbitd, no less
than for that of the army to which they belonged;
and by their unwarrantable detention as prisoners, n o
less than by the treacherous massacre of the force,
he brolce the universal law of nations, and was guilty of
an unpardonable breach of faith. Shortly after fie
departure of the married families, it was discovered t h a t
the troopers of the ShBh's Irregular Cavalry and of t h e
Mission Escort were deserting in great numbers, having
been enticed away, as was supposed, by Mnhammad
Akbar, to whom a message of remonstrance was in
consequence sent. He assured the General, in reply,
that not only would he refrain from enticing the men
away, but that every futwe deserter from our camp
should be shot.
Meanwhile a large body of Afghjn horse had been
observed in the vicinity of camp, i n company with
the cavalry descrters; and, fears being entertained
that it was their design to attack the camp, a general
parade of the troops was ordered for the pwpose of
repelling them. The 44th Foot at this time was
found to muster one hunched files, and the native
infantry regiments, on an average, about sixty files
each. Of the Irregular I-Iorsc not abovc one hundred
effective troopers remained, and the 5th Light Cavalry,
though more faithful to their salt, had been reduced by
casualties to about seventy fighting-men. On the
arrival of Muhammad Akbar's answer to the GeneraYs
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mcssage, the opportunity was tdren of the troops being
paraded, to explain to them its purport, and to warn
them that every inan ~ r h omight be discovered cleserting would be shot. At this very time, a clmprassi
of tlic Mission, being caught in the act, was instantly
shot, as an exainple to the rest, by order of the
General, nncl the crime thus rcceived a salutary check.
Captain Maclray, having becn chosen to convey to
General Snle a, hesh order for the evacuation of
JalltllBfiid, was sent over i n thc evcning to the Sirdir
with that view. The promiscs of Muhammad Alrbar
t o provicle food and fncl mcrc unfulfilled, and another
night of starvation and cold consigned more victims to
a miserable death.
J u n u u ~ y1Otl~-At brcali of day all mas again coiifusion, the troops aiid camp-followers crowding promiscuously to the front so soon as tlie ordcrs for a
march mcrc givcn, evcry oiie dreading, al~oveall things,
t o be left in tllc rear. The Europcail soldiers were
now almost tlie only cfBcicrit nicn Icft, thc IIincllist~nis
having all sufferccl more or less from thc effccts of
frost iii thcir huiids and fcct ; fern mere able even to
hold a musl;ct, much less to pull a trigger ; in fiact,
t h e prolorigcd clclny in tlic sriolv had paralyscd tlie
mcntnl and bodily polvers of tlic stro~igcstmen,
&ring tllcnl iiicapal~lcof any uscful exertion. I-Iope
seeixiccl t o liavc died ~ I evcry
L
breast.
The advancecl gnard (conuistirig of l I c r Majesty's
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44th Foot, the sole remaining Horse Artillery gun,
and about fifty troopers of the 5th Cavalry) having
managed witli much difficulty to push their way to
the front, proceeded a couple of miles without molestation, as far as a narrow gorge between the precipitous spurs of two hills, through which flowed a
smaU stream. Towards this point numbers of Afghhn
foot had been observed hurrying, with the evident
intention of opposing the passage of thc troops, and
were now found to occupy the height on the right in
considerable force. NO sooner did the advance approach within shot, than the enemy, securely perched
on their post of vantage, commenced the attack,
pouring a destructive fire upon the crowded column, as
it slowly drew nighto the fatal spot. Fresh, numbers
fell at every volley, and the gorge was soon choked with
the dead and dying : the unfortunate Sepoys, seeing
no means of escape, and driven to utter desperation,
cast away their arms and accoutrements, which only
clogged their movements without contributing to their
defence, and along with the camp-followers fled for their
lives. The Afghfins now rushed down upon their helpless
and unresisting victims, sword in hand, and a general
massacre took place. The last small remnant of the
Native Infantry regiments were here scattered and
destroyed; and the public treasure, with all the remaining baggage, fell into the handa of the enemy.
Meanwhile, the advance, after pushing through the
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Tangi with great loss, had reached Kabar-i-Jabfir,
about five miles aheacl, without more opposition.
Here tliey halted to enable the rear to join, but, from
the few stragglers who from time to time came up, the
astounding truth was brought to light, that, of all who
had that morning marched from Khurd-ICitbul, they
were almost the sole survivors, nearly the whole of
the main and rear columns having been cut off and
destroyed. About fifty I-Iorse Artillery men, with one
12-pouncler howitzer, seventy iilcs Her Majesty's 4$th,
and one Elunclred and fifty cavalry troopers, now composed the whole 1C:ibul force; but, notmitl~standing
the slaughter and dispersion that had taken place, the
camp-followers still llormed a considerable l~ody.
The app~oachof a party of AfghAn liorse induced
the General to draw up his little force in line, preparatory to an expected attack ; but on its being n.scertaineil to be Muhammad Altbar IChLn and his followers,
Captain Skinner Tvas despatched to remonstrate with
him on the attack on our troops after a treaty had
been entered into and their safety guaranteed.
I n reply, hc expressed his regret at what had occurred, but saicl that, notwithstanding all his endeavours,
he found it impossible to restrain the Ghalzis, who were
in such a state of cvcitement as to be l~cyondthe control cvan of their own chiefs. As a last resource, he
recommended that tlie few remaining troops should lay
down their arms, and place themselves entirely under

his safe-guard, in which case he could ensure their safe
escort t o JallBliil,Bd; but that as the camp-followers
still amountcd to some thousands, aild far out-nurnl~crc~l
his own people, there was no altcrnativc but to leavc
them to tlxcir fate. To tliese terms the General could
not bring himself to consent, aiicl tlie desperate marc11
was resumed. IIerc Captain Maclcay rejoined the
troops, as the Sirdiir considered it impossible for him at
presen-1; to iualce his way safe to J:~llBl$bAd.
About five more rnilcs led down tlie steep descents of
the 1 3 d t ICotal, into a narrow dcfilc, or coniii~cdbcd
of a mountain strcam.
A ghastly sight here met the eye, the ground being
strewn with the bodies of a iiumber of camp-followers,
with whom were several wounded officers and solcliera,
who, having gone on ahend of tlie columii, were attacked
on reaching the foot of the hill, and massacred. Tlie
hcights commanding tlie defile (mhicli was about tlircc
miles long) were fou~ldcrowned with the cnemy.
Muhammad Alcbai, and his train llad talcen a short cut
bver t h e hi11s to Tixin, and were followed by the few
remaining troopers of thc Irregular Cavalry. Dr. Magrath, seeirig them talcc, ns hc thought, a wrong dircction, lmstened to recall tliem, and was t:Jcen prisoner
by a Ghalzi cllief. I n tlicir passage rIowii tlie rlcfilc, a
destructive fire was niainta~iricdon tlic troops from tlic
heights on cithcr side, and frcsli nu~nbcrsof dcad and
woundecl lined tlie course of the stream. Brigndior
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Sllclton commanded the rear with a fcw Europeans,
and but for his persevering energy and unflinching
fortitucle in repelling tlie assailants, it is probable the
~ 1 1 0 would
1 ~ have becn therc sacrificed.
Tlie diminislied remnant rcachcd the encampingground in the Tiail1 valley at about 4 P.M., having lost
sincc starting from ICLbul, inclusive of camp-followers,
about t~vclvetl~onsnndmen ; no less than fifteen officers
jvcre Billed and woundcd in tlzis day's disastrous
marcll.
Altllougli it was now sufficiently plaiu that Muham~ n a dAliba~citlicr could not or ~rrouldnot act up to
hi^ fric11(11y profcssio~is,the General eendeavonretl to
rencw his Tvorsc than uscless negotiation with that
chief, i11 tlic Saint liope tlii~tsomething might still bc
done to 11cltcr tllc situation of tlic troops ; but Cal~tain
Ski~iilrr,\vllo was dcputcd on tllc occasion, retwned
~vitliprecisely the sallic arlslver as before; and as the
Qcncral could not 111 lioilour accccle to his prollosal, all
Iiol~cof sic1 from that y a r t c r was at an exid.
It ~vasxiow clctcrmined to ~naltcan cffort, under
covt:r of d:~i'lillc~~,
to rcacli Jagdala~lt, a c1ist:~nceof
twenty-two rnilcs, by an carly hour on tlic following
moniing, tlic principal ol~jcct11cixlg to gct tlirougl~the
strong and dnngcrouw pass of that ~ ~ l n cbcfore
c
the
crlcrlly slioultl havc sufIiciciit iioticc of thoir intention,
to occnl)y it ill any forcc. Arj tllcrc csistcd a sliort cut
from 'l'iziil to Jilgclrrlalr ovcr tllc hills, tlic success of

282 TED

KABUL INSURREC'l'ION Ol?

1841-42.

the attempt was very doubtful ; hut the lives of all depencled on the issue; and at 7 P.M. the little band
renewed its forlorn ancl dismal mnrch, word having
been previously scnt to M~~harnmacl
Alcbar tlint i t mas
the General's intention to move only as fir as Sch
B&bii, distant scven miles. On moving off" the last
gun was al~andonccl,and wit11 it Dr. Cardew, wllo
hacl becn lnshcd to it in tlie liopc of savitlg him. This
gentleman Ilacl rcndcrcd llimself consl~icuouufrom the
commencement of tlie siege for his zeal and g:~lla~~~ltry,
and had become rt grcat favourite mith thc soldicry in
coneequence, by whom his llaplcss fatc was sinccrcly
lamented. Dr. D d , tlie superintending snrgcorl of
the force, experiencccl no better fort~~ne,
being left in
a state of utter exhaustion on the road miclway to Seh
B5ib&. Little or no molestation was esyerienced by
the force until renching Seh B;Tb6, whcn a few shots
being fired at the rear, thcre was a11 iimmcdinte rush of
camp-followers to the front, atid thc main boily of the
44th European solclicrs, who llacl hitherto been mcll iu
advance, getting mixed up in the crowd, could not be
extricated by ~vithclmmingthctn to the renz; owing to
the narrowness of the road, whicll now trnvcrscd the
hills to Barilt-6b. Boclies of thc ncighbouring tribes
mere by this timc on tllc alert, and fiilcd at raudom
from the heights, it being foi%uuatcly too (lark for
them to aim with prccision; hut tlle pa1~rlic-siric:lten
cnmp-followers now resemblccl a llcrd of startled ilcer,
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and fluctuated baclrwards and forwards, en
at
every shot, blocking up the entire road, and fatally retarding the progress of the little body of soldiers who,
under Brigadier Shelton, brought up the rear.
At Barilr-&b a heapy fire was encountered by the
hindmost from some caves neay the road-side, occasioning fresh disorder, which continued all the way to
Rattar-Sang, where the advance arrived at dawn of
day, and awaited the junction of the rear, which did
not take place till 8 A.M.
January lltl~.-The distance from Jagdalak was still
ten milcs ;the enemy already began t o crowd the surrounding heights, and it was now evident that the delay
occasioned by the camp-followers had cut off the last
chance of. escape.
&om ICattar-Sang to Jagdalak it was one continued
conflict ; Brigadier Shelton with his brave little band,
in the rear, holding overwhelming numbers i~ check,
and literally performing wonders. But no efforts could
avail to ward off the withering fire of jazails, which
from all sides assailed the crowded column, lining the
road with bleeding carcasses. About 3 P.M. the advance
reached Jagdalak, and took up its position behind some
ruined walls that crowned a height by the road-side.
To show an imposing fiont, the officers extended themselves in line, and Captain Grant, Assistant AdjutantGeneral, at the same moment received a wound i n the
face. ' From this eminence they cheered their comrade.
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under Bligadier Shelton in the rear, as they still
struggled their way gdantly dong every foot of ground,
perseverillgly followed up by their merciless enemy,
until they arrived at their ground. But even here rest
mas deuicd them; for the Afghfins,immediately occupfing two hills which commanded the position, kept up
a fire froin ~vhichthe walls of the incloswe affordedbut
a partial shelter.
[" It lnay interest the reader to peruse the following
utterance of General Shelton himself, at Gosport, in
Jmu;try lR(1.4, on the presentation of new colours to
the 44th Regiment :["When the Europeans were left to their own
resources, the men of the &th showed their sterling
worth;-from that moment I assumed the command of
the rear-guard) and in going through the Tidn pass,
annoyed by a galling and destructive fire from the heights
on both flanks, and ~vheli crowds of savage Ghalzis
rushed like n torrent upon the rear) this brave little
band, obedient to my voice, halted, faced about, and
repelled the appalling numbers of the enemy under a
tremendous fiife, with a boldness and determined
courage that might have extracted admiration from
the very stones under their feet ; and thongli they had
been now four days and four nights on the snow, these
noble fellows performed a forced march of tmo days
and one night, without halting-repelling the incessant
attacks of the enemy, under a dest~uctivefire that
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strewed the whole line of road with the dead bodies of
thcir comracles, with a constancy and unyielding courage
that mill command my admiration and respect so long
as I live; and what I now state, was under my own
personal observation. No man ever thought of surrender, but all fell gloriously with their arms in t h e i ~
hands,
fighting to the last, and only sixteen remained of the
number that marched from ICAbul."]
Tlle exllaustcd troops aiid followers now began to
suffer greatly fiom thirst, which they were unable to
satisfy. A tcmpting stream tricklecl near the foot of
the hill, but to ventye clown to it mas cert8n deatli.
Some snow that covered tlie ground was cageilly devoured, but increased, instead of alleviating, theh
suffeiings. Thc ram flesh of three bulloclrs, mllicli had
fortunately been saved, was servccl out to the soldiers,
and ravenously swallowed. At about half-past 3
a messagc having becn brought from M~thalnlnadAlrbar
to Captain Slrinner requesting his presence, that officer
promptly obeyed the call, hoping tlierel)y, even cut the
eleventli hour, to effect some arrangement for tlie preservation df tliose wlio surviverl. The harassed and
worn-out troops, in the expectation of a temporary
truce cluing his absence, tllrcw themselves down to
snatch a brief repose; but even this much-needed
luxury was denied them by their vigilant foes, who now,
from their commanding position, poured into the
crowded inclosure death-dealing volleys in rapid suc-

cession, causing the utmost consternation among the
terrified followers who rushed wildly out in the vain
hope of finding shelter from the fire. At this perilous
juncture Captain Bygrave, with about fifteen brave
Europeans, d i e d forth in the full determination to
drive the enemy from the heights, or perish in the
attempt. Unflinchingly they charged up the hill, the
enemy retreating before them in the greatest trepidation. The respite, however, thus signally gained was
of but short duration, for the heroic little band had no
sooner returned than the enemy re-occupied their posts
of vantage, and resumed their fatal fire. Thus passed
the time until 5 P.M., when Captain Slrinner returned
from his interview with Muhammad Altbar, bringing
a message to the General from that chief, who requested his presence at a conference, and demanded
Brigadier Shelton and Captain Johnson as hostages
for the evacuation of JallQcibbid. The General, seeing
no alternative, made over temporary command to Brigadier Anquetil, and dcparted with the two abovenamed officers under the escort of Muhammad Sh&h
IChhn. The troops witnessed their departure with
despair, having seen enough of Afgh&n treachery to
convince them that these repeated negotiations were
mere hollow artifices designed to engender confidence
in their victims, preparatory to a fresh sacrifice of
blood. The General and his companions were received
by the Sirdrir with every outward tolcen of kindness,
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cession, causing the utmost conatcriiation among the
terrified followers who rushed wildly out in the vain
hope of firlcling shcltcr from t?ic RPC. At this perilous
juncture Capt:ril~ Bygrave, tvith shout fifteen brave
Euro~)ca~iu,
sallied forth in the f~llldcterlniuation to
drive tlie cnetny from the hciglrtu, or pcrish in the
&%tempt. Unllinchingly they charged rrp the hill, the
enemy retreating l~eforethem in tltc greatcut trepiiiation. Tllc respite, howcver, thus signally gained l v w
of but sftort duratiotl, for the Iieroic little E~srld11:d no
sooner returned than thc enemy rc-occupied their posts
of vautage, ar~rf rcsumed their fatal fire. Thus passed
the time until 5 P.M., when Captain Skiriner returned
from his interview with &Iufietrrrmar3 Akbar, bringing
a message t o the General from that chief, wfio requested his presence at a conference, a i d demanded
Brigarlier SIielton and Captain Johnson as hostages
for thc evacuation of Ja1l:ildbrid. The Gencml, seeing
no alternative, made over temporary eorxln~andto Brigadier Anquctil, and cleparted with tfrc two abovenarnerl officers under the escort of 3luhrtmmad Sh&h
KhBn. The troops witnessed their rlepclrture 4 t h
despair, having sccn enough of Afgldn treachery. to
convince them that these repeated riegotiatiun.ii m r c
mere hallow &ifices dcsigne.rl, to engender confiiienoe
in their victims, preparatory to s, frcrak sacrilticc of
biootl. Thc General and his compsnioris wcrc received
by the Sirdkr with every outward token of kiradnem,

287

and no time was lost in supplying them with the bodily
sustenance they so greatly needed; they were likewise
assured that immediate arrangements should be made
for the supply of food to the famishing troops, and for
their safe escort to Jall&lAbAd, after which they were
shorn into a small tent, to enjoy, for the first time since
leaving Khurd-KiLbul, a quiet and refreshing sleep.
January 12th.-Numerous Ghalzi chiefs, with their
attendant clansmen, flocked in from the neighbouring
parts to pay their homage to Muhammad Akbar ;and
about 9 A.M. a conference was held, at which the three
British officers and all the influential chiefs were
present. All the latter were loud and profuse in
their expressions of bitter hatred against the English,
and for a long time the SirdBr's efforts to conciliate
them seemed to be unsuccessful; but the offer of two
lakhs of r6pis appeared at last in some measure to
appease them, of which sum Muhammad Akbar
promised to advance one lakh himself, and to be
security far the other. The day nevertheless wore
on without anything decisive having been agreed upon.
The General became impatient to rejoin his force,
and repeatedly urged the Sirdtir to furnish him with
the necessary escort, informing him at the same time
that it was contrary to British notions of military
honour that a general should be separated from his
troops in the hour of danger; and that he would
infinitely prefer death to such a disgrace. ' The Sirddr
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put him off with promises, and at 7 P.M., firing being
heard i n the direction of the pass, it was ascertained
that the troops, impatient of further delay, had actumoved off. From the time of the General's departure the situation of the troops had been in truth
one of dark and cruel suspense, unenlightened by one
solitary ray of hope. At an early hour in the morning,
before the enemy had yet made their appearance on
the hills, Major Thain, accompanied by Captain
Skimer, rode out a few hundred paces in the direction
of Muhammad Akbar's camp, in expectation of
meeting a messenger from the S i r d k to the last-named
officer;a Ghdzi soldier suddenly made his appearance,
and, passing Major Thain, who was several yards in
advance, went close up to Captain Skinner, and shot
him with a pistol through the face. Major Thain
instantly returned to camp, and announced this act or
treachery. The unfortunate officer was carried inside
the inclosure, and lingered in great pain till 3 P.M.
In him the State lost an officer of whose varied merits
as a soldier and a man it is difficult to speak too
higMy. A deep feeling of anguish and despair now
pervaded the whole assemblage. The extremes of
hunger, thirst, and fatigue were suffered alike by all ;
added to which, the Afghbns again crowned the heights
and recommenced hostilities, keeping up a galling fire
the whole day with scarcely half an hour's intermission.
Sally after sally was made by the Europeans, bravely
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led on b y Major Thain, Captain Bygrave, and Lieutenants Wade and Macartney; but again and again
the enemy returned to worry and destroy. Night
came, and all further delay in such a place being
useless, the whole sallied forth, determined t o pursue
the r o u t e to Jallhlgbbbd at all risks.
T h e sick and wounded were necessarily abandoned
to t h e i r fate. Descending into the valley of Jagdalalr,
they ~ u r s u e dtheir way along the bed of the stream
for a b o u t a mile and a half, encountering a desultory
fire f r o m the Ghalzis encamped in the vicinity, who
were evidently not quite prepared to see them at such
an hour, but mere soon fully on the alert, some following u p the rear, others pressing forward to occupy
the pass. This formidable defile is about two miles
long, exceedingly narrow, and closed in by lofty
precipitous heights. The road has a considerable slope
upwards, and, on nearing the summit, further progress
was f o u n d to be obstructed by two strong barriers
formed of branches of the prickly holly-oak, stretching
completely across the defile. Immense delay and
confusion took place in the general struggle t o force a
Passage through these unexpected obstacles, which
gave ample time for the Ghalzis to collect in force.
A terrible fire was now poured in from all quarter-,
and a massacre even worse than that of Tang6 Thriki
commenced, the AfghAns rushing in furiously upon
the pent-up crowd of troops and followers, and com-
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put him off with promises, and at 7 P.M., firing being
heard in the direction of the pass, it was ascertained
that the troops, impatient of further clelay, had actually moved off. From the time of the General's departure the situation of the troops had been in truth
onc of dark and cruel suspense, unenlightened by one
solitary ray of hopc. At an early hour in the morning,
before the cncrny had yet made their appearance on
tllc hills, 3lnjor Thain, accompanied by Captain
Skinner, rode out a few hundred paces in the direction
of R!IuIian~mad AkbarJs camp, in expectation of
rneetiug a, messenger from the Sirdlir to the last-named
officer ; a Ghalzi soldier suddenly made his appearance,
and, passing Major Thain, who mas several yards in
advance, went close up to Captain Skinner, and shot
him with a pistol through the face. Major Thain
instantly returned to camp, and announced this act or
treachery. The unfortunate officer was carried inside
the inclosure, and lingered in great pain till 3 P.M.
I n liinz the State lost an officer of whose varied merits
as a soldicr and a man it is difficult to speak too
highly. A deep feeling of anguish and despair now
pervaded the v-hole assemblage. The extremes of
hunger, thirst, ancl fatiguc were suffered alike by all;
&c:d to ~vhicti,the Afgl~iinsagain crowned the heights
and recommenced hostilities, keeping up a galling firc
the whole day with scarcely half an hour's intermission.
Sally after sally was made by the Europeans, bravely
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led on by Major Thain, Captain Bygrave, and Lieutenants Wade and Macartney; but again and again
the enemy returned to worry and destroy. Night
came, and all further delay in such a place being
useless, the whole sallied forth, determined to pursue
the route to JallBgbdd at all risks.
The sick and wounded were necessarily abandoned
to their fate. Descending into the valley of Jagdalalr,
they pursued their way along the bed of the stream
for about a mile and a half, encountering a desultory
fire from the Ghalzis encamped in the vicinity, who
were evidently not quite prepared to see them at such
an hour, but mere soon fully on the alert, some following up the rear, others pressing forward to occupy
the pass. This formidable defile is about two miles
long, exceedingly narrow, and closed in by lofty
precipitous heights. The road has a considerable slope
upwards, and, on nearing the summit, further progress
was found to be obstructed by two strong barriers
formed of branches of the prickly holly-oak, stretching
completely across the defile. Immense delay and
confusion took place in the general struggle to force a
passage through these unexpected obstacles, which
gave ample time for the Ghalzis to collect in force.
A terrible fire was now poured in from aJl quarters,
and a massacre even worse than that of Tang6 TAriki
commenced, the Afghans rushing in furiously upon
the pent-up crowd of troops and followers, and com-
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rnitting wholesale slaughter. A miserahlp slndl remnant managed to clear the barriers. Twelve o6cers,*
amongst whom mas B r i ~ c l i c rAnrluetif, wcM: killed.
Upwards of forty t others s~~ecceclcd
in ptlslii~lgtllroilgh,
about twelve$ of wliom, being pretty wtbll ~nonnted,
rdeon
of the rcst n-ith t l ~ cfcsv rremaining
to
cavalry, intencling to m:~ke tlic h t of their
~ ~ l l ~ ~ b Slnall
;id,
1):irties of thi* Europc:~us
marelled on ulldcr diflcrcl~t officers :, t k : C'ork~~try
~ u f f c r ~little
d
nlole\fati@n
became more open, alicl
for several
lnost of the Uh:xlzr,is bc'i~igton busily
engaged in the pluncleririg of the dtb:kd to I)Xl!'Stle
living. But much delay was occbauioncd by the :inxiety
of the men to bring on their wouu<Icd raoxx1radc~,and
the rear was muell harassed by s~ldtienonsets
parties stationed on the heights, unrler which the road
occasiollally
On reacllirlg the Silrki'tb river,
they fourld the enemy in possession of the bridge, and
a hot fire was cnc.ountcreil i r ~crossing the 5irtl below
Lieutonant C:id~t, Ifer l;\lajesty's &l,th,
it, by
was Billed, together with sercsl.al plniv:ttcs.
Junuury 13t?/.-TI1c niorning rliinrlecl as they stpproached Gan<l;i~;l:lk,rt:veali~~gto the encblkly,t v h 0 frtd
by tElis tilne ir~crc:ist.d.considcr:ifjlg iln thvir Eroxrt and
rear, the insigr~ifiv:r~iceof their nuttlerical strength.
To avoid the ?~igurunsassaults tbet were now trlaik? by
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their confident foe, they were compeiilt~rlto Icave the
roa(1, and take up a defcrisive position on it lrvigt~tto
the left of it, where they rnatle a, rcant,ltrte stand,
deterrniried to sell their lives at the (lcart*ht possible
price. At this time they could only rurtnter about
twenty muskets.
Some Afgbhn horsemen, approaehitig from the
direction of Gandrimak, xvcrc tow 11ec.Bontvltts, and, an
atternpi was made by Lieutertant iIa1 ti, c9utrr rzl>on
some pacific c~rra~igerncut.IIo?ctiliticbsvt.rc* fix- n fc;w
minutes suspende(i, a~id,at tllr: in vita tic,^^ of 8 chief,
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135' 111'.
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their confident foe, they were compelled to leave the
road, and take up a defensive position on a height to
the left of it, where they made a resolute stand,
determined to sell their lives at the dearest possible
price. At this time they .could only muster about
twenty muskets.
Some AfghAn horsemen, approaching from the
direction of Gandiimak, were now beckoned to, and an
attempt was made by Lieutenant Hay to enter upon
some pacific arrangement. HostiIities mere for a few
minutes suspended, and, at the invitation of a chief,
Major Qriffiths, the senior officer, accompanied by Mr.
Blewitt to act as interpreter, descended the hill to a
conference.
Several -4fghhns now ascended the height, and assumed a friendly tone towards the little party there
stationed; but the calm was of short duration, for
the soldiers, getting provoked at several attempts
being made to snatch away their arms, resumed a
hostile attitude, and drove the intruders fiercely down.
The die was now cast, and their fate sealed; for the
enemy, taking up their post on an opposite hill,
marked off man after man, officer after officer, with
unerring aim. Parties of Afghiins rushed up at intervals to complete t h e work of extermination, but
were as often driven back by the still dauntless handful
of invincibles. At length, nearly all being wounded
rrlorc or less, a find onset of the enemy, sword in hand,
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terminated the unequal struggle, and completed the
dismal tragedy. Major Griffiths and Mr. Blewitt had
been previously led off to a neighbouring fort, and were
thus saved. Of those whom they left behind, Captain
Souter alone, with three or four privates, was spared,
and carried off captive,
having received a severe wound
in the shoulder; he had tied round his waist before
leaving Jagdalak the colours of his regiment, which
were thus miraculously preserved.
I t only remains to relate the fate of those few
officexs and men, who rode on ahead of the rest after
passing the barriers. Six of the twelve officers, Captains Bellem, Collier, Hopkins, Lieutenant Bird, Drs.
Harpur and Brydon, reached FuthAbibBd in safety, the
other six having dropped gradually off by the way and
been destroyed. Deceived by the friendly professions
of some peasants near the above-named town, who
brought them bread to eat, they unwisely delayed a
few moments to satisfy the cravings of hunger; the
inhabitants meanwhile armed themselves, and, suddenly
sallying forth, cut down Captain Bellew and Lieutenant Bird; Captains Collyer and Hopkins, and Drs.
Warpur and Brydon, rode off, and were pursued; the
three former were overtaken and slain within four
miles of JallBLb5d; Dr. Brydon by a miracle escaped,
and was the only officer of the whole Kfibul force who
reached that garrison i n safety.
Such was the memorable retreat of the British army
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from Kgbd, which, viewed in all its circumstances,-i n the political and military conduct which preceded
and brought about such a consummation, the treachery,
disaster, and suffering which accompanied it,- is,
perhaps, without a parallel in modern historj .*

* A most remarkable historical parallel may, however, be f o u n d
in Book V. of Casar's Commentaries, in the description there give11
of the insurrection of the G a d s under Ambiorix, wherein the R o m a n
general, Sabinns, figures as an exact prototype of Elphinstone, with
a n almost identical result in the details of unavailing valour, ending
in a hollow treaty with treacherous chieftains, a disorderly retreat,
of the Roman army, and its h a 1 annihilation.
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from Kfibul, which, viewed in all its circumstances,in the political and military conduct which preceded
and brought about such a consummation, the treachery,
disaster, and suffering which accompanied it,- is,
perhaps, without a parallel in modern history
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A most remarkable historical parallel may, however, be found
in Book V. of Czsar's Commentaries, in the description there given
of the insurrection of the Gauls under Ambiorix, wherein the Roman
general, Sabhus, figures as an exact prototype of Elphinstone, with
an almost identical result in the details of unavailing valoui-, ending
in a hollow treaty with treacherous chieftains, a, disorderly retreat
of the Roman army, and its h a 1 annihilation.
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CHAPTER XIV.
CAPTIVITY O F THE HOSTAGES.

[INthe early editions of this work the account of the
military operations which ended in the retreat and
destruction of the British army was followed b y
rough notes made by the author, descriptive of the
life i n captivity of himself and his comrades. After the
lapse of so many years it has not appeared advisable
to the author to encumber the work with details,
many of them trivial, the interest attaching t o which
has long since passed away. The chief incidents of
a public nature which followed the captivity of the
ladies and soldiers referred to in the foregoing narrative will be found related in the following pages
extracted from a memoir of the career of Sir Vincent
Eyre, published by the editor in the " Calcutta ReviewJ'
some twelve years ago. The reader will observe that
the extract begins with the incidents immediately preceding the surrender of Eyre, his wife, and thirty-seven
others as hostages to Muhammad Akbar.]
THENcame the retreat, with its attendant horrors,
rivalling those experienced by the French i n their

*.
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winter march from Moscow. Eyre's wound was still
intensely painful, and incapacitated him from mounting
a horse without assistance. To quote his own words :
" Deep snow covered every inch of mountain and plain
with one unspotted sheet of dazzling white, and so intensely. bitter was the cold as to penetrate and defg!
t h e defences of the warmest clothing." The thermometer stood at several degrees below zero; and men's
beards were coated with icicles. There was a mingled
multitude of four thousand five hundred fighting men
(including seven hundred European soldiers) and
twelve thousand native camp-followers, with their
women and children. Their route lay through the
Khurd-KiLbul pass, "a truly formidable defile, about
five miles from end to end, shut i n by lofty hills,
between whose precipitous sides the sun, at this season, could dart but a momentary ray." There, half
concealed behind rocks m d bushes, eager hordes of
armed Ghalzis lay in ambush for their prey. The
scene that ensued may be more easily imagined than
described. The treachery of the chiefs was but too
evident. Perched securely on high, the foe defied all
attempts to silence or dislodge them. It was necessary
t o run the gauntlet of their fire; and not less than
n the attempt.
three thousand souls perished i
Eyre and his family, consisting of wife and a little
boy, emerged safely from the gorge; the latter, being
strapped to the back of a faithful A f g h h servant on
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CIXAPTER XIV.
CAPTIVITY OF THE HOSTAGES.

:IN tlttb c:LI'I~ c*ititio~lsof this work the account of the
n1iilit:iq ojic~r:itioas rrllich ended in the retreat and
dc8tra~:tioli of the British army was followed by
rough IKJ~I*:, 11~:~cIc: by the author, descriptive of the
life in c:tlbtivity of Ilimsclf and his comrades. After the
lapse of so niany years it has not appeared
advisable
-to tltc author to ellcumber the work with details,
lrtulry trf fjiv1~1trivial, the interest attaching t o which
Itas lo~igsince ltasscd away. The chief incidents of
a ~)~zll,lEcfintiturc nf~iehf'ollol~ed the captivity of the
Isdies :nnlil holdicrs r e b r e d to in the foregoing narrativt: will Zic b'oxmd related i n the following pages
tbstracred fkom L: rricsnioir of the career of Sir Vincent
Eyre, ~,u"r'iihI~.rll~y
the cditor in the " Calcutta Review"
sorri~~ J B . I ~ Y C~ 'C : I ~ Y:go. The reader will observe that
t f l t b cbstr:icwf,1,egills with the incideuts immediately prec.nli~kgr s~rrrct~tIt!r
of Eyre, his wife, and thirty-seven
ctt1tc.r.s :is Itr,stilgt>sto Muhammad Akbar.]
If ' zit.^ I ~ ; I I I I Cthe rctrcat, with its attendant horrors,
ri~aiiirig tliuse crpcrienced by the French in their
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winter march from Moscow. Eyre's wound was stiU
intensely painful, and incapacitated him from mounting
a horse without assistance. To quote his own wbrds :
"Deep snow covered every inch of mountain and plain
with one unspotted sheet of dazzling white, and so intensely bitter was the cold as to penetrate and defy
the defences of the warmest clothing." The thermometer stood at several degrees below zero ; and men's
beards were coated with icicles. There was a mingled
multitude of four thousand five hundred fighting men
(including seven hundred European soldiers) and
twelve thousand native camp-followers, with their
women and children. Their route lay through the
Khurd-K&bul pass, " a truly formidable defile, about
five miles from end to end, shut in by lofty hills,
between whose precipitous sides the sun, at this season, could dart but a momentary ray." There, half
concealed behind rocks and bushes, eager hordes of
armed Ghalzia lay in ambush for their prey. The
scene that ensued may be more easily imagined than
described. The treachery of the chiefs was but too
evident. Perched securely on high, the foe defied all
attempts to silence or dislodge them. I t was necessary
to run the gauntlet of their fire; and not less than
three thousand souls perished in the attempt.
Eyre and his family, consisting of wife and a Little
boy, emerged safely from the gorge; the latter, being
strapped to the back of a faithful Afghhn servant on
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EYRE, MEIN, AND 8TURT.
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horseback, had a very narrow escape, owing to the
horse falling and throwing them both off when in the
Very middle of the pass. TO crown the misfortunes of
the day, snow began to fall, and thousands had to pass
the night without shelter, food, or fire. Only four
small tents were saved, under which some of the
women, children, and wounded found refuge. Eyre
and Lieutenant Mein sat up all night in attendance
on their dying friend Sturt, of the Engineers, who had
been mortally wounded in the pass. At her h ~ s b a n d ' ~
side his youthful bride also kept watch with them.
She was the daughter of the gallant Sale, and well
worthy of such a sire. To assuage Stert's burning
thirst, Eyre and Mein were obliged to wander, altern a t e l ~ , through the camp in search of fire to melt a
cupful of snow, and often before they could regain
the tent the contents had frozen again into a hard
mass. Sturt did not survive the night, and was buried
a t early dawn. Mein's disinterested devotion to his
wounded friend in hurrying back to save him at the
risk of his own life, and dragging him through the
pass under the enemy's fire, was justly extolled by Sir
Robert Peel in Parliament, who quoted the scene
ver6atim &om Eyre's book.
Meanwhile, Muhammad Akbar, like a vulture watching his prey, scanned every movement of the force
from the neighbowling heights. Shortly after the
retreat commenced, he had demanded that Pottinger
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horseback, had a, very nnrrov escape, owing to the
Ilorsc falling and tlirowillg tlicm both off when in the
very middle of thc pass. To crown tlic niisfortuxles of
the day, snow began to fail, and thousands had to pass
the night witl~outsf~cltc~r,focitl, or fire. Orily four
small tents wcrc saved, under hid^ sorilc of the
worllcn, c.hildl.erl, :uid ~ot11idr.0founci rufilgc. Eyre
and I ~ i c t ~ ~ e x i3Icin
a ~ l t sat up a11 11ight ill attendance
on their tlyi~iphiend Sturt, of t i ~ cI:1ig-i1icers, who had
t,ccl~rllurtnlly wouncietl i11 tlic pahs. * i t her husband's
side his youtllfirl bride :iIso 1ir.pt -cvatcIi wit11 them.
Shc was tlic d:tu;rliter of tht: pllallt Salo, and well
wortl~yof such a sirc. To as*uagc Yturt'a liwning
thirst, Eyre and ,Pleilr were ol~ligccito ~v:lnder, alternateIy, through the camp in seurth of fire to melt a
cupful of suow, and often before tliey cc~tlclregain
the tent the coute~tts bad fiuzeri again into a. hard
masa. Sturt ditl not burvivc tllc nigllt, and was buried
a t early da-n. lleilzss dihinterestcd devotion to his
~voundcdfiieud in hurrying back to save llinl at the
risk of Ilia om11 life, and dragging hini through the
yass u d e r the enemy's fire, was jtistly extolled by Sir
Robert Peel in I'arliameut, who quoted thc scene
verbutim from Ejrc's book.
BPeaavhile, 3lu2~an1ma(lAkbar, like a. vulture watching his prey, r;caulicd ever?; nlovenieiit of the force
fiunl tllc neigllif-louring lieiglits. Shortly after the
retreat commerlecd, lrlc had dema~lrledthat ll'ottinger

and two other officers should be given up as hostages,
and prompt compliance had been yielded. But still
he was not satisfied. The ladies, married families, and
mounded officers were next required to be made over
to his care, an assurance being given to the General
that by such a mark of confidence alone could the
chiefs be induced to provide for the wants of the force,
and to restrain their followers from acts of hostility.
The General himself, i n a memorandum which he
subsequently drew up, thus explains his own motives :
"I complied with his wish, hoping that, as from the
very commencement of negotiations the Sirdar had
shorn the greatest anxiety to have the married people
as hostages, this mnrlr of trust might elicit a corresponding feeling in him."
Eyre, on receiving a verbal order to prepare for
the departure of himself and family, sought the General,
in order to hear it from his o m lips. The poor
General mas greatly distressed, but, warmly pressing
his hand, urged him to mount and be off, as the escort
sent by Muhammad Akbar was impatient to start; so
there seemed to be no alternative. Muhammad
Akbar, although suspected of treachery, was then professedly our ally, with whom a treaty existed. Hostilities were therefore at an end, so far as he was
concerned. It was pretended, on his behalf, that the
Ghalzi chiefs on the previous day exerted themselves
in vain to restrain their followers. Captain Nicholl
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HIS REASONS FOR WRITING IT.

now commanded the artillery i n person, and Eyre felt
that his o a n presence could no longer be of any
service to the force. His obvious duty was to obey
the (icneral's wistles at all hazards ; he therefore departed with the new batch of hostages, consisting of
sevcu officers, ten Iadics, and twenty-two children.
Ait~ufig tliem were Ladies JI;tcni~gI~tenand Sale.
Couiltillg, tlien, scvcn officers left behind at Kiibul,
aritf tIrrci: made ovcr on the march, the chicfs Iirid now
gninect ~rossebsion of seventeen British officers, nomi11a11y as iiosi;iger for the fulfilment of the treaty.
12yrc alld Elis associates in misfortune remained as
captives in tllc L;rrids of Muhammad Alibar during
eight inid a, half months, Eyre occupying his leisure
irk recortli~lg,on such scraps of paper as he could collect,
the strange and stirring incidents which he had witnessed, while yet they were fresh in his own memory
and in the minds of his fellow-captives, from whom,
as ~ ~ u ns
l l from such public and private documents
as Iiad been saved and mere within his reach, he induxtrioilsly gleailed many important and interesting
l)iwticul:brs. His chief object in these labours was to
~dlace,as far as in him lay, the whole unvarnished truth
before tlne British public at tthc earliest practicable
opporturiitp. I-ic thus wrote to a friend: " I feel well
ah.~~trecl
that tlic more my statements are sifted, the
xtlorrt c'lcvirly will their truth be established in all
t:sst*atid pui~its. Hewen h o r n s I would give my

right hand that such events as I have described had
never occurred; but, having occurred, why should I
conceal them? I s the loss of an army nothing? Can
our national interests be advanced by glossing over
such unheard-of calamities and disgrace ? " I n another
letter he thus expresses himself: " I wrote my narrative
because it was at the time very doubtful whether any
of the chief actors would survive, and I felt an anxious
desire that, should me perish in captivity, the public
might be able to judge properly of the respective merits
of all concerned. I can boldly assert that there is not
a sentence which I do not believe to be strictly true."
Perhaps few narratives written. under such circumstances have so vell stood the test of time,* or have
met more general and lasting approval. W e have
little doubt that honest old Gascoignes the poet, who
underwent some similar experiences in his youth
during the wars in the Low Countries i n the sixteenth
century, very accurately expresses EyreJs feelings in
regard to his volume on Krihul in the following stanza
from the poem entitled " The Pruites of War" :
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Go, little booke ! God greunt thon none offende,
For so meant he who sought t o set thee forth,
And v h e n thon commest where soldiers seem t o wend,
Submit thyselfe a s writte but little worth.

* On one occasion, iluring his visit to Enrope in 1855-56, Eyre
happened t o be looking over the book-shelves of a, bookseller's shop
in Paris, when he suddenly came upon his own work, translated
into French. It is impossible to imagine a more pleasing surprise
t o a n author then such a discovery.
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Confesse withal that thou hast bene too bolde
To speak so plaine of hanghtio hartes in place,
And say that he which wrote thee couldo have tolde
Full many a tale of blouds that were not base.

I

The story of the captivity was appended to Eyre's
narrative in the form of a journal, and may still
be read with interest. W e must content ourselves
with a few of the more prominent episodes. On the
fourth day after their surrender to Muhammad Akbar
they were joined by the General himself, wit11
Brigadier Shelton and Captain Hugh Johnson, and
learned with profound dismay and grief that the remainder of the force had been gradually shot down in
the passes,. the chiefs having played them false eve11
to the end, notwithstanding all the concessions that
had been made. It was evidently Muhammad A k b d s
game to hold his captives as trump cards wherewith
to extort from the British Government better terms
for himself and country than he could well hope to
obtain by any other means at his disposal. Hence
they found themselves, on the whole, well treated,
although their anxieties were kept alive by the fact
that a small, though influential, section existed among
the Ghalzi chiefs who made no secret of their inclination to put the whole party to death; and whose
debates on this momentous subject were often carried
on in tones sufficiently loud to be overheard by their
intended victims.

THE EARTHQUAKB AT BADIABAD.
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Their first place of confinement was the fort of
BadifibibBd, in the district of LughmBn, a stronghold
of!one of these same Ghalzi chiefkains, having walls
twenty-five feet high, and lofty flanking towers, surrounded by a faussebraye and deep ditch. Here they
remained three months, during which they were
allowed to exchange letters with their friends in Jal1916bBd, where Sale still maintained his defensive
position. On February 19th they were alarmed by a
violent rocking of the earth, accompanied by a loud
subterranean rumbling sound; the lofty parapets
around them fell in with a thundering crash; the
dwelling-house waved and tottered like a ship at sea,
and all within it simultaneously rushed out into the
central court-yard, to find their terror-stricken Afghhn
keepers upon their knees, ejaculating loud prayers to
Allah for protection. It seemed as though the last
day had arrived. Eyre had a nsrrow escape from
being crushed to death by a mass of the wall, under
which he chanced to be standing while tending his
horse, which he had been permitted to retain.
The same earthquake levelled in a few seconds the
walls of defence which Sale's force had, with continuous
labour, repaired and strengthened at Jall&l&b&d. But
the Afghans were unprepared to take advantage of
the chance thus offered. On April 9th tidings reached
the captives that Muhammad Akbar's camp had been
surprised by Sale, and his force completely routed,
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DEATH OF ELPHIBSTONE.

MISSION OF COLIN MACHENBIE.

and on the following day they were hurried off
towards the mountains, after a sharp debate among the
chiefs on the expediency of destroying them at once.
Poor General Elphinstone, in his already shattered
state of health, could ill bear up under the fatigues
and privations he had to undergo, and died at Tizin
on April 23rd, " a happy release for him," says Eyre,
"from suffering of mind and body. Deeply he felt
his humiliation, and bitterly regretted the day when
he resigned the home-borne pleasures of his native
land to hazard the repntation of a proud name in a
climate and station for which he was physically unfit.',
The body was forthwith forwarded by Muhammad
Akl~arto General Pollock (by that time at JallLlAbAd)
for honourable interment-a tribute of respect to a
fallen foe highly creditable to the Afgh&ncbief.
On the following day Captain Colin Mackenzie was
despatched on a mission to General Pollock, taking
with him the first portion of Eyre's narrative. After
perusal by General Polloclr, it was forwarded by the
latter to Lord Ellenborough's private secretary, and
eventually to England for publication. Colin Mackenzic's ,journeys to and fro proved full of peril, for,
altllo~~gh
disguisecl as an Ai'gl-i;in ancl escorted by a
well-known and popular sort of Rob Eoy, or freebooter,
named Uutti, in the pay of Mulianlmad Akbar, whose
knowledge of that wild mountainous country and its
still. wilder inhabitants stood him in good stead, he was

in freqnent and imminent danger of discovery and
consequent death from parties of wandering Ghalzis,
whom they unexpectedly encountered, and who persisted in being unpleasantly inquisitive regarding the
suspicious-looking traveller, with his face and form so
closely muffled up in the folds of his turban and large
sheepskin cloak, leaving his eyes scarcely as visible
as those of the roughest Skye terrier, and whom it
was necessary to palm off as a sick chief of Peshawur
sent by Muhammad Akbar under Butti's escort o
his native place. One glimpse of the white skin
beneath his wide Afghhn trousers (which he found it
next to impossible to prevent from rising above his
knee) would have been his death-warrant. But Heaven
protected him.
The propositions whereof he was the bearer were,
that the British general should treat with Muhammad
Akbar as the acknowledged head of the AfghQn
nation; that there should be an exchange of prisoners,
including all on each side ; that the British should
retire from Afghgnistgn; and that General Pollock
should pay down a handsome douceur in money. I n
case of these arrangements being effected, Muhammad
Akbar would be glad to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the British. This, however,
was only his public message, but, in secret, Mackenzie
had been desired t o ascertain if a private arrangement
could not be made, to the effect that General Pollock
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should ensure an amnesty to Muhammad Akbar and
his followers for the past, and that the British Government should bestow on him a large jagir. In this
case he would willingly assist Pollock in reconquering
AfghAnistAn.
Mackenzie returned from his mission on May 3rd
without ha*g opened any prospect of release for the
captives, although the negotiation, as far as it went,
had been of a friendly nature. H e was immediately
despatched a second time with more moderate proposals, but again returned with an equally ineffectual
result. On May 23rd Muhammad Akbar removed all
his captives from the Zaudak valley to a fort i n the
vicinity of KiSbul. Here Mackenzie had nearly died
of typhus fever, the result of his recent fatigues and
exposure. Muhammad Akbar selected Major Colin
I
Troup as his next envoy, and he was absent in that
capacity from the 10th to the 27th of July, but brought
!1
baclc no definite reply. Pollock was, in fact, busy in
preparing for a n advance on Htibul, with ~ t r i n ~ ~ ~ t
instructions from Lord Ellenborough t o proceed with
his military preparations without reference t o any
negotiations. Meanwhile, typhus fever and dysentery
spread alarmingly among the captives, and, on A
U
~
~
7th, Captain John Conolly breathed his last. His
brother, the celebrated Arthur Conolly, had but recently been decapitated at Bukh&ra, after having been
confined at the bottom of a dry well, in company

~
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THE PRISOXERS SENT TO BAMIAN.

AEBAR.

1

i

I

~

~ t Colonel
h
Stoddart, for eighty days, without change
of raiment.
On August 23rd nine officers of t h e Ghazni garrison
joined the KAbul captives. Among them mas the
brave young Nicholson, destiiied t o a brilliant career
i n the PanjAb, and a hero's death sixteen years
later in the moment of victory a t Delhi. Me now
became Eyre's messmate, and beguiled the hours with
animated details of the scenes h e had witnessed
during the ineffectual defence of t h a t fortress; with
him, too, was Dr. Thomas Thomson, since risen to
eminence as a botanist and a traveller. On August
25th all were hui-ried off towards Bgmiiin, en. voute to
~ ~ U 1 linl Usbeg TBtary, with a threat held out that
they would be sold into bondage on arrival. Eyre 2nd
Maclcenzie were both at this time t o ill to travel 011
horseback, and were packed into a pair of panniers
to balance each other on each side of a camel, a mode
of travelling for invalids which their miserable experience on that memorable journey did not enable
them to recommend for general adoption, except in
cases where the penalty of torture has been incurred.
They had a strong escort, consisting of some four
~ hundred Afghtin soldiers, deserters from the British
service, under one SBah Muhammad, their former
subadar. Their route lay over the steep mountainpasses of Sufaid Kt&, Unai, Hiijigalc and Kiillu, the
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latter attaining an altitude of thirteen thousand four
hundred feet, whence Eyre describes the view as
"presenting a boundless chaos of barren mountains,
unequalled in wild terrific grandeur." The
valley of BAmiBn, beyond the Indian Caucasus, was
reached ou September 3rd.
And now, at the very time when hope began t o
yield to despair in all their breasts, and a life of
wretched slavery seemed their inevitable lot, aid came
from an unexpected quarter, and their speedy deliverance was at hand. Eyre thus tells the story in a
letter to a friend in Calcutta:"On Sunday, September l l t h , SBah Muhammad,
having received a positive order from Muhammad
Akbar for our immediate march to Kulum, our
desperate condition induced Pottinger to tempt him
with the offer of a bribe for our release. Captain
Johnson volunteered to be agent in the matter, and
found him more accessible than was expected. This
man had hitherto kept aloof from any attempt a t
friendly intercourse with the prisoners, towards whom
his manner had been invariably haughty and his
language harsh. Great, therefore, mas our astonishment to learn that he had been seduced from his
anegiance to Muhammad Akbar and bought o w r
to our side.
" Meanwhile, the rapid advance of the two English

'

30'7

armies upon Kgbul, and the probable defeat of Muhammad &bar, led us to expect that chief's arrival
among u s as likely to happen at any moment. It
was, therefore, necessary to be prepared against any
sudden surprise. The Hazarah chiefs i n the vdley
were sounded and found favourable to our scheme.
The men composing our guard were gained over by a
promise of four months' pay. A new governor was
set up over the Hazarah province by Major Pottinger,
t h e existing governor being too much i n Muhammad
Akbar's interests to be trusted.
" On September 16th the country was considered
sufficiently safe to admit of our setting out on our
return towards Kgbul. W e had only proceeded a few
miles when a messenger met us wlth the news of
General Pollock's victory over Alrbar, which cheering
intelligence was shortly afterwards confirmed by a note
from Sir Richmond Shakespear, who was hastening
t o our assistance with six hundred KazilbAsh horsemen. O n the 17th me recrossed the Kith pass, and
encamped about three miles from its base. We had
been here about two hours, when horsemen were descried descending the pass of Hhjigak. Instantly SBah
Muhammad's men were on the alert and formed up
i n line. Judge of our joy when the banner of the
Kazilb6sh was distinguished streaming in the air,
and imagine, if you can, with what emotions of delight
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and gratitude we eagerly pressed forward to greet our
gallant countryman, Sir Eichmond Shakespear, who
soon came galloping up to where we stood. For the
first time after nine miserable months of thraldom
we felt the blessedness of freedom. To God be all the
glory, for IHe alone could bring it to pass ! "
There was still some danger that Muhammad Alcbar
might intercept their flight, but at Shakespear's suggestion Pollloclr despatched Sale's brigade to meet them
at Kot-Ashrd. All doubt was then at an end; they
were once morc under the safe-guard of British troops,
who lined the heights 6f Sufaid KhAlc and who raised
hearty cheers of welcome as tile procession threaded
the pass; among them most conspicuous rode the
gallant Sale, with his long-lost wife and daughter by
his side.
On the 21st Pollocli's camp at RBbul mas reached,
where the Horse Artillery guns fired a salute in houow
of the event, and tlius happily terminated the tragedy
of the KBbul insurrection.
The cvents of those days have still such a thrilling interest for British readers that we have been tempted to
linger perhaps too long over that portion of Eyre's
career in connection with which his name first became
familiarly known. I t was his strange destiny to
witness the " Alpha '' and " Omega " of the downfall
of the old Sepoy army; for it is now generally admitted that the first seeds of the mutiny of 1857 were

3
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sown i n the K6bul campaign. I n allusion to this,
Kaye, i n his " Sepoy War," declares : "The charm of a
century of conquest was then broken. The Sepoy
regiments, no longer assured and fortified by the sight
of that ascendant star of fortune which once had shone
with so bright and steady a light, shrunk from e n tering t h e passes which had been the grave of so many
of their comrades. It was too true; the Sikhs were
tampering with their fidelity. Brhhman emissaries
were endeavouring t o swear them with holy water not
to advance at t h e word of the English commander.
Xightly meetings of delegates from the digerent
regiments were held, and perhaps we do not even
now know how great was the danger."
Before leaving KBbul, Eyre, through a strange
accident, recovered his friend Maule's Bible, on t h e
fly-leaf of which t h e owner had thus written, as if prophetically, two days before his murder : " I n case of
my death I wish this book to be sent to my mother,
or nearest living relative." No Muhammadan will
knowingly destroy the Word of God, and it is remarkable that Arthur Conolly's prayer-book, ;wherein
he had entered a touching record of his sufferings
and aspirations in the well at BukhiLra, was, after
the lapse of many years, left at the door of his
sister's house in London by a mysterious foreigner,
who simply left word that he came from Russia, but
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the pass; among them most conspicuous rode t h e
gallant Sale, with his long-lost wife and daughter by
his side.
On the 21st Bol10cl~~s
camp at KtLbul was reached,
where the Horse Artillery guns fired a salute i n honour.
of the event, and thus happily terminated the tragedy
of the KAbul insurrection.
The events of those days have still such a thrilling interest for British readers that we have been tempted t o
linger perhaps too long over that portion of EyreJs
career in connection with which his name first became
familiarly known. I t was his strange destiny t o
witness the "Alpha" and " Omega" of the downfall
of the old Sepoy army; for it is now generally admitted that the first seeds of the mutiny of 1857 w e r e

sown i n the Kfibul campaign. I n allusion to this,
Kaye, in his " Sepoy War," declares : " The charm of a
century of conquest was then broken. The Sepoy
regiments, no longer assured and fortified by the sight
of that ascendant star of fortune which once had shone
with so bright and steady a light, shrunk from entering the passes which had been the grave of so many
of their comrades. I t was too true; the Sikhs were
tampering with their fidelity. Brfihman emissaries
were endeavouring to swear them with holy water not
to advance at the word of the English commander.
Nightly meetings of delegates from the different
regiments were held, and perhaps we do not even
now know how great was the danger."
Before leaving K&bul, Eyre, through a strange
accident, recovered his friend MauleJs Bible, on the
fly-leaf of which the owner had thus written, as if prophetically, two days before his murder : " I n case of
my death I wish this book to be sent to my mother,
or nearest living relative."
No Muhammadan will
knowingly destroy the Word of God, and i t is remarkable that Arthur Conolly's prayer-book, [wherein
h e had entered a touching record of his sufferings
and aspirations in the well at Bukhitra, was, after
the lapse of many years, left at the door of his
sister's house in London by a mysterious foreigner,
who simply left word that he came from Russia, but
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of whom no trace could be discovered after a most
diligent search.
Returning with Pollock's force to India, Eyre was
posted to the new troop of Horse Artillery, raised to
replace the old first troop, first brigade, which had
perished in the Afghjn passes, and with whose
services at Kgbul he had been so intimately associated.
I n his public report to the commandant of the Artillery regiment, Eyre, speaking of the siege, thus
writes : '' The gunners, from first to last, never once
partook of a full meal or obtained their natural rest:
of the hardships and privations undergone it would
be difficult to convey an adequate idea. Throughout
the last struggle all eye-witnesses concur in testifying
to their stubborn valour."
[The Editor may be pardoned for concluding this
brief sketch of the captivity, by here extracting from
the regimental orders of the commandant of the artillery the opinion expressed by that officer of the conduct
of the men of that corps employed in Xhbul.]
EXTRACT
FROM

R E ~ I M E N T A L ORDERS
BY

BRIGADIER
W.

H. L. FRITH,COMMANDANT
OB ARTILLERY,dated
10th March 1843.

THEtotal absence of official details on the subject has
hitherto prevented the Commandant from noticing the
conduct of the late 1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Ar-
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tillery during the insurrection a t and disastrous retreat
from Ktibul ; he now publishes extracts from a letter
received yesterday from Lieutenant V. Eyre, late Commissary of Ordaance. as a public record of the high
state of discipline and determined bravery exhibited
by t h i s gallant and devoted Qoop on all occasions.
It will always b e a subject of sincere gratification
t o reflect on the noble manner in which they sustained
the character of the corps under the severest trials, and
in a climate that multiplied a n hundred-fold the
difficulties with which they had to contend, whilst
their fate i n the unequal struggle demands the deepest
sympathy.
Extract from a letter from Lieutenant V. Eyre,
late Commissary of Ordnance i n Ktibul, to Captain
E. Buckle, Assistant Adjutant-General, Artillery :"It is necessary to premise, that at the commencement of the rebellion on the 2nd November 1841, a portion of General Elphinstone's force was sent to occupy
the Bala Hissar, and the remainder was concentrated in
the cantonment; to the former, Captain Nichol and
Lieutenant Stewart were attached with four guns,
and t o the latter Brevet-Captain W d e r , with two guns.
On the 9th of November, Captain Nichol, by order
of t h e General, strengthened Captain Waller's detachment with an additional gun, and the troop thus
became equally divided.
c c The first active service performed in the field by
the Horse Artillery was on the afternoon of the 3rd of
November, when a sally was made under Major S W ~ Y ~ ~ J

.
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tillery during the insurrection at and disastrous retreat
from KAbul; he now publishes extracts from a letter
received yesterday from Lieutenant V. Eyre, late Commissary of Ordnance. as a public record of the high
state of discipline and determined bravery exhibited
by this gallant and devoted Qoop on all occasions.
It will always be a subject of sincere gratification
t o reflect on the noble manner in which they sustained
the character of the corps under the severest trials, and
in a climate that multiplied an hundred-fold the
difficulties with which they had to contend, whilst
their fate in the unequal struggle demands the deepest
sympathy.
Extract from a letter from Lieutenant V. Eyre,
late Commissary of Ordnance in Khbul, to Captain
E. Buckle, -4ssistant Adjutallt-General, Artillery :" It is necessary to premise, that at the commencement of the rebellion on the 2nd November 1841, a portion of General ElphinstoneJs force was sent to occupy
the Bala Hissar, and the remainder was concentrated in
the cantonment; to the former, Captain Nichol and
Lieutenant Stewart were attached with four guns,
andto the latter Brevet-Captain Waller, with two guns.
On the 9th of November, Captain Nichol, by order
of the General, strengthened Captain Waller's detachment with an additional gun, and the troop thus
became equally divided.
((Thefirst active service performed in the field by
the Horse Artillery was on the afternoon of the 3rd of
November, when a sally was made under Major Saayne,
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5th Native Infantry, and a body of the enemy was
defeated principally by the fire of the guns. On this
occasion Captain Waller was severely wounded, and
from that date up to the 22nd of November, when I
was myself disabled, the virtual command of the Horse
Artillery detachment in the cantonment devolved upon
me; during this period several severe actions took place
with the enemy, in all of which our arms were more
or less successful. One fort was breached and taken
by assault, another was taken by a coup de main, and,
besides several sorties of minor importance, two great
actions were fought on the 10th and 13th of November
against the collective forces of the enemy, amounting
on each occasion to several thousands of horse and foot, .
in whicl.1 our side mas completely triumphant, and
of their guns were captured.
"Provisions, of which there had been from the
beginning an alarming scarcity, soon began entirely
to fail. The cold of winter set in with unusual rigour,
the defence of our long line of low ramparts grievously
harassed the troops, the g m s placed in battery at the
several angles of the cantonment required the constant
'attendance of the Artillerymen by day and night.
"The gunners, from first to last, never once partook
of a full meal, or obtained their natural rest ; of the
hardships and privatious undergone it
be difficult
to convey an adequate idea.
"During the whole of this most trying period, the
behaviour of the Horse Artillerymen was distinguished
a degree of patience, cheerfulness, zeal, and forti-

. THE

i

!

i

I

,
I

ARTILLERY AT KABUL.

tude, that excited the unbounded admiration of every
e ~ e - ~ i t ~ e sand
s , filled the heart of every artillery
officer with pride and delight.
cc O n the 23rd November, Brigadier Shelton sallied
f o r t h with about seven hundred bayonets and one gun,
w h i c h (there being no artillery officer available) was
commanded by Sergeant Mulhall. A n immense army
of Afghans poured forth t o battle, and a terrible
Sergeant Mulhall and his brave gun's
conflict
c r e w Committed great havoc amid the dense masses
of t h e enemy, exhibiting a very high degree of ~r0fes.m
sional skill ;but their efforts, though partially successf~~l,
w e r e imdEectual to repel the overwhelming hosts of
assailants. Galled by the fatal fire of Afghan rifles,
the infantry lost heart and Red, abandoning our gun to
its fate; staunch t o the last, the Artillerymen stood
by their charge until they were nearly all exterminated,
Sergeant Mulhall himself escaping by a miracle, with
his clothes perforated with bullets i n divers placesreport of this day's operations i n the
cc Inthe
field, Brigadier Shelton did ample justice t o the Axtillery sergeant and his devoted little detachment, but
the document has, I fear, been lost.
cc On the 14th December,
a treaty h a ~ n gbeen
entered upon, our troops were withdrawn from the
Bala Hissay, and Captain Nichol, on arriving in cantonmenis, requested me t o send i n a report of the
conduct of his men, which 1 did, but that also was
subsequently lost on the retreat.
cc That the Horse Artillery sustained their high fame
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to fail. The cold of winter set i n with unusual rigour,
the defence of our long line of low ramparts grievously
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tude, that excited the unbounded admiration of eveiy
eye-witness, and filled the heart of every artillery
officer with pride and delight.
"On the 23rd November, Brigadier Shelton sallied
forth with about seven hund~edbayonets and one gun,
which (there being no artillery officer available) was
commanded by Sergeant Mulhall. An immense army
of Afghans poured forth to battle, and a terrible
conflict ensued. Sergeant Mulhall and his brave gun's
crew committed great havoc amid the dense masses
of the enemy, exhibiting a very high degree of profes..
sional skill ;but their efforts, though partially successful,
were ineffectual to repel the overwhelming hosts of
assailants. Galled by the fatal fire of Afghan rifles,
the infantry lost heart and fled, abandoning our gun to
its fate; staunch to the last, the Axtillerymen stood
by their charge until they were nearly all exterminated,
Sergeant Mulhall himself escaping by a miracle, with
his clothes perforated with bullets in divers places.
cr I n the public report of this day's operations in the
field, Brigadier Shelton did ample justice to the Artillery Sergeant and his devoted little detachment, but
the document has, I fear, been lost.
'(On the 14th December, a treaty having been
entered upon, our troops were withdrawn from the
Bala Hissar, and Captain Nichol, on arriving in cantonments, requested me to send in a report of the *
conduct of his men, which I did, but that also was
subsequently lost on the retreat.
cc That the Horse Artillery sustained their high fame
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to the last is well known. On the retreat of the army
from Kfibul, owing to the starved condition of the
horses, which disabled them from pulling the guns
through the deep snow and rugged mountain-passes,
the guns were, one by one, spiked and abandoned.
In the Khurd-Ktibul pass a whole gun's crew perished
rather than desert their charge. On nearing Jagdallak
some Horse Artillerymen, headed by Captairl Nichol,
acting as Dragoons, charged and routed a party of the
enemy's cavalry.
"Throughout the last struggle up to GandAmak
all eye-witnesses concur in testifying to their stubborn
valour. They died like true soldiers, selling their lives
dearly.
"Only three men escaped with life, being taken
prisoners. Two others, who were left behind with the
detachment of wounded at K&bul, also survived.
I
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(True Copy.)

"E. BUCKLE,A.A.G.A."
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A handsome Monument has been erected by the
Artillery Corps at Durn Durn to the memory of all those
of the Service who fell in Afghanistan, with the
inscription which appears on the next page :-

315

Sacred to the
of Memory
CAPTAINTHOMAS
NICHOL,
LIEUTENANT
CHAELESSTEWART,
q

SERGEANT
MULHALL,
and the
Non-commissioned Officers and Men of the
1 s t T'roop, 1 s t Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery,
who fell in the performance of their duty
during t h e insurrection at, and retreat from, Cabd,
in the Months of
November and December 1841,
and
January 1842,
o n which occasion of unprecedented trial
22 Officers and Men
upheld
in the"most noble manner
the character of the Regiment to which they belonged.
This gallant band formed the oldest Troop in the
BENGALAXTILLERY.
It had previously been distinguished
on numerous occasions,
having served
in Egypt, in the Maratta and Nepaul Wars,
and in Ava.
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Sacred to the
of Memory

and the
Non-commissioned Officers and Men of the
1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery,
who fell in the performance of their duty
during the insurrection at, and retreat from, Cabul,
in the Months of
November and December 1841,
and
January 1842,
on which occasion of unprecedented trial
22 Officers and Men
upheld
in the most noble manner
the character of the Regimeut to which they belonged.
This gallant band formed the oldest Troop in the
BENG.AL
AKTILLERY.
It had previously been distinguished
on numerous occasions,
having served
in Egypt, in the Maratta and Nepaul Wars,
and in Ava.
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Sacred
also to the Memory of
who perished
in command of a detail of Shah ShoojaJs mountain train,
and whose gallant conduct emulated that
of his comrades.
Also
to the Memory of
LIEUTENANT
RICHARD
MAULE,
Artille~y,
who mas killed at the outbreak of the
Affghalz insurrection,
November 1841,
and likevise of
LIEUTENANT
A. CHRISTIE,of the same Regiment,
killed in the Kyber Pass,
on the return of the victorious army
under the command of
MAJOR-GENER-4L
SIR GEORGE
POLLOCK,
G.G.B., &c.
of the
BENGAL
ARTILLERY.
As a Tribute of
Admiration, Regard, and Respect,
This Monument
is erected by the
ARTILLERY
REGIMENT.
Fortis cadere eedere %onpotest.

APPENDICES.

LETTER
FROY CAPTAIN
@OLIN . & , ~ A C ~ N Z I ETO
LIEUTENANT
V. EYRE.

I

(2e;ferrecl to at pcqe 89.)

MY

I

I

J

EYRE,
As you wish for an accoulzt of the manner in
which P was besieged i n the hcla-i-Nishan Khan, in
the breaking out of the Gab~11insurrection, I comply,
although unwilling to appear so often in the first
person, as I necessarily must, iii order to give you a
clear idea of the fatal n a t u ~ eof the blunder committed,
in n o t sending me assistance from cantonments. I
have by me a copy of some notes, wliich I made at the
request of the late Major Tilain, then hide-de-Canlp
to our lamented chief, General Elphinstone. You are
aware that the fort, in which I chanced to be liting,
contained the godowi~sof the Shah's commissariat;
and that in one part the quarters of Rrigaclirr
*nquetil vere situated. For tlre defence of tllese,
a guard of one hauildar, two naicks, and eighteel1
DEAR
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Sacred
also to the Memory of
LIEUT. CRARLES
ALEXANIDEH.
GREEN,
B.A.,
who perished
in command of a detail of Shah Shooja'a mountain train,
and whose gallant conduct emulated that
of his comrades.
Also
to the Memory of
LIEUTBNANT
R I C H A ~MAULE,
D
htillel.y,
who was killed at the outbreak of the
Affghan insurrection,
,
November 1841,
and likevise of
LIEUTENANT
A. CHRISTIE,of the same Regiment,
killed in the Kyber Pass,
on the return of the victorious army
under the command of
MAJOR-GENERBL
SIRGEORGE
POLLOCK,
G.C.B., kc.
of the
BENGAL
ARTILLERY.
As a Tribute of
Admiration, Regard, and Respect,
This Monument
is erected by the
ARTILLERY
REGIMENT.
Fortis cadere cedera non potest.
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TO
LETTERFROM CAPTAINCOLINMACRENZIE
LIEUTENANT
V. EYRE.

(Referred t o at pctge 88.)

MY DEAR EYRE,

1

As you wish for an account of the manner in
which I mas besieged in the Bela-i-Nishan Khan, in
the breaking out of the Cabul insurrection, I comply,
although unwilling to appear so often in the first
person, as I necessarily must, in order to give you a
clear idea of the fatal nature of the ldunder committed,
in not sending me assistance from cantonments. I
have by me a copy of some notes, which I made at the
request of the late Major Thnin, then Aide-de-camp
to our lamented chief, General Elphinstone. You are
aware that the fort, in which I chanced to be living,
contained the godoms of the Shah's commissariat;
and that in one part the quarters of Brigadier
Anquetil were situated. For the defence of these,
a guard of one havildar, two naicks, and eighteen

.
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sepoys had been assigned. The fort itself lies between
that quarter of Cabul called the Moorad Khanah and
its most western suburb, the Deh-i-Affghan. The
Cabul river flows between the fort and the Kuzzilbash
quarter (the Chundoul), to the south. Close to it, to
the north, divided by a narrow road and a high wall,
is a large grove of mulberry trees, known by the namc
of the Yaboo Khanah, i n which thc Yaboos of the
Shah's commissariat used to be kept; but from which
towards the end of October, 1841, they had fortunately been removed into camp at Seeah Sung. I n
this Yaboo Khanah was a guard of six suwars ; and, b j
chance, a detachment of a jemadar and ninety-five rucu
of Captain Ferris's Juzailchees ; as also another of the
Shah's sappers, consisting of one jemadar and fiftynine men, including havildars and naieks. These last
were encumbered with a host of women and childreu.
brought up from their native country with them by
the express orders of the Supreme Government. The
house of Captain Troup, late Brigade-Major of the
Shah's force, built so as to be capable of a tolera1.l~
defence, is about forty yards to the east of the f o ~ t ,
across a narrow canal ; and the large tower, occupied
by the late Captain Trevor and his family, lies across tIlc
river to the south-east, distant about seven hundrcd
yards. This also, at the tirne, mas perfectly defensible.
You will easily perceive that, with these posts in oul.
possession, and commanding, as we did, the ope11
space between us, it was IL point of importance to
maintain our ground until the arrival of what we
hourly expected, a regiment from the cantonment,

whose presence would have immediately decided the
wavering Kuzzilbashes in our favour, and would have
cut off all communication between the insurgent
populatioll of Deb-i-Affghan and their rascally brethren
in the Moorad Khanah. Spreading far beyond the
Yahoo Khanah, in the direction of cantonments, and
circling round the west of the fort down to the river's
edge, are walled gardens and groves, which afford
excellent cover to a lurking enemy, who were enabled
t o come, without much danger, to within a few yards
of m y defences.
Early on the morning of the 2nd of November, 1841,
as I was preparing to go into cantonments with my
baggage, intending to accompany the Envoy on the
it was reported to me
following day down to Pesha~~rur,
that an alarming riot had taken place in the town.
Brigadier Anquetil and Captain Troup had gone O L I ~
on their usual morning ride, not supposing the disturbance was of the importance it has since proved to
be. I waited for the return of the above two officers
for about an hour, previous to adopting decided measures, either f o r defence or retreat,-at the same time
causing all the guards to stand to their arms. Suddenly a naked man stood before me, covered with
blood, from two deep sabre-cuts in the head, arid five
musket-shots in the arm and body. H e roved to be
a suwar of Sir W. Macnaghten, who had been sent
with a message to Captain Trevor, but who had been
intercepted by the insurgents. This being rather a
strong hint as to how matters were going on, 1immediately gave orders for all the gates to be secured, and
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whose presence would have immediately decided the
wavering Kuzzilbashes in our favour, and would have
cut off all communication between the insurgent
population of Deh-i-Affghan and their rascally brethren
in the Moorad Khanah. Spreading far beyond the
Yaboo Khanah, in the direction of cantonments, and
circling round the west of the fort down to the river's
edge, are walled gardens and groves, which afford
excellent cover to a lurking enemy, who were enabled
to come, without much danger, to within a few yards
of my defences.
Early on the morning of the 2nd of November, 1841,
as I was preparing to go into cantonments with my
baggage, intending to accompany the Envoy on the
following day down to Peshalvur, it was reported to me
that an alarming riot had taken place in the town.
Brigadier Anquetil and Captain Troup had gone out
on their usual morning ride, not supposing the disturbance was of the importance it has since proved to
be. I waited for the return of the above two officers
for about an hour, previous to adopting decided measures, either for defence or retreat,-at the same time
causing all the guards to stand to their arms. Suddenly a naked man stood before me, covered with
blood, from two deep sabre-cuts in the head, arid five
musket-shots in the arm and body. He proved to be
a suwar of Sir W. Macnaghten, who had been sent
with a message to Captain Trevor, but who had been
intercepted by the insurgents. This being rather a
strong hint as to how matters were going on, I immediately gave orders for all the gates to be secured, and
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personally snperintended the removal of the detacllments in the Yaboo Khanah, with their wives and
families, into the fort. At the same time I caused
loop-holes to be bored i n the upper walls of Captain
Troup's house, i n which were a naick and ten sepoys.
Whilst so employed, the armed population of ID&-iAffghan came pouring down through the gardens, mld
commenced firing on us. I threw out slrimishers;
but, in order to save the helpless followers, v e were
obliged t o abandon the tents and baggage. In covering the retreat, one of my men was ldlcd, a d one
badly wounded; while about five of the enemy wcre
lcilled. The whole of the gardens were then occupicd

British would justqy them in openly
taking our part .*
Trevor despatched my requisition, for ammunition
at least, if not for more effectualassistance, into cantonments, where it arrived safely, the distance not being
more t h a n one mile and a half. Shortly after, our
spirits were raised by the apparent approach of a heavy
cannonade, and volleys of musketry from tile direction
of t h e Moorad Khanah, and by the flight throiigh the
gardens of the multitudes who were assailing me,
towards Deh-i-Affghan, from which quarter crowds of
women and children began to ascend the hill, evidently
i n expectation of a n assault from our soldiery. But
these cheering sounds died away, and it was in vain
that we strained our eyes, looking for the glittering
bayonets through the trees, and round the corners of
t h e principal street leading from cantonments. My
besiegers swarmed back with shouts, and it required
much exertion on my part to prevent despondency

on the part of the

ly ~ a t c h e d ,that one of

ecided rneusrcres

* During the expedition into Kohistan, under General M'Caskill,
I accompanied it, having been placed by General Pollock in charge
of Shahzadee Shapoor and the Kuzzilbash camp. I n my frequent
communications with Khan Shereen Khan, some of the late Kuszilbash leaders, and with other chiefs of the Knzzilbash faction, all
t h e oircurnstances of the late insmrebtion were over and over
again recapiinlated, one and all declaring positively that the
slightest exhibition of cuergy on our part in the first instance, morc
especially in reinforcing my post and that of Trevor, wonld a t once
hove decided the Knzzilbashes, and all over whom they possessed
any influence, in our favour. Khan Shereen also confirmed the idea,
th& an offensive movement on the opposite side of the town by
Brigadier Shelton, had it been made in the early part of the fatal
2nd of November, wonld a t once have crushed the insurrection.
01
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amongst my people, which feeling had been strongly
excited by the confirmation of the rnmour of the murder
of Sir Alexander Burnes, his brother, and Captain
Broadfoot ; by the sight of the smoke from his burning
house; and by the intelligence that the treasury of
Captain Johnson, also i n the town, had been sackcd, and
the guard slain. I n the evening I servccl out provisions from the Governme~ltstores. The attacks continued at intervals during the night, and we had most
disagreeable suspicions that the enemy were uudermining our north-west tower, or bastion. At early
dawn we sallied out to ascertain this, but were driven
in again, after finding our apprehensions too well
verified. There is much dead ground about all Affghan
forts, on which it is impossible to bring musketry t o
bear; and the towers can always be undermined, in
the absence of hand-grenades on the part of t h e besieged. To meet this attempt, we sunk a shaft inside
the ground-floor of the tower, and I placed four resolute
men on the brink, ready to shoot the first man who
should enter. The extent of the fort requirecl all my
men t o be on duty at the same time, and some now
began t o wax weary. The cheerfulness of the reinainder was not improved by the incessant howling of
the women over the dead and dying, As a trait indicative of the character of the Affghan juzailchees, I
lnust mention, that whenever they could snatch five
minutes to refresh themselves with a pipe, one or
other of them would twang a sort of rude guitar? as an
accompaniment to some martial song, which, mingling
with the above notes of war, sounded very strangely.

APPEKDIX A.

I n t h e middle of this day (3rd November), to my
great grief, I saw the enemy enter Captain Trevor's
tower; and a report was brought to us by two of his
servants, who escaped across the river, that he and his
family h a d all been killed, which, though it afterwards
proved t o be untrue, had a bad effect on my men,
whose ammunition had now become very scarce, in
was evident from our ramparts; and the enemy, taking
possession of the top, which overlooked my defences,
pitched their balls from their large juzails with such
accuracy, as to clear my western face of defenders;
l y crawling on my hands and knees
and it was o ~ ~by
u p a small flight of steps, and whisking suddenly
through the door, that I could ever visit the tower
that had been undermined. The guard from Captain
Troup's house now clamoured for admittance into the
fort; and as Mr. Fallon, that gentleman's writer,
called out to me that they were ready to abandon their
post, I let them in, barricading my own door with sacks
of flour. Against the door and small wicket, on Brigadier Anquetil's side, I had already piled heaps of
stones and large timbers.
I n t h e afternoon the enemy brought down a large
wau-piece against us, the balls from which shook the
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:~rnongstmy pcopIe, which feeling had been strongly
excited by the confirmation of the rnmour of the murder
of Sir Alcsa~zder Burnes, his brother, and Captain
t3roadfoot ; by the sight of the smoke from his burnipg
lionse; ancl by the iritelligence that the treasury of
Captain .J'otinsort, also in the town, had been sacked, and
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I n the middle of this day (3rd November), t o my
great grief, I saw the enemy enter Captain Trevor's
tower; and a report was brought to us by two of his
servants, who escaped across the river, that he and his
family had all been killed, which, though it afterwards
proved to be untrue, had a bad effect on my men,
whose ammunition had now become very scarce, in
spite of my having husbanded it with the greatest care.
The scene of plunder now going on in Trevor's house
was evident from our ramparts; and the enemy, taking
possession of the top, which overlooked my defences,
pitched their balls from their large juzails with such
accuracy, as to clear my western face of defenders ;
arid i t was only by crawling on my hands and knees
up a small flight of steps, and whisking suddenly
through the door, that I could ever visit the tower
that had been undermined. The guard from Captain
Troup's house now clamoured for admittance into the
fort; and as Mr. Pallon, that gentleman's writer,
called out to me that they were ready to abandon their
post, I let them in, barricading my own door with sacks
of flour. Against the door and small wicket, on Brigadier AnquetilJs side, I had already piled heaps of
stones and large timbers.
In the afternoon the enemy brought down a large
wall-piece against us, the balls from which shook the
upper walls of one of our towers, alarming the juzailchees much, who dread the effect of any species of
ordnance. This disposition to despair was increased
by the utter failure of ammunition, and by the Affghans
bringing down quantities of fire-wood and long poles
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with combustible matter at the ends, which they deposited under the walls of the Yaboo Khanah, i n readiness t o burn down my door. Some suwars who were
stationed on Brigadier Anqueti17s side of the fort, now
broke into a sort of half-mutiny, and began pulling
down the ,barricade against his gate, to endeavour to
save themselves by the speed of their horses. This
I quelled, by going down amongst them with a doublebarrelled gun, and threatening to shoot the first man
who should disobey my orders. I n the evening I was
quite exhausted, as were my people; having by that
time been fighting and working for nearly forty hours
without rest. Indeed, on my part, it had beenswithout refreshment, as eating was impossible from excitcment and weariness; and my absence for five minutes
a t a time from any part of the works disheartened tlle
fighting men. Added to this, my wounded were
dying for want of medical aid. I therefore yielded
t o the representations of my juzailchee jemadar, and
of Mr. Fallon, from both of whom I received valuable
assistance during the whole affair, and prepared fi)r
a retreat to cantonments. This pcre determined should
take place during the early part of the night, a t which
time, it being then the fast of the Bamazan, we calculated the enemy would be at their principal meal. I
ordered the juzailchees to lead, and to answer all
questions in case of encountering a post of the enemy.
The wounded were placed on what yaboos I possessed,
abandoning everything in the shape of baggage ;these,
with the women and children, followed next in order ;
and I myself proposed to bring up the rear with my
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few regulars, who, I fondly imagined, would stick by
me in case of a hot pursuit. We were to avoid the
town, and to follow the course of the small canal above
mentioned, and afterwards to strike off by lanes, and
through some fields, in the direction of cantonments.
A night retreat is generally disastrous, and this proved
no exception to the general rule ; but, notwithstanding
my strict order that all baggage should be left behind,
it being very dark, many of the poor women contrived
to slip out with loads of their little property on their
shoulders, making their children walk, whose cries
added t o the confusion and to the danger of discovery.
On going among the women to see that my orders
for leaving all their property were obeyed, a young
Ghoorka girl of 16 or 13, who had girded up her loins
and stuck a sword into her kummerbund, came to me,.
and throwing all that she possessed at my feet, said,
"Sahib ! you are right; life is better than property."
She was a beautiful creature, with fair complexion
and large dark eyes, and, as.she stood there with her
garments swathed around her, leaving her limbs free,
she was a picture full of life, spirit, and energy. I
never saw her afterwards ;and fear she was either killed
or taken prisoner on the night march.
Before we had proceeded half a mile, the rear
missed the advance, upon whom a post of the enem
had begun to fire. All my regulars had crept ah
with the juzailchees, and 1found myself alone wi
chuprassee and two suwars, in the midst of a help
and wailing crowd of women and children. Rid
on by myself along a narrow lane, to try and pick
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with combustible matter at the ends, which they deposited under the walls of the Yaboo Khanah, in readiness t o burn down my door. Some suwars who were
stationed on Brigadier AnquetilJs side of the fort, now
broke into a sort of half-mutiny, and began pulling
down the .barricade against his gate, to endeavour to
save themselves by the speed of their horses. This
I quelled, by going down amongst them with a doublebarrelled gun, and threatening to shoot the first man
who should disobey my orders. I n the evening I was

from any part of the works disheartened the

whole affair, and prepared for
nts. This we determined should
early part of the night, at which
fast of the Ramazan, we calcu-

ing in the shape of baggage; these,
nd children, followed next in orcler ;
posed to bring up the rear with my

1i
1
i

i

1

I

APPENDIX A.

325

few regulars, who, I fondly imagined, would stick by
me in case of a hot pursuit. We were to avoid the
town, and to follow the course of the small canal above
mentioned, and afterwards to strike off by lanes, and
through some fields, in the direction of cantonments.
A night retreat is generally disastrous, and this proved
no exception to the general rule ; but, notwithstanding
my strict order that all baggage should be left behind,
it being very dark, many of the poor women contrived
to slip out with loads of their little property on their
shoulders, making their children walk, whose cries
added to the confusion and to the danger of discovery.
On going among the women to see that my orders
for leaving all their property were obeyed, a young
Ghoorka girl of 16 or 18, who had girded up her loins
and stuck a sword into her lrummerbnnd, came to me,
and throwing all that she possessed at my feet, said,
" Sahib ! you are right; life is better than property."
She was a beautiful creature, with fair complexion
and large dark eyes, and, as she stood there with her
garments swathed around her, leaving her limbs free,
she was a picture full of life, spirit, and energy. I
never saw her afterwards ; and fear she was either killed
or taken prisoner on the night march.
Before we had proceeded half a mile, the rear
missed the advance, upon whom a post of the enemy
had begun to fire. All my regulars had crept ahead
with the juzailchees, and I found myself alone with a
chuprassee and two suwars, in the midst of a helpless
and wailing crowd of women and children. Riding
on by myself along a narrow lane, to try and pick out
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the road, I found myself suddenly surrounded by a
party of Affghans, whom at first I took to be my own
juzailchees, and spoke to them as such. They quickly
undeceived me, however, by crying out, "Peringhee
hust," '(Here is an European," and attacking me with
swords and knives. Spurring my horse violently, I
wheeled round, cutting from right to left, for I, fortunately, had my own sword drawn previous t o the
surprise. My blows, by God's mercy, parried the
greater part of theirs, and I was lucky enough to cut
of£ the hand of my most outrageous assailant. I n
short, after a desperate struggle, during which I received two slight sabre-cuts, and a blow on the back
of my head from a fellow, whose sword turned in his
hand, which knocked me half off my horse, I escaped
out of the crush, passing unhurt through two volleys
of musketry from the whole picket, which, by that
time, had become alarmed and had turned out. They
pursued me; bnt I soon distanced them, crossing
several fields at speed, and gaining a road which I
perceived led round the western end of the Shah's
garden. Proceeding cautiously along, to my horror,
I perceived my path again blocked up by a dense
body of Afghans. Retreat was impossible; so, putting m y trust in God, I charged into the midst of
them, hoping that the weight of my horse would clear
my way for me, and reserving my sword-cut for the
last struggle. It was well that I did so, for by t h e
time I had knocked over some twenty fellows, I found
that they were my own juzailchees. If you ever experienced sudden relief from a hideous nightmare,

You may imagine my feelings for the moment. With
these worthies, after wandering about for some time,
and passing unchallenged by a sleepy post of the
enemy, I reached the cantonments. During the night
many stragglers of my party, principally followers,
dropped in. During the whole business, from first to
last, including the retreat, I had under a dozen killed,
and about half that amount wounded, nearly half
the former being followers; whereas about thirty of
the enemy had bitten the dust, and gone to their place.
I cannot close this letter to you without remarking
that, amongst other lamentable errors which led to ow
heavy downfall, that of omitting in the first instance
to strengthen my post was, next to SheltonJs refusal
to pour his brigade into the town, while the rioters
yet amounted to barely two hundred men, the g r e ~ t s t .
But the whole blame cannot, in this paiticular in-

themselves to me rem
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the road, I found myself suddenly surrounded by a
party of Affghans, whom at first I took to be my own
juzdlchees, and spoke t o them as such. They quickly
undeceived me, however, by crying out, " Feringhee
hust," "Here is an European," and attacking me with
slvords and knives. S p m i n g my horse violently, I
wheeled round, cutting from right to left, for I, faytunately, had my own sword drawn previous t o the
surprise. My blows,
God's mercy, parried the
greater part of theirs, and I was lucky enough to cut
off the hand of my most outrageous assailant. In
short, after a desperate struggle, during which I received two slight sabre-cuts, and a blow on the back
of my head from a fellow, whose sword turned i n hi5
hand, which knocked me half off my horse, I escaped
out of the crush, passing unhurt through two volleys
of musketry from the whole picket, which, by that
time, had become alarmed and had t m e d out. They
pursued me; bnt I soon distanced them, crossing
several fields at speed, and gaining a road which I
perceived led round the western end of the Shah's
prden. Proceeding cautiously along, to my horror,
1 perceived my path again blocked up by a dense
body of Afghans. Retreat was imposs~ble; so, p u t ting my trust i n God, I charged into the midst of
them, hoping that the weight of m y horse would clear
"'Y w q for me, and reserving my sword-cut f o r t h e
last struggle. I t was well that I did so, for b y t h e
time I Lad knocked over some twenty fellows, I found
that they were my o m juzailchees. If you ever ex'eneed sudden relief from a hideous nightmare,
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you may imagine my feelings for the moment. With
these worthies, after wandering about for some time,
and passing unchallenged by a sleepy post of the
enemy, I reached the cantonments. During the night
many stragglers of my party, principally followers,
dropped in. During the whole business, from first to
last, including the retreat, I had under a dozen killed,
and about half that amount wounded, nearly half
the former being followers; whereas about thirty of
the enemy had bitten the dust, and gone to their place.
I cannot close this letter to you without remarking
that, amongst other lamentable errors which led to our
heavy downfall, that of omitting in the first instance
to strengthen my post was, next to SheltonJs refusal
t o pour his brigade into the town, while the rioters
yet amounted to barely two hundred men, the greatest.
But the whole blame cannot, in this particular instance, be attributed t o our poor friend General
Elphinstone. He had not been sufficiently informed
as to the importance of my position, nor as to the
facdity with which a strong reinforcement could have
reached me. That he was specially anxious personany
as to my safety there could be no doubt, as was shown
by the warmth of his reception of me.
I need not remind you of the devoted heroism displayed tlnoughout the siege by Hussain Khan, the
juzailchee jemadar, and the handful of brave men
who accompanied him, and who personally attaching
themselves to me remained under my command to
the last. Numbers of them fell ; others were disabled;
a few departed t o t h e k own homes on the day when
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I was taken prisoner and Sir W. Macnaghten was
murdered ; and, I believe, nearly the sole survivors
are some ten or fifteen men, who, with their brave
leader, Hussain Khan, are now with us in camp.
These proceed with the rest of the juzailchee corps
under Captain Ferris to Ferozepore, where, we hear,
ihey are to be disbanded, and sent back to their own
country, to be destroyed by their blood-thirsty countrymen as a reward for their fidelity to us ; and yet
these were the men wl~o,during the period I was beleaguered in the fort of Nishan Khan, at a time when
I was quite unlrnown t o them, not only refused to
listen t o the repeated propositions of the Affghans outside t o deliver me up to their vengeance, their own
safety being thereby insured, but who, during the
siege of cantonments, laughed to scorn the most
tempting offers on the part of AmeenooIah Khan,
Mahorned Alcbar, and other Affghan chiefs, t o induck
them t o join the general cause of Islam against the
Kaffirs, invariably bringing the letters, in which they
were conveyed, for my inspection and perusal.*
Yours very sincerely,
C. MACKENZIE.

Camp, Rawul Pindee,
En route to Ferozepore, Nov.19, li 84.2.

* They were disbanded a t Jhelum, in the Punjab, each of the old
soldiers receiving a donation of twelve months' pay, and the rest s,
,patuity in proportion to the length of their services, with which
they a11 seemed very well satislied.-V. X.
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Buddeeabad.
Sl~,--With the deepest regret, I have the honour to
forward, for the information of the Right Honourable
the Governor-General in Council, the annexed memorandum of occurrences preceding and during the
insurrection at Cabul, up to this date.
The state of my health and mental sufferings previous to, and consequent on, the unfortunate occurrences, render me little competent to furnish such
complete information as I might have done, had it not
been for the total destruction of my entire staff and
all official documents and memoranda; and I have
only been able to remedy the deficiency through the
kid
of Major Pottinger and Captain Lawrence, n~~having aided me with facts and dates, I tmst,
however meage the account may be, that its tenor is,
upon the whole, perfectly correct.
I beg to be allowed to express my sense of the
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gallant manner in which the various detachments sent
out were led by Brigadier Shelton, and of the invariably noble conduct of the officers on those occasions, particularly of those who fell leading their men;
viz. Colonel Mackrell, Captains Swayne, Robinson,
MCCrea, and Lieutenant Raban, Her Majesty's 44th
Foot; Colonel Oliver and Captain Macintosh, 5th
Native Infqntry ; Captain Westmacott and Lieutenant
Gordon, 37th Native Infantry ; Captain Walker, 4th
Local Worse, and Lieutenant Laing, 27th Native
Infantry.
I hope I may also be permitted to record my sense of
the zeal and exertions of my lamented Aide-de-camp
Major Thain,'and my acting Quartermaster-General Captain Paton, both of whom were severely wounded, as also
Captain Grant, Assistant Adjutant-Generd, and my
Aide-de-camp Captain Airey. I had inadvertently
omitted Captain Bellew, Assistant QuartermasterGeneral, who, at the storm of the Rika-bashee and
Mahomed SherreePs fort, evinced the greatest gallantry
and volunteered to carry the powder-bags.
From Brigadier Anquetil, commanding the Shah's
force, and Colonel Chambers, commanding the cavalry,
I on all occasions received the most cordial assistance ;
and I take this opportunity to record the ever-ready
zeal and gallant conduct of Captain Troup, Major of
Brigade, Shah Shooja's force.
Throughout the whole siege the utmost zeal was
manifested by Lieutenant Sturt, Engineers, and by
Lieutenant V. Eyre, Commissary of Ordnance, who,
in consequence of the paucity of artillery officers, on

all occasions volunteered his services, and was unfortunately wounded.
Captain Colin Mackenzie, Assistant Political Agent,
Peshamr, volunteered to take charge of a body of Juzailchees, an$ was engaged in every affair, his and
their canduct being most conspicuous.
The manner in which the soldiers, European and
Native, bore up without a murmur against all privations
and very harassing duty, at a most inclement season,
was highly creditable to them, and more particularly
the Horse Artillery, who on all occasions upheld the
character of that distinguished corps.
Among the many valuable and promising officers
who have fallen in the recent retreat, I would especially mention Captains Skinner and Hay, 6lst and 35th
Native Infantry; Lieutenant Le Geyt, Shah's 2nd
Cavalry ;and Lieutenant Bird, Shah's 6th Infantry ;the
latter officer distinguished himself in the assault and
capture of the Rika-bashee Fort.
Of the surviving officers, my thanks are due to
Major Eldred Pottinger, C.B., Political Agent, and
Captain George St. P. Lawrence, Military Secretarp to
the late Envoy and Minister, for their cordial assistance a n d co-operation till the death of their lamented
chief ; and ' to Captain Anderson, Shah's 2nd Cavalry;
and Captain Bygrave, Paymaster, for their zeal and
alacrity in the performance of their duty, amid trials
and d.ifficulties almost unprecedented.
I have the honour, &c.
W. K, ELPHINSTONB.

a

f

To the Secretav to Government.

331

330

APPENDIX B.

APPENDIX B.

gallant manner in which the various detachments sent
out were led by Brigadier Shelton, and of the invariably noble conduct of the officers on those occasions, particularly of those who fell leading their men;
viz. Colonel Mackrell, Captains Swayne, Robinson,
BiI'Crea, and Lieutenant Raban, Her Majesty's 44th
Foot; Colonel Oliver and Captain Macintosh, 5th
Native 1nf:ntry; Captain Westmacott and Lieutenant
Gordon, 37th Native Infantry ; Captain Walker, 4th
Local Norse, and Lieutenant Laing, 27th Native
Infantry.
I hope I may also be permitted to record my sense of
the zeal and exertions of my lamented Aide-de-camp
Major Thain,'and my acting Quartermaster-General Captain Paton, both of whom were severely wounded, as also
Captain Grant, Assistant Adjutant-General, and my
Aide-de-camp Captain Airey. I had inadver.tently
omitted captain BeUew, Assistant QuartermasterGeneral, who, at the storm of the Rika-bashee and
Mahomed Shkeef's fort, evinced the greatest gallantry
and volunteered to carry the powder-bags.

gallant conduct of Captain Troup, Major of

,Shah ShoojaJs force.

ughout the whole siege the utmost zeal was
sted by Lieutenant Sturt, Engineers, and by

,

I,

all occasions volunteered his services, and was unfortunately wounded.
Captain Colin Mackenzie, Assistant Political Agent,
Peshawur, volunteered to take charge of a body of Juzailchees, and was engaged in every affair, his and
their conduct being most conspicuous.
The manner in which the soldiers, European and
Native, bore up without a murmur against all privations
and very harassing duty, at a most inclement season,
was highly creditable to them, and more particularly
the Horse Artillery, who on all occasions upheld the
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No. 2.
The following extracts from a memorandum of
Major-General Elphinstone deserve attention, both as
supporting some of the Author's statements, and
exhibiting in some degree the udortunate General's
disadvantages, as enumerated by himself.-EDITOR.

*

*

*

*

*

*

"I was unlucky in the state of my health; as,
during the whole siege, I was not able to move without difficulty, except on horseback, and then not
easily. On the evening of the 2nd) going round the
guards, I had a very severe fall, the horse falling on
me. I was obliged to return home therefore. I then
asked Captains Paton and Grant if they thought all had
been done, and told them to see that Brigadier Anquetil
made the arrangements in the Mission Compound;
and it was a great loss to me that, shortly aafter his
coming into cantonments, he was taken ill, by which I
was deprived of his assistance, which he would cordially
have afforded me. The extent of the cantonment-the
unfinished state of everything i n i t - i t s indefensibie
position, commanded as it was on every side-artitularly the facilities aforded for the a~proach of
matchlocks-added much to our dz$icuZties. The troops
were on half rations, and the whole of them on duty
every night, and often all day, from threatened attacks.
The want of artillery officers, notwithstanding Captain
(Lieutenant) Eyre's volunteering, Captain Waller being
wounded early in the business.-On the 9th, not finding myself equal to the duties, particularly a t night,
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when I could not get about on horseback, I recalled
Brigadier Shelton from the Bala Hissar. . . . .
I was unlucky, also, in not understanding the state of
things, and being wholly dependent on the Envoy and
others for information." - . . .
i

No. 3.
The passage next quoted clearly shows that it was in
obedience to the General's order that the married
officers, as well as their wives and children, resigned
themselves to Mahomed Akbar. This is, of course, a
point of peculiar interest to those officers, especially
as misrepresentation upon it has gone forth.EDITOR.
Extract from *a Memorandum by Major-General
'W. K. Elpkinstone, C.B., of the Events preceding
and during the Insurrection at Cabul.
"On the 9th (January) the march was ordered at
10 A.M., but, consequent on a message from the Sirdar, requesting us to halt till he could organize an
escort for us, and promising supplies and fire-wood, it
was countermanded. But a similar scene of confusion to
that of the day before had taken place, and it was
past mid-day before anything like order was restored.
rr Captain Skinner returned to the Sirdar, by whom
he was again sent back with a proposal that the married
people and their families should be made over to him,
promising honourable treatment to the ladies. I complied with his wish, being desirous to remove the ladies

--
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and children, after the horrors they had already witnessed, from the further dangers of a camp, and hoping
that, as from the very commencement of negotiations
the Sirdar had shown the greatest anxiety to have the
married people as hostages, this mark of trust might
elicit a corresponding feeling i n him.
"(Signed)

S

APPENDIX 6.

W. K. ELPEINSTONE,
" Major-General."

MEMORANDUM
of Released Captives who joined General
Pollock's camp at Ktibul in September 1842.
Officers
Soldiers
Civilians
.
Officers' Wives
Soldiers' Wives
Children
.

. 35

.

.
Total

.

.
2
.

51

.

2

10

. 22
. 122

Among the present survivors (besides the author) are
Lieutenant-General Sir George Lawrence, K.C.S.I.,
C.B., Lieutenant-General Colin Mackenzie, C.B., Lieutenant-General Sir I. Talbot Airey, K.C.B., MajorGeneral J. Haughton, C.S.I., Colonel G. Mein.
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